

# Undergraduate Journal of International Studies

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Beijing's Post-9/11  
Xinjiang Policy  
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the Nation-State, and the  
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Potable Water in Ibarra,  
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# Table of Contents

Beijing's Post-9/11 Xinjiang Policy.....	8
<i>Benjamin S. Piven</i>	
Off the Map and Into Uncharted Territory: A Review of the Dialectic, the Nation-State, and the Zapatistas .....	19
<i>Sarah E. Johnson</i>	
The Impact of World Literature in Secondary Schools in Oregon and Chile: A Comparative Case Study.....	34
<i>Annette McFarland</i>	
Modern Slavery in India .....	60
<i>Lain Heringman</i>	
Tómela con Confianza: EMAPA-I and the State of Potable Water in Ibarra, Ecuador .....	70
<i>Derek Andrew Reighard</i>	

# Beijing's Post-9/11 Xinjiang Policy

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*In August 2002, the US State Department added a Uighur separatist group based in China's Xinjiang region to its official terrorist watch list and China threw its weight behind the US-led War on Terror. Many experts, however, allege that China's counterterrorism efforts were not aimed at fighting terrorism but instead at destroying Uighur culture. In light of the August 2002 'internationalization' of the Xinjiang issue, do Beijing's policies and actions match up with international norms regarding human rights and rule of law? If claims of human rights abuses are true, was the August 2002 declaration actually counterproductive to US efforts to fight terrorism and its causes? This paper describes the basic dynamics at work on the ground in Xinjiang and details Beijing's counterterrorism campaign, ultimately seeking to place Beijing's behavior in its appropriate domestic and international context and assess prospects for the future.*

Contemporary debates surrounding the War on Terror essentially focus on the need to establish its limits. From disagreements within the international community on how to define the 'enemy,' to figuring out how best to engage that enemy, the unique circumstances of this 'war' have created many new ethical questions. Balancing national security with the obligation to ensure basic human rights has proven a difficult task for the world's most powerful nations. As the international community continues to wrestle with creating a common definition of terrorism, it has become increasingly clear that political and national agendas are immensely powerful in framing this important debate.

China's entry into the US-led War on Terror provides valuable insights into the complex relationship between national interest and international security. Prior to September 11, the homegrown separatist movement in China's Xinjiang province was a domestic problem that China sought to understate. The September 11 terrorist attacks and subsequent War on Terror, however, provided a rare opportunity for China to cast the Xinjiang issue in the emotive rhetoric of an international struggle against 'violent Islamic fundamentalism' in order to gain support for its counter-terrorism operations in the region. As China sought to 'internationalize' its own internal security issues, tensions between international expectations and Chinese national interests became apparent.

An independent nation until being annexed in 1949 by the People's Republic of China, Xinjiang has historically

been the seat of some of the most ardent resistance to Beijing's rule. Xinjiang is home to nearly 9 million Uighurs, an ethnic Muslim group with more ties to Central Asia and the Middle East than to the Han Chinese who increasingly dominate their cities. A Uighur separatist movement calling for the independence of "East Turkistan," as the region was formerly known, has used both peaceful and violent means to achieve its goal. Xinjiang possesses some of China's richest energy reserves and is also indispensable to Beijing's larger strategic goals, acting both as a buffer and a springboard for promoting China's interests in Central Asia. Maintaining stability in Xinjiang fits directly into Beijing's national political imperatives, which relate to ongoing sovereignty issues in Tibet, Taiwan, and other minor territorial disputes.<sup>1</sup>

In August 2002, the international tide turned in Beijing's favor when US Under Secretary of State Richard Armitage announced that the US government would recognize the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM), a shadowy Xinjiang separatist group, on its official list of terrorist groups. The UN later followed suit. While adding ETIM to the US list of international terrorist groups was less about freezing the financial assets of a suspected terrorist group and more about securing China's acquiescence to US military activities in Afghanistan, the Chinese government used the declaration as a mandate to begin crackdowns against destabilizing groups operating within Xinjiang.

Many NGOs and China experts have accused Beijing of

<sup>1</sup> China is engaged in territorial disputes with the governments of India, Taiwan, South Korea, Bhutan, Vietnam, Indonesia, Japan, Philippines, Malaysia and North Korea.

using the August 2002 declaration as a sort of ‘carte blanche’ to crack down on all expressions of dissent in Xinjiang, and at the same time making more unverified claims of direct links between Uighur separatists and well-known terrorist groups like Al Qaeda. According to many experts, President Bush’s proviso that China’s anti-terrorism campaign “not be used as an excuse to persecute minorities” went largely unheeded by Beijing, as it increasingly sought to root out dissent under the banner of promoting a ‘harmonious society’ and fighting the ‘three evils’ of separatism, extremism and terrorism.<sup>2</sup> As of 2004, the Chinese government had directly referenced the ETIM decision in every official communication on the Xinjiang issue in an effort to demonstrate that it had international support for its newest crackdown. Similarly, official statements made no reference to the caveat of the US declaration relating to the protection of ethnic minority groups.<sup>3</sup>

The implications of this seemingly minor event—the ‘internationalization’ of the Xinjiang issue by the ETIM announcement—are momentous, especially when viewed through the lens of Beijing’s traditional rejection of ‘foreign interference’ in its domestic issues. In petitioning the US and UN to add ETIM to the terrorist watch list, China acknowledged, implicitly, two important points. First, that it is engaged in fighting a type of conflict that has proliferated in the periphery of the post-Cold War world—a “people’s war”—and second, that international cooperation and legitimacy are key in fighting these conflicts.

People’s wars, also called communal wars, are intra-state conflicts marked by informal resistance movements and guerilla warfare. They are typically fought along ethnic and religious lines with devastating results, as evidenced by the most recent conflicts of the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda and Darfur.<sup>4</sup> Recent history has shown that despite the best intentions of the international community to initiate early intervention, current institutions are ill equipped to deal with allegations of human rights abuse and emerging threats to international security due to outdated legal structures and contrasting notions of sovereignty. The Chinese government has historically supported a non-interventionist notion of sovereignty, holding that the international community should not interfere in the domestic affairs of sovereign nations. China in particular is considered one of the main obstacles to the creation of a more dynamic mechanism to deal with intra-state conflicts. Beijing fears that an enhanced intervention regime could end up jeopardizing its core national political interests, mainly in regards to Taiwan, Tibet or Xinjiang.

So why did China feel the need to seek international approval for its internal housekeeping operations? Could this point to an emerging trend of multilateral engagement on issues of international security by the Chinese? China’s desire to ‘internationalize’ the Xinjiang conflict could indicate that the Chinese leadership is aware of the power of an international mandate and popular support in dealing with non-traditional conflicts, and acknowledges the role of the international community in defining these newly emerging threats. In light of the allegations made by human rights groups, is China a “Responsible Stakeholder” in the international system and can it be trusted to operate within international norms, or is it using the War on Terror to ensure control over its unwieldy hinterlands?<sup>5</sup> The Xinjiang issue speaks to the capacity of the international security regime to ensure that its mechanisms are not co-opted by the world’s most powerful nations to achieve political goals.

The purpose of this essay is not to deny the existence of a serious separatist movement in China’s Xinjiang region, but to address the degree to which Beijing’s counter-terrorism campaign has been aimed at choking peaceful dissent and asserting Chinese dominance. This essay will examine the Xinjiang conflict as framed by its ‘internationalization’ and seek to evaluate Beijing’s claims of a grave terrorist threat against the complex realities of Xinjiang’s multi-ethnic society.<sup>6</sup> After laying out the basic socioeconomic dynamics at work ‘on the ground’ in Xinjiang, this essay will evaluate the degree to which Beijing’s statements and policies have been in line with accepted international norms regarding rule of law and human rights protections. Finally, this essay will seek to place this newest stage of the Xinjiang conflict into the wider picture of China’s national and international political affairs to assess possibilities for the future.

### Social Dynamics and Sources of Tension

Beijing’s efforts to characterize Xinjiang as a hotbed of jihadism tend to ignore the region’s complex social dynamics. High levels of poverty and widespread discrimination have contributed to feelings of dissatisfaction with Chinese rule among members of Xinjiang’s Uighur community. Beijing continues to encourage members of China’s ethnic Han majority to migrate to Xinjiang, which contributes to Uighur economic dislocation and political isolation. This migration policy is widely agreed upon as a main factor in generating Uighur resentment of Chinese rule. Beijing pursues similar policies in Tibet, encouraging Han Chinese to “Go West”

<sup>2</sup> Chien-peng Chung, “China’s ‘War on Terror,’ September 11 and Uighur Separatism,” *Foreign Affairs*, July-August (2002): 11.

<sup>3</sup> Nicolas Becquelin, “Criminalizing Ethnicity: Political Repression in Xinjiang,” *China Rights Forum*, no.1 (2004): 40.

<sup>4</sup> Mark D. Evans, “Weak States, State Making, and Humanitarian Intervention with a View from the People’s Republic of China,” in *International Intervention in the Post-Cold War World: Moral Responsibility and Power Politics*, ed. Michael C. Davis (New York/London: M.E. Sharpe, 2004), 105.

<sup>5</sup> Former Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick introduced the notion of China becoming a “responsible stakeholder” in the international community during a September 21, 2005 speech to the National Committee on US-China Relations.

<sup>6</sup> James Millward, *Violent Separatism in Xinjiang: A Critical Assessment* (Washington DC: The East-West Center, 2004), viii.

in an effort to assert control over urban areas and dilute minority influence. Today roughly 9 million Uighurs live in Xinjiang and form around 45 percent of the population, however this percentage is steadily decreasing, both due to Han migration and increasingly strict enforcement of regulations on the number of children each family may have.<sup>7</sup>

Han migration affects all facets of Uighur life in Xinjiang and contributes to the creation of a sort of 'oppositional identity' among many Uighurs. Literature on interethnic relations within Xinjiang focuses on the low degree of integration between Han and Uighur populations.<sup>8</sup> Many have pointed to continuing displacement and discrimination as the roots of contemporary Uighur separatist leanings, not any sort of inherent Muslim rebelliousness or influx of fundamentalist Islam, as Beijing would lead outsiders to believe. To get a real sense of the causes of Uighur resentment, it is necessary to examine the economic, political and social realities of Xinjiang's Uighur population.

The widespread perception of economic inequality between Xinjiang's Uighur and Han residents undermines the legitimacy of the Chinese government and contributes to the region's ethnic tensions. While Beijing's "Great Western Development Strategy" and the Hu-Wen administration's related concept of "Scientific Development" have sought to correct social tensions resulting from uneven economic development, a large segment of the Uighur population remains mired in poverty. Similarly, high rates of unemployment among minorities and the ongoing government-mandated Han migration policy tend to make Uighurs skeptical that their economic prospects will improve.<sup>9</sup> Income differentials among Han and Uighur farmers illustrate the fact that Han farmers have better access to investment and land for cotton production.<sup>10</sup> Local officials are said to favor Han businesses in competition with local Uighur firms,<sup>11</sup> while government funds are often times diverted (by Han officials) from irrigation and agricultural projects for Uighurs to new projects in areas settled by Han Chinese immigrants. Uighur communities

complain that they are left uncompensated by blatantly discriminatory projects like these.<sup>12</sup>

In a particularly telling example, riots broke out in September 2007 in Xinjiang's Ili province among Uighur farmers who accused the government of price-fixing. The farmers in the area are under the direct control of a local PLA (People's Liberation Army) branch and are required to sell their cotton to the government at a fixed price set almost four yuan below market value. When PLA officers arrested a farmer accused of hiding cotton for sale on the open market, the farmers rioted and 25 were detained by the PLA. Many Uighurs see government price fixing schemes like this as a means for Han Chinese to colonize the area,<sup>13</sup> while others lament the fact that Han Chinese living in urban areas have "markedly better" economic prospects than Uighurs. Uighur peasants are prohibited from entering cities to gain access to economic opportunities by a strictly enforced residency card system.<sup>14</sup>

However, the rise of a Uighur middle class has shown that economic mobility is possible. This reinforces a view among the predominantly moderate population that it is within "their interest to 'get along' with the majority Han."<sup>15</sup> Similarly, as many Uighurs look west to the post-Soviet Central Asian republics now struggling with harsh realities of capitalist market integration, they realize their futures are increasingly tied to China's booming markets.<sup>16</sup> However, most Uighurs do not favor outright independence, but rather increased autonomy from the central government.

The marginalization of the Uighur community also carries over into the political sphere. Although Article 4 of China's 1982 constitution called for the establishment of "special administrative regions" to allow for a degree of self-determination among China's national minorities, Uighurs have little say in their government. While the government of the Soviet Union, which encompassed a similarly large spectrum of ethnic groups, gave 'republic status' to larger minority groups, Beijing only acknowledges the 'cultural

<sup>7</sup> Colin Mackerras, "Ethnicity in China: The Case of Xinjiang," *Harvard Asia Quarterly*, vol. 8, no. 1, Winter (2004). Although minorities are exempt from China's one child per couple rule, this does not mean that they are exempt from all regulations. Uighur couples in urban areas are allowed a of the rules [relating to the number of children] had become stricter between 1999 and 2003. maximum of two children. Mackerras writes that in field studies in Xinjiang he was under the impression that the implementation of the rules [relating to the number of children] had become stricter between 1999 and 2003.

<sup>8</sup> Herbert S. Yee, "Ethnic Relations in Xinjiang: A Survey of Uyghur-Han Relations in Urumqi," *Journal of Contemporary China*, vol. 12, no. 36, August (2003): 443.

<sup>9</sup> Mackerras, 2004.

<sup>10</sup> Mackerras, 2004

<sup>11</sup> "The Great Leap West," *The Economist*, August 28, 2004.

<sup>12</sup> Justin V. Hastings, "Perceiving a Single Chinese State: Escalation and Violence in Uighur Protests," *Problems of Post-Communism*, vol. 52, no. 1, January/February (2005): 31.

<sup>13</sup> Choi Chi-yuk, "Farmers Riot against Army's Cotton Control, PLA-Dictated Price Cap Riles Xinjiang Growers," *South China Morning Post*, October 5, 2007, 4.

<sup>14</sup> Hastings, 2005: 31.

<sup>15</sup> Mackerras, 2004.

<sup>16</sup> Joshua Kurlantzick, "Xinjiang 'Terror' Crackdown Called Ploy to Foil Ethnic Group," *The Washington Times*, October 23, 2002, A13.

independence' of national minorities. This has the intended effect of both denying Uighur political aspirations and creating space for Han Chinese to dominate the political scene.<sup>17</sup> Uighurs fill some spots in the local government, but very few belong to the local Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership, where the real power lies. While there are still a few Uighurs represented in the CCP, mostly from the rising middle class, Uighurs are still greatly under-represented in the party and therefore do not share a fair proportion of political power.<sup>18</sup> This lack of political integration contributes to Uighur alienation and antipathy towards Chinese rule.

In terms of the social realities facing Xinjiang's Uighurs, many experts say that government efforts to control Uighur religious practice has increased tension in the region. While this could ultimately serve as a rallying point for Islamic fundamentalist beliefs, it has failed to do so at this point.<sup>19</sup> Even before September 11, Beijing instituted a broad range of restrictions on religious practice. These include banning religious practices during the month of Ramadan, restricting independent trips to Mecca for the Hajj, closing mosques and independent religious schools, and exerting heavy-handed control over clergy, including the detention and arrest of those deemed unpatriotic.<sup>20</sup> Beijing maintains only one official clerical school in Xinjiang and allows only those imams educated in this school to practice. Curriculum is determined by the China Islamic Association, which operates from Beijing. Around 14 'patriotic' clerics graduate per year for service to the nearly 11 million Muslims living in Xinjiang. This ensures that after the older imams die out, says Yitzhak Shichor of the University of Haifa, Xinjiang will be completely "deprived of authentic Islamic leadership."<sup>21</sup> Official restrictions also dictate that all individuals under the age of 18 are forbidden from entering "religious places." The stated reason for this is that young people should be receiving an education, not praying.<sup>22</sup>

Along the lines of the restriction of cultural practice, literature deemed 'subversive' has also been the subject of government regulation. Xinjiang expert Nicolas Becquelin alleges that the government staged a massive June 2002 book burning in Kashgar in which "tens of thousands of

'illegal' publications were destroyed." Becquelin reports that these books included 128 copies of "A Brief History of the Huns and Ancient Literature" as well as copies of "Ancient Uighur Craftsmanship," which details traditional Uighur artistic techniques. Other more subtle policies point to the increasing marginalization of Uighur culture, like the 2002 decision to accelerate the shift to all Chinese-language education in Xinjiang. Becquelin contends that these, among many other examples of systematic repression of Uighur culture and language, represent attempts by Beijing to "effectively obliterate" the Uighur nation.<sup>23</sup> The pretext behind Beijing's crackdown on 'subversive' literature will be discussed later on.

Uighur grievances are shown to result from the widespread perception of real economic, political and cultural inequalities. Beijing's claims that violent Islamic fundamentalists with foreign support aim for the "elimination of pagans" and the installation of "a theocratic 'Islam[ic] state' in Xinjiang" mask the true basis for Uighur discontent.<sup>24</sup> There is widespread agreement among experts that Uighur identity is the common denominator among calls for independence. The former Kazakh ambassador to China is quoted as saying that the Uighurs are "struggling to preserve their cultural identity against an officially sanctioned mass influx of Han Chinese into their region."<sup>25</sup> Uighur dislocation caused by Han migration has served to cement dissatisfaction with Chinese rule.

### Beijing's Case: The White Papers

China's campaign to tie Uighur dissent to international terrorist groups was a fundamental part of 'internationalizing' the Xinjiang conflict. With the release of a January 2002 "White Paper"<sup>26</sup> on Xinjiang entitled "'East Turkistan' Terrorist Forces Cannot Get Away with Impunity," China beefed up its rhetoric and began calling the separatist movement a threat to the "security and stability of related countries and regions."<sup>27</sup> While it is possible that radical elements could exist within Xinjiang, the Chinese characterizations tend to ignore fundamental historical and cultural realities that make claims of a terrorist infestation difficult to take seriously.

<sup>17</sup> Eric Hyer, "China's Policy towards Uighur Nationalism," *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, vol. 26, no. 1 (2006): 76.

<sup>18</sup> Mackerras, 2004.

<sup>19</sup> Millward, 2004: 31.

<sup>20</sup> Amnesty International, *People's Republic of China: Uighurs Fleeing Persecution as China Wages Its "War on Terror"*, July 2004, 3.

<sup>21</sup> Yitzhak Shichor, "Blow Up: Internal and External Challenges of Uyghur Separatism and Islamic Radicalism to Chinese Rule in Xinjiang," *Asian Affairs*, vol. 32, no.2 (2005): 128.

<sup>22</sup> Mackerras, 2004.

<sup>23</sup> Becquelin, 2004: 45.

<sup>24</sup> China State Council Information Office, *'East Turkistan' Terrorist Forces Cannot Get Away with Impunity*, January 21, 2002, [http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200201/21/eng20020121\\_89078.shtml](http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200201/21/eng20020121_89078.shtml).

<sup>25</sup> Hyer, 2006: 80.

<sup>26</sup> China's "white papers" are official statements of government policy.

<sup>27</sup> China State Council Information Office, *'East Turkistan' Terrorist Forces Cannot Get Away with Impunity*, January 21, 2002, [http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200201/21/eng20020121\\_89078.shtml](http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200201/21/eng20020121_89078.shtml).

First, Uighur separatist movement is certainly not united in its opposition to Chinese rule, despite Beijing's efforts to make it seem that way, and poses minimal threat to China's overall national stability. The movement lacks any coherent organization; previous attempts to unite under an umbrella organization or create an agenda have failed. Moreover, the group lacks any symbolic leadership, like the Tibetan Dalai Lama, or government-in-exile that can drum up support among the international community. Uighur Diaspora organizations, on the other hand, are under-funded and lack significant widespread public support.<sup>28</sup> Beijing's effort to paint Uighur separatists as united around the banner of Islam also masks the high degree of internal factionalism among Uighurs. Many times, religious and linguistic differences, territorial disputes and divergent political loyalties do more to drive a wedge between individual Uighur groups than contribute to any sort of collective anti-Han identity.<sup>29</sup>

Second, Beijing's claim that Xinjiang is a hotbed of jihadi-fundamentalist fervor is baseless. On the contrary, many experts consider the Uighurs one of the most progressive Muslim groups in the world.<sup>30</sup> The leading Uighur independence group, the East Turkistan National Congress, has made clear that it calls for a secular and democratic state in Xinjiang. As traditional religious moderates, Uighurs would more likely oppose the fundamentalist Wahhabism of Saudi Arabia (and espoused by Al Qaeda) or the puritanical Deobandi sect claimed by the Taliban. Uighur women in Xinjiang interact freely with men and are historically permitted to run their own businesses and hold political office. For these reasons, experts remained skeptical when Beijing in 2002 released its first White Paper explicitly linking Xinjiang's separatists with religious extremism.

The January 2002 document makes a passionate appeal for "all peace-loving people" to condemn the "explosions, assassinations, arsons and poisonings that have been directed at the stated aim of founding a "so-called state of 'East Turkistan."<sup>31</sup> This claim and others like it ignore the fact that a state called East Turkistan actually existed until 1949. In later publications the Chinese government claimed to have 'peacefully liberated' Xinjiang. The reader

is left wondering about the meaning of the term 'liberation,' when the last Xinjiang republic was a democracy with a constitution that provided for freedom of speech, religion and assembly.<sup>32</sup>

Referring to alleged separatists as affiliated with "East Turkistan" organizations or alternately relying on the term "East Turkistan terrorists," the paper makes explicit references to many different groups, yet cites no independent evidence that these organizations are still active or ever existed.<sup>33</sup> From the "Shock Brigade of the Islamic Reformist Party" to the "East Turkistan Islamic Party of Allah," the convoluted document claims that terrorist forces are responsible for over 200 attacks in Xinjiang that killed 162 and injured over 440 people. Alternately highly detailed in some sections and confusingly obtuse in others, at least one Xinjiang expert criticizes the account given in this document as "less than systematic."<sup>34</sup> Moreover, the Chinese government betrays its lack of knowledge about Islam with its constant use of the word 'Wahabiyya' in official communications, which the government uses consistently to describe all Islamic movements, regardless of political or ideological affiliations.<sup>35</sup> Wahhabism is an ultra-conservative form of Islam practiced on the Arabian Peninsula, and there is little evidence to support the idea that it is making inroads among Muslims in China's northwest.

Also noteworthy is that the 2002 paper fails to name any terrorist attacks since April 1998. The only incident in the intervening years was the murder of a Kashgar court official.<sup>36</sup> While the paper claims that Hasan Mahsum, an alleged ETIM leader, made official contact with Al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden in early 1999, it fails to name a single terrorist attack within China during this period of increased international support for "East Turkistan" forces. If Al Qaeda provided the alleged financial and organizational support in 1999, would this not cause either a spike in the number or deadliness of attacks? The level of premeditated violence drops off in 1998 and Beijing's claims increasingly fail to match up with reports of violence. Beijing, however, doesn't miss a beat, instead explaining that the terrorists merely "changed their combat tactics," and shifted their attacks on China towards ideological warfare.

<sup>28</sup> Shichor, 2005: 125.

<sup>29</sup> Dru Gladney, "Islam in China: Accommodation or Separatism?" *The China Quarterly* (2003): 454.

<sup>30</sup> Kurlantzick, 2002.

<sup>31</sup> China State Council Information Office, 'East Turkistan' Terrorist forces cannot get away with impunity, January 21, 2002, [http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200201/21/eng20020121\\_89078.shtml](http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200201/21/eng20020121_89078.shtml).

<sup>32</sup> Joshua Kurlantzick, "The Unsettled West," *Foreign Affairs*, July/August, 2004.

<sup>33</sup> The January 2002 publication ("East Turkistan terrorists cannot get away with impunity") makes reference to eight distinct terrorist entities operating within Xinjiang. These include: the East Turkistan Islamic Party, the East Turkistan Opposition Party, the East Turkistan Liberation Organization, the Shock Brigade of the Islamic Reformist Party, the East Turkistan Islamic Movement, the East Turkistan Islamic Party of Allah, the Uyghur Liberation Organization, the Islamic Holy Warriors and the East Turkistan International Committee. James Millward gives a more in depth analysis of these groups and others in "Violent Separatism in Xinjiang." See Millward, *supra* note 6.

<sup>34</sup> Millward, 2004: 13.

<sup>35</sup> Shichor, 2005: 128.

<sup>36</sup> Amnesty International, 2004: 10.

Most troubling is the Chinese government's effort to conflate what it calls "separatist thought" with terrorism. Here, Beijing's propaganda campaign reaches its peak – it explicitly condemns any individual who uses "arts and literature [that] tout the products of opposition...and [advocate] ethnic splittist thinking" as a terrorist.<sup>37</sup> In 2002 the Xinjiang CCP Secretary called on authorities to fight "separatist techniques...including news media, literature works, arts performances and letters."<sup>38</sup> This official went on to condemn any literature disseminating dissatisfaction or separatist thinking, and called on authorities to target terrorists using "popular cultural activities" to advocate their causes. These represent the starkest examples of the Chinese government's propaganda campaign to equate any expression of dissatisfaction with separatism, and by that token, terrorism.

Beijing also makes serious accusations against peaceful Uighur Diaspora organizations, formally linking them with the 'external forces' that are responsible for Xinjiang's instability. In a December 2003 publication called "Combating Terrorism, We Have No Choice," Beijing takes aim at two legally registered organizations that it calls terrorist organizations, namely the World Uighur Youth Congress (WUYC), an umbrella organization of Uighur groups from Central Asia, Turkey, Australia, the US and Europe, and the East Turkistan Information Center (ETIC), a project based in Munich. The paper accuses the WUYC of affiliating with groups that have "engaged in plans" of assassinating Party, government and military leaders, attacking infrastructure in Xinjiang, and masterminding bombings. It accuses the ETIC of using the internet to instigate terrorism, 'splittism' and jihad.

As with other documents, the authors cite no independent sources to support the accusations.<sup>39</sup> Becquelin reports that when questioned about the ETIC allegations, a Chinese government spokesman replied that the organization advocated independence on its internet site, thereby "implying that this qualified it as a terrorist group."<sup>40</sup> A rebuttal published on the World Uyghur Congress (WUC) website by WUYC Founder Dolkun Isa says that all WUYC activities are "carried out openly within the scope of UN charter, the European Parliament charter and the Germany

law"<sup>41</sup> while the World Uyghur Congress, Isa's current affiliation, declares as its main objective the promotion of "the right of the Uighur people to use peaceful, nonviolent, and democratic means to determine the political future of East Turkestan." According to its mission statement the WUC is a "nonviolent and peaceful opposition movement" that unequivocally rejects the use of terrorism.<sup>42</sup> Regarding the ETIC, while the Chinese government alleges that the organization is engaged in "spreading, preaching and instigating terrorism, extremism and splittism, calling for jihad by violent and terrorist means,"<sup>43</sup> however the English-language version of the website does not appear to advocate violence.<sup>44</sup>

Literature on the Xinjiang issue points to the fact that the Chinese government has historically manipulated its stance on the Xinjiang issue depending on its particular set of interests at a given time. For example, while China's 2002 White Paper on National Defense calls Xinjiang's 'East Turkistan' terrorist forces a 'serious threat' to domestic security within China, the 2000 document only makes four generalized references to terrorism.<sup>45</sup> The 2002 document makes this claim despite the fact that there were no large-scale acts of premeditated anti-state violence in the intervening period. The case for a serious terrorist threat in Xinjiang is weakened by inconsistency and a lack of credible evidence. Beijing's awkward handling of the Xinjiang issue points to the fact that the government walks a fine line on the separatism issue. When Beijing ratchets up rhetoric about Xinjiang's terrorist "infestation," it ends up discouraging foreign investment in Xinjiang. However, touting Xinjiang's "ethnic harmony" and understating the Xinjiang issue deprives Beijing of its ability to react firmly to a real crisis.<sup>46</sup>

As if the opportunistic timing of Beijing's counter-terrorism campaign were not reason enough to question the sincerity of its claims, these contradictions further erode the legitimacy of its allegations. The Chinese effort to drum up international support for fighting Uighur separatism is a clear misrepresentation made to justify harsh repression and maintain Chinese dominance in the region. As China made its international case for the Xinjiang terrorist crisis, it can be seen to initiate widespread crackdowns on Uighurs to eliminate all subversive elements.

<sup>37</sup> Becquelin, 2004.

<sup>38</sup> Ibid.

<sup>39</sup> "Combating terrorism, we have no choice," *People's Daily Online*, December 18, 2003, [http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200312/18eng20031218\\_130652.shtml](http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200312/18eng20031218_130652.shtml).

<sup>40</sup> Becquelin, 2004.

<sup>41</sup> Dolkun Isa, "Rebuttal of the Chinese Public Security Ministry's "Terrorist" Accusation," *World Uyghur Congress*, <http://www.uyghurcongress.org/En/AboutWUC.asp?mid=109573888&mid2=-2118628734&mid3=-1844889938>.

<sup>42</sup> "Introducing the World Uyghur Congress," *World Uyghur Congress*, <http://www.uyghurcongress.org/En/AboutWUC.asp?mid=1095738888>.

<sup>43</sup> "Combating terrorism, we have no choice," *People's Daily Online*, December 18, 2003, [http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200312/18/eng20031218\\_130652.shtml](http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200312/18/eng20031218_130652.shtml).

<sup>44</sup> *East Turkistan Information Center*, <http://www.uygur.org/>.

<sup>45</sup> Becquelin, 2004.

<sup>46</sup> Shichor, 2005.

## The Crackdown

Human rights advocacy groups like Human Rights Watch Asia, Amnesty International and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) have made allegations that serious human rights abuses took place in Xinjiang after September 2001. In December 2007 the German Parliament officially condemned the “excessive” use of the death penalty against Uighurs, many of whom were never charged or brought before a court.<sup>47</sup> Becquelin points to the fact that Xinjiang is the only region in China, besides Tibet, where the execution of political prisoners is common, with another author calling Xinjiang the “death-penalty capital of the world.”<sup>48</sup> China’s post September 11 counter-terrorism campaign, with its widespread arrests, imprisonments and executions, violates any international standard of human rights protection and seriously undermines China’s efforts to portray itself as a responsible sovereign nation.

Due to strict control of information by Chinese authorities and the denial of access to representatives of human rights organizations, it is difficult to field exact figures on the number of people affected by the crackdowns after September 2001. A 2002 Amnesty International report puts the number of Uighurs detained in the six months after September 2001 in the thousands. International Uighur advocacy organizations estimate that the number is at least 3,000, with some 20 individuals executed.<sup>49</sup>

Perhaps the most important long-term aspect of the late 2001 crackdown was the adoption of nine new amendments to China’s Criminal Code. These substantially widened the scope of activities punishable under Chinese law and increased mandatory minimum sentences for existing crimes. The Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress adopted these new measures for the “punishment of terrorist crimes, [and to] ensure national security and the safety of people’s lives and property, and uphold social order.”<sup>50</sup>

The bulk of the amendments increase punishments for individuals who stand accused of organizing, funding or engaging in terrorist activities. One amendment increases the minimum sentence for crimes covered under the previous criminal statutes, so that individuals who ‘disturb social order’ to the extent that ‘serious consequences have been caused’ face a minimum sentence of five years imprisonment. Crimes punishable under the old law

included “gathering in public places, blocking traffic... or obstructing agents of the state from carrying out their duties.” The new amendment applies to individuals who “knowingly disseminat[e] fabricated threats or messages.”

The language of the new laws merely refers to ‘terrorist activities’ and fails to establish any criteria or parameters for distinguishing illegal acts from legal acts. The legislation also fails to distinguish peaceful advocacy groups from violent terrorist organizations.<sup>51</sup> This provided wide leeway for authorities to conflate peaceful expressions of dissent or cultural activities with disturbance to ‘social order’ and thereby impose harsh punishments, including the death penalty.

A sampling of official reports from within China points to a revival of the government’s ‘strike hard’ campaign around October 2001. A China News Service article reported that 10 violent terrorist groups had been “wiped out” and that around 210 “hardened minority ‘splittists,’ suspected violent criminal terrorists or religious extremists” were rounded up in Urumqi. Other official reports said that 166 “violent terrorists and other criminals” were arrested in late 2001. An Urumqi news outlet reported that 150 individuals were arrested for involvement in “illegal religious activities and separatism.”<sup>52</sup> While these official releases only represent a proportion of the arrests that actually took place, they illustrate the wide scope of the operation against Xinjiang’s so-called ‘splittists.’ In many of these reports, there is no distinction drawn between ‘hardened minority splittists’ and individuals engaged in ‘illegal religious activities.’ These vague accusations demonstrate the extensive scope of the crackdown and the degree to which the Chinese government targeted even the most benign elements of Xinjiang’s society.

There were also reports of arbitrary crackdowns on Uighur religious practices in late 2001 and early 2002. The *Xinjiang Legal Daily* reported in October that “dozens of Muslim clerics and students were detained or arrested for ‘illegal’ religious activities...in Khotan, Kashgar and Bortala.”<sup>53</sup> A November report said that police closed down 13 “illegal religious centers,” arresting over 50 individuals. Reuters reported in December 2001 that nine Uighurs were arrested for “illegal preaching.” The group stands accused of preaching the “separatist cause” after translating the Koran into local languages.<sup>54</sup> Many of those arrested were required to undergo programs of “political education” intended to give a “clearer understanding of the party’s ethnic and religious policies.” Amnesty International reported the widespread

<sup>47</sup> “Germany Criticizes ‘Excessive’ Use of Death Penalty,” *South China Morning Post*, December 6, 2007, A7.

<sup>48</sup> Kurlantzick, 2004.

<sup>49</sup> Amnesty International, *People’s Republic of China: China’s Anti-Terrorism Legislation an Repression in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region*, October 2002, 10.

<sup>50</sup> Amnesty International, 2002: 5.

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>52</sup> Amnesty International, 2002: 6.

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>54</sup> “China arrests nine Muslims in broad crackdown,” *Reuters*, December 21, 2001.

closing of mosques around Xinjiang. Official reasoning was that the mosques were located close to schools and thus constituted a “bad influence” on people. Local officials in Ili issued a notice in January 2002 that the government would be stepping up surveillance in order to “eradicate feudal, superstitious and backward ideas,” and that local customs, including weddings, funerals, circumcision ceremonies and other ‘rituals’ would be supervised.<sup>55</sup> An unverified account by Uighur advocacy groups reported that 5,000 individuals were detained in Kashgar between April and August 2002 for engaging in “unofficial Islamic activities.” The report alleges that 150 of these people were executed by the Chinese authorities.<sup>56</sup> Again, this sampling of reports paints a picture of a wide crackdown on Uighur religious practice.

Peaceful displays of dissent were also treated as sedition as China waged its counter-terrorism campaign. In one well known January 2002 incident, an Urumqi man was detained after he recited a poem at a concert that criticized local government policy and “advocated ideas of ethnic separatism.”<sup>57</sup> Another similar incident occurred in January 2003, when a Uighur man was arrested after reading a poem in a Kashgar concert hall that “attacked government policy regarding ethnic minorities.”<sup>58</sup> A CCP official interviewed about the incident said that the poet’s intent was “to destroy the unity between Uighur and Han.” The official went on to say, “We regard this as terrorism in the spiritual form, but we want to educate, not punish him.”<sup>59</sup> The offense of ‘spiritual terrorism’ is not defined in China’s criminal law, but inciting separatism through the dissemination of separatist ideology and seeking to ‘disturb social order’ does constitute a crime. In fact, this crime is punishable by death, as evidenced by an Oct. 5, 2001 *New York Times* article that reported the execution of seven Uighurs charged with ‘disrupting social order.’<sup>60</sup>

Reports of Uighurs executed for ‘separatism’ are widespread and deeply troubling, as sources point to the fact that many of these individuals were held without legal representation, subjected to summary trials, many times at “public sentencing meetings,” and executed at these rallies immediately after their sentences were read. In some instances, sources report that torture is used to extract confessions.<sup>61</sup> An Amnesty International publication reports that between Sept. 25, 2001 and Nov. 16, 2001, official

reports state that 105 individuals were sentenced at “public sentencing meetings,” and 12 of these individuals were sentenced to death. Of these individuals, 10 were found guilty of charges relating to separatism.

There are multiple instances of Uighurs being forcibly returned from countries such as Nepal, Pakistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan, and executed. In multiple cases these individuals were recognized as refugees by UNHCR and, in at least one case, were days away from resettlement.<sup>62</sup> These violations of the international principles of non-refoulement<sup>63</sup> and torture risk undermining international legal standards such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1984 Convention against Torture, among other customs of international law. In April 2007 one Uighur with Canadian citizenship was sentenced to life imprisonment for charges relating to “plotting to split the country.” Representatives from the Canadian government were not allowed to attend his trial or meet with the individual’s family members within China.

These reports lead to serious questions about China’s commitment to human rights and international law. With China’s 2001 ratification of the UN Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, it acknowledged the equal and inalienable right of all humans to freedom, justice, and dignity, and promised to protect the social, cultural, civil and political freedoms of its citizens. Wide ranging human rights violations and discrimination against Uighurs by the Chinese not only contravene all accepted international norms of due process and rule of law, but cast doubt on China’s commitment to the articles of the Covenant.

## Conclusion

Beijing’s characterizations of Xinjiang have tended to overstate the real danger posed by the ‘East Turkistan’ separatist movement. China misused the pretext of counter-terrorism to justify its crackdown both on real and perceived threats, ignoring the US proviso not to use its counter-terrorism operations to repress minority populations. Beijing’s purposeful misrepresentation of the Uighur separatist movement was a blatant attempt to co-opt the international community’s legitimate goal of fighting transnational terrorist networks. As a result, accounts of

<sup>55</sup> Amnesty International, 2002: 9.

<sup>56</sup> Amnesty International, 2002: 10.

<sup>57</sup> Amnesty International, 2002: 8.

<sup>58</sup> Amnesty International, 2004: 14.

<sup>59</sup> “Pressure to Conform in West China,” *Christian Science Monitor*, September 29, 2003.

<sup>60</sup> Craig Smith, “Fearing Unrest, China Presses Muslim Group,” *The New York Times*, October 5, 2001, 3A.

<sup>61</sup> “China: High court upheld life imprisonment of Canadian Uighur,” *Amnesty International*, July 23, 2007.

<sup>62</sup> Amnesty International, 2004: 17-34.

<sup>63</sup> Art. 3 of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 1984. “No State Party shall expel, return (“refouler”) or extradite a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture.”

China as a “Responsible Stakeholder” in the international security regime should be questioned.

This essay shows that the Uighur separatist movement stems from the perception that Chinese Uighurs are increasingly marginalized by Han migration to the region. The government’s failure to integrate its Uighur population is the cause of separatist sentiments, not any inherent rebelliousness on behalf of Uighurs or Muslims in general. While Islam is intrinsic to the Uighur identity, it is an oversimplification to call it a main factor in contemporary calls for greater autonomy. Uighur nationalism underpins the reaction against government-sanctioned discrimination and Beijing’s efforts to control its Uighur population. However, as the expression of Uighur culture and religion is increasingly criminalized and channels for airing real grievances are closed, Islamic fundamentalist-inspired violence could present a viable alternative for those seeking to be heard. Indeed, ‘well-behaved’ or nonviolent separatist movements like that of Tibet rarely gain the international notoriety or support necessary to make tangible gains. Increasingly, it seems as if violence pays.<sup>64</sup> In the end, Beijing’s ‘counter-terrorism’ operation might have done more harm than good. This conclusion has consequences not only for Uighurs and the Chinese government, but the international security regime as well.

Any remedy to the Chinese human rights situation is complicated and closely tied to the Chinese government’s fundamental political concerns. Part of the Chinese regime’s domestic legitimacy lies in its ability to ensure stability for economic growth and the perception that it is committed to safeguarding China’s territorial integrity. Beijing achieves the latter mainly by refusing to concede on sovereignty issues relating to Xinjiang, Taiwan, Tibet, Hong Kong and other minor territorial questions. These two political insistencies -- maintaining stability and territorial integrity -- are always complementary and force Beijing into a delicate balancing act.

Xinjiang is a microcosm of interaction between these two forces. If China allows increased autonomy for the region’s minorities, as provided by Article 4 of the PRC constitution, the regime’s promise to safeguard the boundaries of the Chinese nation might be questioned, possibly emboldening proponents of Tibetan independence and placing the stability of the Chinese regime in jeopardy. On the other hand, if Beijing continues to repress minority populations, calls for separatism are increasingly justified. In the economic respect, if China allows autonomy for Xinjiang in the interest of creating a more stable investment environment, nationalists will criticize Beijing for succumbing to international

pressure and ‘selling out’ its most fundamental interests, namely, that of territorial integrity. But if Beijing continues its crackdown on Uighurs in an effort to quash separatism, it would again justify Uighur grievances and crystallize resentment, driving hardcore elements underground and creating a fertile environment for extremism and violence.

While Beijing encourages investment and provides for economic development in the region, its abrasive rhetoric and heavy-handed policies are increasing tension and cementing opposition. China must find a way to acknowledge and assuage the real concerns of its repressed ethnic minorities and at the same time maintain the perception among the general Chinese populace that it has not given in to separatist demands or international opinion. This is a demanding task and one that will become increasingly difficult to solve over time if Beijing continues to delay political reforms.

China faces a similarly problematic set of questions in its relationship with the highly developed western nations at the core of the international community. The basic problem is that Beijing has trouble balancing its domestic political obligations with international obligations, mainly owing to the discrepancy between international-level expectations and its national-level imperatives. China’s international identity is increasingly complex, given its high profile on the international political stage, robust economy and growing military capabilities. However, while China displays some of the trappings of a nation at the core of international society, it likewise faces many of the devolutionary forces of a developing nation on the periphery, as seen in its various separatist movements and territorial disputes. As a result, China is expected to live up to international norms established by nations of the core group of which it is a part, but its domestic political realities make it difficult to do so.<sup>65</sup>

In terms of the Xinjiang issue, as China sought to engage the international community in its ‘core’ capacity to cooperate against transnational terrorism and internationalize its own fight against separatism, it ultimately failed to live up to international expectations that it would not use the August 2002 ETIM declaration to eliminate internal dissent. In other words, China realizes the role of international legitimacy in winning the ‘war of opinion,’ but is not prepared to compromise its fundamental interests in order to maintain that legitimacy. However, the fact that China even sought the 2002 UN/US State Department ETIM declaration is a step in the right direction. It indicates that Beijing recognizes that international security threats in the post-Cold War world are increasingly coming from non-state actors and intra-state conflict, and perhaps

<sup>64</sup> Michael C. Davis, “The Emerging World Order: State Sovereignty and Humanitarian Intervention,” ed. Michael C. Davis, *International Intervention in the Post-Cold War World: Moral Responsibility and Power Politics* (New York/London: M.E. Sharpe, 2004), 11.

<sup>65</sup> Evans, 117.

more importantly, that it is the role of the international community to define these common threats, such as the one posed by transnational terrorism networks.

China's reluctance to support the creation of a more dynamic mechanism to deal with emerging crises is borne from its domestic political situation, and the fear that creating a wider scope for the terms under which UN intervention can and should be authorized would create a precedent that would ultimately come back to haunt China. So what to outsiders seems to be an outdated, irresponsible notion of sovereignty is in fact a pragmatic response to real problems faced by the Chinese government. Unfortunately, this also means China's inability to solve these problems and institute political reform has huge implications for international security and humanitarian regimes.

The dual goals of creating a more responsible regime in Beijing and developing a stronger international security system must advance simultaneously. To do this, the foundation of China's relationship with the world's core nations must be built on more than just trade and security issues. While commonly held wisdom says that China will gradually adopt widely accepted 'core' values as it is drawn further into the structures of the international community, this has proven to be only partly true. While China's behaviors have come further in line with international norms in some areas, namely trade and commerce, in other areas China's integration only serves to highlight the disparity between international norms and Chinese reality. This makes China an easy scapegoat and a frequent target for criticism by Western rights advocates, lending credence to Chinese nationalist claims that the Western-led international community seeks to undermine a rising China. Even worse, political isolation drives China towards increased engagement with its Shanghai Cooperation Organization allies, to whom human rights issues matter least. The international community must learn to balance criticism with a more complete understanding of the profound centrifugal forces at work within China.

Addressing China's fundamental national concerns would provide the breathing room that China desperately needs in order to initiate serious domestic political reforms. Mutual assurance and a 'roadmap' approach built on compromise and trust, not absolutes, must be part of the ongoing dialogue about the most serious issues. In practice, this means that the international community must signal that it recognizes the importance China places on territorial integrity, and Beijing must in turn signal that it is willing to resolve its most pressing issues and engage in political reform. By reinforcing the stability of the Chinese government and promoting helpful dialogue, the international community will be able to draw Beijing's values closer to those of the core nations and reduce its need to rely on coercive measures to secure legitimacy.

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## Off the Map and Into Uncharted Territory: A Review of the Dialectic, the Nation-State, and the Zapatistas

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*This paper provides the basis for understanding the history of subaltern peoples according to a reassessment of dialectical theory. The Western Dialectic has been applied to non-Western regions of the world, taking root as a subtle and pervasive effect of years of colonialism and imperialism. The result is that the dialectical processes unique to colonized areas have been overlooked and marginalized. The nation-state, which is often considered to be both the culmination of Dialectical history and also the global norm of socio-political organization, is used to assess the (mis)application of the Western Dialectic in the non-West. The Zapatistas are presented as a comparative case study to provide a unique and as yet uncharted example of a viable alternative to both the nation-state and the Western Dialectic.*

On January 1, 1994, the Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional (EZLN) emerged from the Selva Lacandona. A plethora of internet images of Zapatistas wearing black masks, carrying burdensome packs,<sup>1</sup> guns and ammunition created what has become a new archetype of armed resistance. The new archetype became more distinct when the imagery was combined with a message of peace, despite the show of weaponry.<sup>2</sup> This message was the Zapatistas' Word, or their narrative, which would be among their most powerful weapons.<sup>3</sup> Embedded within this narrative was the story of an indigenous life and culture developed and cultivated over centuries, which for 500 years had been isolated and hidden in the southernmost reaches of Mexico. The Zapatistas' Declaración de la Selva Lacandona – a declaration of war – begins with the phrase: “Somos producto de 500 años de luchas” – “We are the product of 500 years of struggles.”<sup>4</sup> This is a reference to the (primarily indigenous) persons' struggles for recognition, for rights, and for land since the arrival of the Spanish *conquistadores* some 500 years ago.

The imagery from the Selva Lacandona of the masked guerrilla emerging from the jungle exemplifies a dichotomy of past and present and of subaltern and dominant. The weaponry makes obvious the strife inherent to this duality, and yet the call for peace signals a need and an attempt to resolve the conflict between past and present. What, then, does the rustling from the Selva Lacandona portend? The EZLN represents a struggle that is rooted in the past and that has been overlooked or marginalized in the present.

This is the history of an “other” – not *the* other, but one of many others. While the conflict in the South of Mexico is localized, the impact of the struggle has resounded internationally. The international appeal of the Zapatistas indicates that their struggle is, if not typical, then similar to other struggles elsewhere in the world. It is the effort of people – whose history, and through this their cultures and traditions, has been marginalized by more dominant historical interpretations – to resolve (at least) two disparate courses of history with distinct patterns and outcomes. In the case of the Zapatistas, the two courses of history are that of the West, imposed through 500 years of colonialism and imperialism, and the indigenous history, which in many ways was truncated by the imposition of the Western interpretation of history.

Since the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, socio-political organizations in the West have organized as sovereign states, which are the primary entities and actors in the international system.<sup>5</sup> Theory and practice have come to adhere to sovereign states as cause and effect of state relations and functions, with the nation-state – specifically the liberal, democratic nation-state – as the ultimate evolved form of the sovereign state. In some ways, history is interpreted as an evolution to precisely this point, to this version of State, as the culmination of human society and organization. Methods of interpretation, such as the contemporary usages and understandings of the Dialectic (and more narrowly Dialectical Materialism), point towards this conclusion.

<sup>1</sup> “Informe del Diálogo para la Paz,” <http://www.ezln.org/documentos/1994/19940223.es.htm>.

<sup>2</sup> Karen Kampwirth, “Creating Space in Chiapas: An Analysis of the Strategies of the Zapatista Army and the Rebel Government in Transition,” *Bulletin of Latin American Research* (1996): 261-67.

<sup>3</sup> Subcomandante Insurgente Marcos, *Nuestra arma es Nuestra Palabra* (New York: Siete Cuentos, 2001).

<sup>4</sup> Comandancia General del EZLN, “Declaración de la Selva Lacandona,” <http://www.ezln.org/documentos/1994/199312xx.es.htm>.

<sup>5</sup> Stephen D. Krasner, *Compromising Westphalia in Global Transformation Reader*, (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000).

From this perspective, society has been constantly refining to a point where conflict will have been resolved and unity achieved.

In a general sense, the dialectic functions to describe the process by which history evolves, not define the specific elements that shape evolution. It is a pattern of conflict-resolution, not a template that dictates how history should progress. Instead, dialectical history is like a strand of yarn with threads that intersect and diverge. Threads may intertwine to form a single thread, or fray into divergent pieces. The yarn is both individual threads and threads that are spun together. Likewise, the dialectical map, or chart, is a multifaceted network of processes that overlap, converge and diverge, with distinct rates of development and unique components acting out the conflict-resolution of distinct histories.

The Dialectic we know and recognize is that which is constantly refining towards the liberal, democratic nation-state. This particular form of the Dialectic is not, however, all encompassing; it is specific to the Western world that developed it, and as such is hereafter referred to as the Western Dialectic, which is distinguished from the more general dialectic. The Western Dialectic has been applied to the non-Western regions of the world, taking root as a subtle and pervasive effect of years of colonialism and imperialism during which some dominant cultures imposed their interpretations of history and progress on other peoples. The result was that the dialectical processes, or threads, unique to colonized areas have been overlooked, ignored, and marginalized. The forgotten processes also follow a dialectical pattern of conflict and resolution, and as such can be recognized as alternative dialectical processes that coexist with the dominant, Western Dialectic.

The dialectic is often used to describe the evolution of socio-political organization; the Western Dialectic is considered to culminate in the (liberal, democratic) nation-state. The nation-state, which is often considered to be the global norm of socio-political organization and not a uniquely Western construct, is therefore used to assess the (mis)application of the Western Dialectic in the non-West. It is important to note that, because it is the application of the Western Dialectic that is flawed and not the premise of dialectical conflict-resolution, dialectical theory itself provides the basis for revision and, as such, is used to describe the flaw of misapplication.

In order to assess the viability of the nation-state and the Western course of development as represented by the Western Dialectic, theories of the dialectic and the nation-state and also theories relevant to each will be discussed in detail. The Zapatistas are presented as a comparative case-study, to provide a unique and as yet uncharted example of a viable alternative to both the nation-state and the

Western Dialectic. The study will assess the Zapatistas in relation to three primary components of the nation-state. Ultimately, this case provides both a need and potentially a methodology for the revision of dialectical application.

## The Dialectic

The dialectic has its contemporary basis in the work done by the 19<sup>th</sup> century German philosopher G. W. F. Hegel. The Hegelian dialectic is essentially a tripartite process. Subject A becomes Object A, and then in turn Subject A *and* Object A. In other words, the process is fulfilled by the realization that Subject and Object are two parts of a whole, which can only be understood as whole given the identification of both Subject and Object. That 'whole' (or Whole A) is the goal of the dialectical process, the Absolute.<sup>6</sup> This dialectical process is summarized as Thesis (Subject) – Antithesis (Object) – Synthesis (Whole or Absolute) [See FIGURES 1 and 2]. There are two important outcomes of this philosophy.

The first outcome comes from Hegel's explanation that the dialectic is ongoing as a result of being self contained.




Figure 1.




Figure 2.

<sup>6</sup> Scott Warren, *The Emergence of Dialectical Theory* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1984).

Hegel presents the concept of *Aufhebung* by stating that “all criteria of knowledge continually undergo a historical and dialectical *Aufhebung*.”<sup>7</sup> *Aufhebung* further suggests that “the continuity or unity of self-consciousness is provided for by the simultaneous *negation and retention*<sup>8</sup> of past forms of consciousness within a radical recomprehension of the totality.”<sup>9</sup> *Aufhebung* is significant because it indicates that actors in the dialectic must be negated and retained; alternatively, if a “thing” is unresolved, then it has not yet gone through or completed the dialectical process; or, it occurs outside the charted territory of the dialectical map.

The second consequential outcome of Hegel’s dialectic is Marx’s development of Dialectical Materialism, which expanded Hegel’s philosophy. For Hegel, knowledge was the ultimate goal of the dialectic and ideas were “the actual forces with which the dialectic operated [...] For Marx, it was economic relationships to the methods of production.”<sup>10</sup> Marx converted the dialectical process to a finite evolution of Feudal Lords (Thesis) – Serfs and Peasants (Antithesis) – City Life (Synthesis-becomes-Thesis) – Guilds (Antithesis) – Entrepreneurs (Synthesis-becomes-Thesis) – Proletariat (Antithesis) – Classless Society/Communism (Synthesis/Absolute) [See FIGURE 3].<sup>11</sup> Marx phrased socio-political




Figure 3.

evolution in economic terms and then structured these terms according to the dialectic. In doing so he made the dialectic finite, with communism the ultimate “Absolute” of the process, in contrast to the Hegelian perpetual conflict-resolution cycle of ideas and knowledge. The collapse of

the Soviet Union demonstrated that the dialectic did not culminate with the manifestation of communism. Instead, the Soviet Bloc proved finite. The resulting logic, intermingled with Cold War-style binary thinking, interpreted the end of the Soviet Union and the Soviet Bloc as the true “end of history,” and the end of the dialectical process, with the modern, liberal, democratic nation-state standing victorious at the fore [See FIGURE 3].<sup>12</sup> Globalization poses a problem to this theory; this problem will be addressed once the nation-state has been discussed.

### Nation-State Theory

Modern society is commonly considered to revolve around the nation-state, which is taken to be the basic element, or building block, of society.<sup>13</sup> Political and Social Sciences’ terminologies traditionally refer to inter- and intra-state conflicts; anti-state overwhelmingly refers to a conflict in which the leadership of a specific State is at stake, as opposed to conflict in which the State as ideology is at stake. There is, however, a logical argument to be made for the potential viability of alternatives to the nation-state. The consideration that the nation-state is the primary form of social and political organization is insufficient evidence to preclude the *possible* existence of an alternative. The absence of evidence is not evidence of absence. One alternative seems to be taking hold, that of the Zapatistas, which will be the primary focus of the case-study.

In attempting to understand that there may be alternatives to the nation-state, one must first ask: what is the nation-state? One commonly referenced understanding of the State comes from Max Weber: that the State is most immediately recognized by its power, or its ability to claim “the monopoly of the legitimate use of force in the enforcement of its order.”<sup>14</sup> Alternatively, Michael Keating proposes that “The critical aspect of statehood was the assertion of sovereignty.”<sup>15</sup> Keating develops this by saying, “Its essence is the claim to sovereignty, that is to ultimate authority within a territory.”<sup>16</sup> Ultimate authority within a territory refers to external state acknowledgement of that authority as much as to power within the state. Thus, Keating acknowledges the State’s power base while considering it in terms of other nation-states as well. One description of states in terms of international relations describes states as sovereign entities with ultimate

<sup>7</sup> Warren, 1984: 45.

<sup>8</sup> The emphasis is my own.

<sup>9</sup> Warren, 1984: 37.

<sup>10</sup> John L. Heineman, “002: Cultural and Institutional History of Modern Europe,” <http://www2.bc.edu/~heineman/marx.html>.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid.

<sup>12</sup> Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History?” *The National Interest* (1989).

<sup>13</sup> Margaret Canovan, *Nationhood and Political Theory* (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 1996).

<sup>14</sup> Georg Sørensen, *Changes in Statehood* (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 77.

<sup>15</sup> Michael Keating, *Nations Against the State* (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 18.

<sup>16</sup> Keating, 2001: 27.

authority in the international system, as in the Peace of Westphalia.<sup>17</sup> Another traditional political understanding of the State comes from Georg Sørensen, who describes the sovereign State as having “a (more or less) defined territory, a population, and some form of government (at least at the point of independence).”<sup>18</sup> These understandings are not contradictory; Max Weber and Michael Keating are referencing what the State *does*, while Sørensen identifies what the State *is*.

Like the state, the nation is complex and definitions are varied. Margaret Canovan identifies nations according to five categories: as states, as cultural communities, in terms of the subjective identities of individuals, as ethnic groups, and as products of modernization.<sup>19</sup> Nenad Mišćević proposes a perhaps simpler understanding, distinguishing between the “civic, state-oriented” nation and the “ethnically oriented” nation, while acknowledging a tendency to use the terms interchangeably.<sup>20</sup> Max Weber, however, draws a distinction between the people of a nation and the members of a State.<sup>21</sup> Rather, he identifies a nation as “a specific sentiment of solidarity” of a certain group of people ‘in the face of other groups.’<sup>22</sup> Nationality is thus distinct from citizenship, and the lines of nation and state do not necessarily correspond. Citizenship is one problem that will be returned to when assessing the Zapatistas. Ideas of nationality, and the corresponding implications concerning citizenship, are necessary bases with which to assess the nature of any form of governance. Given the various understandings of the nation-state, three basic areas of the nation-state serve as specific points of reference: the state, the State, and the nation. In this case, the state will be considered the geographic territory. The State is government and its mechanisms. The nation, then, consists of the people within that territory, both as subjects of a State and as ethnically or subjectively identified social groups.<sup>23</sup>

The nation-state is often contemporarily referred to in terms of its establishment and practice. That is to say, theorists ask the epistemological question of *what it does*, not the ontological question of *why it is/exists*. Existing nation-state theory follows epistemological lines by examining the role and the actions or methods of the nation-state in

society. The problem that arises from this tendency is that the saliency of the nation-state is seldom considered. According to Chernilo, the intrinsic worth of the nation-state to society was formalized by methodological nationalism, “the equation between the nation-state and society in social theory.”<sup>24</sup> Chernilo is critiquing theorists’ and social scientists’ tendency to assume in their methodology that nationalism – and thus the nation-state – exists. The result of this critique is the implication of a flaw in social theory – the failure to consider alternatives to the status quo.

The ontological question is markedly distinct from the question posed by many regarding the future of the nation-state in a globalized world.<sup>25</sup> The “crisis” that the nation-state has come to as a result of globalization and an increasingly (re)organized international system concerns the evolution of the nation-state as a form of government. The “crisis” occurs within the Western Dialectic, whereas the ontological question seeks to contextualize the Western Dialectic and the nation-state in the context of a greater dialectical map. The question surrounding the fate of the nation-state in the face of globalization thus supports the argument that nation-state hegemony – and thus, the Western Dialectic – is assumed. Globalization has, in practice, resulted in a perception of the narrowing of the dialectic, which corresponds with the notion that the world is shrinking. However, globalization also presents a global window or portal that offers a greater opportunity to encounter and envision alternative dialectical threads that are specific to other, distant locations.

Margaret Canovan points out that “the existence of nations is a tacit assumption of most current discourse in political theory,” and argues that there is a “presumed existence of political community,” and that this “political community is in fact a nation-state.”<sup>26</sup> Daniel Chernilo agrees that theorists skipped the normative (ontological) question and looked instead to formative (epistemological) issues. He perceives, then, “the invitation... to reconsider the set of *institutional practices* that have led to the creation and consolidation of the nation-state in modernity and the *intellectual outlook* with which scholars have tried to make sense of these practices.”<sup>27</sup> Chernilo sums up this invitation,

<sup>17</sup> Stephen D. Krasner, *Compromising Westphalia* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000).

<sup>18</sup> Sørensen, 2001: 73.

<sup>19</sup> Canovan, 1996: 50.

<sup>20</sup> Nenad Mišćević, *Nationalism and Beyond: Introducing Moral Debate about Values* (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2001), 10.

<sup>21</sup> Daniel Chernilo, *A Social Theory of the Nation-State: The Political Forms of Modernity Beyond Methodological Nationalism* (New York: Routledge, 2007), 52-53.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>23</sup> The modern nation-state typically categorizes people within such a territory as citizens or various categories of non-citizens. Non-citizens, with rare exceptions such as refugees, are generally considered to be citizens of some government, even if it is a different government. As such, all people are accordingly categorized. In turn, there is little space in which a person might claim non-citizenship in a general sense. This is true even for such persons as refugees, as such persons are subject to a strict definition and recognition process. From a government’s perspective, it is unlikely that people within a geographic state would not be considered citizens of that state.

<sup>24</sup> Chernilo, 2007: 9.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>26</sup> Canovan, 1996: 13.

<sup>27</sup> Chernilo, 2007: 9.

saying, “The nation-state cannot be regarded as though the final representation or most desirable form of modern socio-political life.”<sup>28</sup> This does not signal the end of the modern nation-state, nor its failure. It does, however, serve to remind that existence is not synonymous with indefinite hegemony.

Keating analyzes ‘stateless nations’ as one nation-oriented alternative to the nation-state, saying, “Most scholarly discussions of minority nationalism place it within the context of the nation-state. Either the minority nation wants its own nation state, or it wants some form of home rule within it. Yet both the meaning of the nation, and the form and content of the state are historically contingent, and change over time.”<sup>29</sup> This argument demonstrates both that the nation-state is not absolute and that alternatives – such as the alternative posed by the Zapatistas – are possible.

Bart de Ligt’s proposal of non-violence suggests an alternative to State monopoly of the legitimate use of force.<sup>30</sup> Is it possible for a State (or non-State form of governance) to act non-violently? A further question comes up in regards to territory. Hakim Bey<sup>31</sup> proposes a Temporary Autonomous Zone (T.A.Z.) that exists, temporarily, outside of the authority of the state.<sup>32</sup> This is notably distinct from an autonomous zone that exists within the territory of the state because it specifically disavows the authority, or claim, of a greater State within the confines of the Zone. These two premises will provide a point of reference for how the Zapatistas are significantly distinct from the liberal, democratic nation-state.

### **A Dialectical Rut: An Argument For A Nation-State Alternative**

The tendency to consider the nation-state as the culmination of historical evolution based on dialectical theory is rather like being stuck in a rut of a road. Perspective is one possible reason for the failure to recognize an alternative to the nation-state. By definition, history consists of that which has already occurred. The dialectic offers a pattern by which to analyze the events that shape the course of history, and historical events can be applied to the dialectic to show which tensions (theses and antitheses) have led to new historical syntheses. The tendency to use

this dialectical pattern to demonstrate present or future courses is flawed, however, because any analysis of outcome is purely theoretical until the outcome is certain. To apply a future theoretical outcome, such as the triumph of the nation-state leading to the end of the dialectic, is to create policy from theory. As such, the application would be creating and dictating future courses, rather than evaluating the course of history. Such an application is not outside the scope of policy-makers and politicians who seek to create change; the error is to present the future course as absolute. The rut, then, comes from an inability or refusal to acknowledge theses or antitheses that come from outside the understood Western Dialectic.

An example of the historical rut is that the potential threat a nation-state alternative would pose is inconsistent with traditional threats to the nation-state, yet is often treated as such. Theories that consider the security of the nation-state are based, overwhelmingly, on leftover Cold War logic. For example, the Democratic Peace Theory proposes that democracies do not go to war with each other.<sup>33</sup> While scholars acknowledge that this does seem to be generally true, there remains skepticism as well.<sup>34</sup> The Democratic Peace Theory is heavily influenced by Cold War era lines of division between communist dictatorships and liberal, democratic nation-states. Conflicts are broken down as coming from individuals or from States. Internal conflict is, by geographic nature, within the confines of the nation-state, and also typically treated as criminal. Organizations that threaten a nation-state are likewise treated by governments at the level of individual members.<sup>35</sup> Conflicts that occur from outside the territory of the state by individuals are labeled terrorist and thus criminal. Therefore, only states can legitimately come into conflict with other states. Even when heads of state are prosecuted for crimes, the conflicts that such leaders incite are immediately addressed on a state-to-state basis. Thus, the hegemonic nation-state is unassailable in its position. There is no space in which to address the threat posed by a group like the Zapatistas who operate inside the territory of a state but outside the mechanisms of the state, seeking to replace the nation-state itself.

The inattention to a potential alternative like the Zapatistas – not terrorist, not Soviet – has allowed such an alternative to evolve with less influence from the nation-state

<sup>28</sup> Chernilo, 2007: 14.

<sup>29</sup> Keating, 2001: xi.

<sup>30</sup> Bart de Ligt, *The Conquest of Violence* (London: Pluto Press, 1989).

<sup>31</sup> A note on the author: Hakim Bey is an extraordinarily controversial figure. The idea of the TAZ is his, and is insightful and significant; but the concept of the TAZ is the limit to which this paper will consider his work.

<sup>32</sup> Hakim Bey, *T.A.Z.: Temporary Autonomous Zone, Ontological Anarchy, Poetic Terrorism* (Williamsburg, Brooklyn: Autonomedia, 2003).

<sup>33</sup> Thomas S. Szayna et al., *The Emergence of Peer Competitors: A Framework for Analysis* (Santa Monica: Rand, 2001), 148-49.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid.

<sup>35</sup> Recent events and the response to terrorism of, for example, Al Qaeda, contradict this, but it remains to be seen whether this contradiction will be maintained over the long-term. Furthermore, this particular conflict has not yet fully played out at the time of writing. However, the push towards treating prisoners of this conflict within the criminal justice system is in line with the statement that individual members, and not the organization as a whole, are subjects of governmental response to terrorism.

mini-dialectic, permitting it to remain a distinct system. This is the greatest irony of the “End of History.” While the Western Cold War/nation-state Dialectic progressed, alternative versions of the dialectic were also progressing, largely ignored by the mega-forces of the Cold War era. The alternative dialectic the Zapatistas represent stands in a position to explode the dialectic into the realm where novel or even radical change is not only possible, but inevitable, by fracturing the pattern of conflict-resolution. Since Marx’s interpretation, the dialectic has traditionally been considered to be continually refining to a utopian point. If multiple threads of the dialectic are considered, however, then dialectical progress is much less refined than would otherwise be assumed. Moreover, certain historical events, such as the discovery and colonization of the Americas by Western Europe, shatter the dialectical process in a way, forcing a radical expansion in a way that reboots the process of conflict-resolution, and also generating new dialectical threads as it does. The imposition of the Western Dialectic in terms of the nation-state has created additional points of dialectical opposition. The dialectic must both refine and expand, because any past conflict-resolution is not necessarily permanent.

The Zapatistas are impacted by the Western Dialectic as well as their own, unique dialectic. Each dialectical thread is a series of conflicts and resolutions; however, the source of theses and antitheses in one thread may have sources unrelated to those of the other thread. For example, the Western Dialectic does not account for conflicts stemming from traditions that predate Spanish arrival in Latin America. In similar fashion, the Zapatistas’ own dialectic may have outstanding theses that, when confronted with the Western nation-state, resolve into a unique synthesis unlike that of any other dialectical process.

### Mexicans, Indigenous Persons, or Zapatistas?

The idea of the nation affects any assessment of the Zapatistas in two distinct ways: they are both subject to the Mexican State and as Maya are also members of an ethnically and subjectively identified social group [See Table 1<sup>36</sup>]. As citizens of the Mexican State, the members and supporters of the Zapatistas have been negatively impacted by their subaltern status. This is a reflection of the difficulties that surround nation-building and conceptualizations of citizenship. As indigenous Maya, the Zapatistas self-identify and are identified as dual citizens: on the one hand they are members of their contemporary nation, while on the other hand they may claim rights to a nationhood that lies beyond the confines of the contemporary nation – that

which predates the contemporary nation. This status has not worked to benefit those to whom it applies, but rather to detract from their ability to claim full Mexican citizenship. In other words, the non-Mexican citizenship has been subtracted from Mexican citizenship, rather than added to incorporate the two into a more vibrant, culturally rich sense of nationality. The Zapatistas’ vision of their society, however, depends upon this latter sense of nationality. The Zapatistas go one step further, and claim that their efforts in Chiapas are, in fact, necessary throughout Mexico. The Segunda Declaración de la Selva Lacandona states specifically, “There will be no solution for Chiapas without a Mexican solution.”<sup>37</sup> In this way they align their desire for (indigenous) autonomy in Chiapas with the need for greater autonomy throughout Mexico.

CARACOL	ASSOCIATED INDIGENOUS GROUPS	ALTERNATIVE NAMES
Caracol de la Realidad	Tojolabales, Tzeltales y Mames	“Madre de los Caracoles del Mar de Nuestros Sueños” “S-NAN XOCH BAJ PAMAN JA TEZ WAYCHIMEL KU’UNTIC”
Caracol de Morelia	Tzeltales, Tzotziles y Tojolabales	“Torbellino de Nuestra Palabras” “MUC’UL PUY ZUTU’IK JU’UN JC’OPTIC”
Caracol de la Garrucha	Tzeltales	“Resistencia Hasta un Nuevo Amanecer” “TE PUY TAS MALIYEL YAS PAS YACH’IL SACÁL QUINAL”
Caracol de Roberto Barrios	Choles, Zoques y Tzeltales	“El Caracol que Habla Para Todos” “TE PUY YAX SCOP’J’U’UN PISILITIC” (Tzeltal) “PUY MUITIT’AN CHA AN TI LAK PEHTEL” (Chol)
Caracol de Oventik	Tzotziles y Tzeltales	“Resistencia y Rebelión por la Humanidad” “TA TZIKEL VOCOLIL XCHUIC /TOYBAILTIC SVENTA SLEKIL SJUNUL BALUM IL”

Table 1.

The sense of shared identity is further reflected in the Declaración de la Selva Lacandona. This declaration references the Mexican Constitution and relates the Zapatista struggle to what they perceive is a struggle shared by all Mexicans. The announcement begins by citing the Mexican constitution, and the Zapatistas claim legitimacy through this measure, basing their claims within the Mexican national framework. The declaration goes on to denounce the Mexican government as illegitimate, and calls for the removal of this government on behalf of and by all the people of Mexico.<sup>38</sup> In this way, the Zapatistas clearly and explicitly align themselves as Mexican, with (at least) dual identities – that of indigenous persons, and of Mexicans.

The second effect contemporary understandings of nationality have had on the Zapatistas is in how this group is imagined by *Kaxlanes* [non-indigenous people]. It is perhaps easiest for many to assume that there is a shared sense of nationality within the Zapatistas. The overwhelming tendency is to describe the Zapatistas as Maya rebels, or

<sup>36</sup> Subcomandante Insurgente Marcos, “Chiapas: La Treceava Estela (las montañas del Sureste Mexicano,” <http://palabra.ezln.org.mx/comunicados>.

<sup>37</sup> Comité Clandestino Revolucionario Indígena-Comandancia General del Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional México, Segunda Declaración de la Selva Lacandona, <http://www.ezln.org/documentos/1994/19940610.es.htm>.

<sup>38</sup> Comandancia General del EZLN, Declaración de la Selva Lacandona, <http://www.ezln.org/documentos/1994/199312xx.es.htm>.

Maya revolutionaries. Indeed there is an argument to be made regarding shared Maya culture providing the basis for nation building. However, it is necessary to bear in mind that one person's understanding of "Maya" is not necessarily the same as the next person's understanding of the term.<sup>39</sup>

One way to assess a shared sense of nationality is according to language(s) spoken by a group of people. In the case of the Zapatistas, the incorporated cultural groups tend to speak an indigenous language – although not necessarily the same indigenous language [See Table 1]. It is absolutely necessary to realize that the various Mayan languages are, in fact, distinct and disparate languages. Contemporary Mayan languages are theorized to have evolved from a proto-Mayan language – or a shared historical language [See FIGURE 4<sup>40</sup>]. When compared to the relationships between Indo-European languages, [see FIGURE 5<sup>41</sup>] it can be understood, perhaps more easily, that the Mayan languages have degrees of variation between them that

distinguish one from another. In other words, the argument that the shared Mayan language provides a basis for nationality is comparable to arguing that English and German languages provide a basis for a common nationality.

Moreover, the Mayan language speakers who are affiliated with the Zapatistas do not represent the whole of Mayan language speakers. For example, Mayan language speakers can be found in – but are not limited to – the Yucatán, Guatemala and Belize [FIGURES 6<sup>42</sup> and 7<sup>43</sup>]. If Mayan languages – as they represent a sense of shared culture, history and tradition – did provide




Figure 4.



Figure 6.




Figure 5.



Figure 7.

such a basis for nation building, then surely there would be greater affiliation between Maya in Chiapas and in other regions. The Zapatistas are localized to Chiapas, and their affiliation with movements in neighboring Mexican states like Oaxaca is generally limited to solidarity and not actual collaboration.

<sup>39</sup> Furthermore, indigenous is not necessarily Maya. The Nahuatl-speaking Aztec descendants are a notably distinct ethnic group in the region.

<sup>40</sup> Brian M, "The Mayan Family of Languages," University of Texas, [http://www.utexas.edu/courses/stross/ant389\\_files/ant389.htm](http://www.utexas.edu/courses/stross/ant389_files/ant389.htm).

<sup>41</sup> "Wales: History: Language Family Tree," BBC, [http://www.bbc.co.uk/wales/history/sites/language/pages/family\\_tree.shtml](http://www.bbc.co.uk/wales/history/sites/language/pages/family_tree.shtml).

<sup>42</sup> "Mayan Family," Summer Institute of Linguistics in Mexico, <http://www.sil.org/Mexico/maya/00i-maya.htm>.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid.

Ultimately, there is a great deal of discord between mythologized Maya history and contemporary Maya reality. In a historical sense, Maya peoples have united and fragmented repeatedly, rather than following some continuous mystic thread of identity. Beyond a linguistic analysis of language divergence, the greatest example of this may be the dissolution of the Classic Maya cultural and power base, with the eventual Post-Classic resurgence in the Yucatán that coincided with Aztec assumption of regional power. Such socio-political organizations are typically discussed in terms of civilizations, empires, city-states, and so forth. However, these terms represent distinctly European concepts with implications that do not *necessarily* apply to non-European power and social structures. It is therefore crucial to recognize that, although European people, city-states and empires eventually transitioned into nations, States and nation-states, the imposition of this terminology onto non-European peoples reflects the imposition of nationhood on them as well. In terms of the assessment of nationality and nation-state identity, the implication is that there is a noticeable regional precedent for self identity and social construction that rests not upon the nation, but upon cooperation between unique groups towards shared goals.

An example of the laws the Zapatistas have incorporated into policy is The Women's Revolutionary Law, which demonstrates how nationality is not the determinant for socio-political inclusion; rather, inclusion is based upon ideological and principled affiliation with the Zapatistas.<sup>44</sup> A person's identity as "a Zapatista" does not identify that person as a Maya, a Tzotzil, or a Mexican, nor vice versa, but as a participating member of a locally organized full-democracy.<sup>45</sup> Effectively, the Zapatistas have re-imagined the role of the individual within the socio-political organization. A person's identification as a member of a nation neither includes them nor excludes them from participating in governance; the idea of citizenship drives governance. Unlike the aforementioned Weberian distinction between nationality and citizenship, the Zapatistas have attempted to create a socio-political order in terms of full-citizenship for every member of society, contingent solely upon the individual's desire and agreement to participate. Significantly, this attempt negates the division between members of a nation and the State.

### Zapatista Territory

Geographic territory is perhaps the most basic concept

associated with the nation-state. As indicated previously, the geographic state is considered the recognized territory that a government controls. There are multiple reasons why the Zapatistas cannot be considered to have formed such a state.

First, there is no recognition by any external governmental entity or institution of a Zapatista state. Mexico, on the other hand, is an internationally recognized state, and Zapatista territory is within the confines of the Mexican state. Second, Zapatista territory is not contiguous [See FIGURE 8<sup>46</sup>]. Moreover, the territory is broken up by




Figure 8.

Mexican military presence *in between* Zapatista-occupied territories [See FIGURE 9<sup>47</sup>]. The result is one of inordinate instability from a nation-state perspective – although not necessarily from the Zapatistas' perspective. The EZLN's presence is still highly contested; however, the presence of the Mexican military and State is also contested. Finally, the Zapatistas have not petitioned anyone to be partitioned from the Mexican state. Their claim is for autonomy that is not subject to but united with a greater Mexican nation and state that would be restructured similarly, into Autonomous Zones, by removing what the Zapatistas have termed an illegal government – that of the Mexican state.<sup>48</sup> The result would be a network of independent territories united by choice rather than force or violence of State. Nation and geographic state would remain, but

<sup>44</sup> Shannon Speed, R. Aida Hernández Castillo, and Lynn M. Stephen, eds., *Women's Revolutionary Law in Dissident Women: Gender and Cultural Politics in Chiapas* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2006).

<sup>45</sup> Full-democracy functions in this context as a reference to a democratic process in which all members participate to the fullest measure they desire and deem appropriate; this is in contrast to a representational democracy in which members elect others to act on their behalf.

<sup>46</sup> CIEPAC, "Nonviolent Ways Project: Proyecto de la Vía No-Violenta: Rebel Zapatista, autonomous and pluri-ethnic municipalities and territories," <http://www.nonviolentways.org/mapas.html>.

<sup>47</sup> CIEPAC, "Nonviolent Ways Project: Proyecto de la Vía No-Violenta: Municipalities with Mexican Military Presence: barracks, encampments, military bases, checkpoints," <http://www.nonviolentways.org/mapas.html>.

<sup>48</sup> Comandancia General del EZLN, "Declaración de la Selva Lacandona," <http://www.ezln.org/documentos/1994/199312xx.es.htm>.

without an overarching, sovereign State. Indeed, when “autonomy” is used in this context, it is not a reference to traditional concepts of autonomy within the boundaries




Figure 9.

of a sovereign nation-state, but to autonomy without a greater, sovereign state. Hakim Bey’s radical conception of the Temporary Autonomous Zone (TAZ) describes this style of state as an underground subversive State in a constant state of war.<sup>49</sup> Bey imagines a contemporary version of this pseudo-State, the TAZ. He argues that the TAZ, as an alternative to a State, *must* be temporary, a momentary departure from the Hegelian dialectic, “which is secretly nothing more than a vicious circle.” This is based on his assertion that technology of the State makes any Autonomous Zone necessarily fleeting, either by choice of the occupants or by assault from the State.

While Bey’s determination that the nature of the TAZ is impermanence, the Zapatistas’ duration in their territory for more than 10 years, as well as their long term goals, defy such transience. Indeed, it is this duration that makes it necessary to write a paper such as this one. The determination that the Hegelian dialectic is a vicious circle is, in fact, a reflection of the contemporary assumptions regarding the course of the dialectic. Understanding the dialectic to be more complex and varied, as is suggested here, implies variances within the dialectic that Bey does

not acknowledge. Indeed, disruption of the dialectic has provided the basis for dialectical discourse in the long-term.<sup>50</sup> Moreover, Bey fails to consider the possibility that the TAZ could *succeed*, and in so doing create the possibility of permanence. The Zapatistas have arguably done exactly this by establishing Autonomous Zones that function to allow the development of an alternative to the Mexican state on a durative, ongoing basis.

### El *Caracol*, Or The People’s Mandate

The Zapatistas address the matter of government – or the mechanisms of the State – in The Sixth Declaration of the Lacandon Jungle, which lays out an official outline for governance in the autonomous Zapatista communities.<sup>51</sup> The Sixth Declaration deals with how to create civil and democratic authority when “*la parte político-militar del EZLN no es democrática, porque es un ejército.*”<sup>52</sup> The solution to this has been to separate the militaristic and civil aspects of the Zapatistas, subjugating the military to civil society. The significance of this Declaration is two-fold: the Zapatistas have employed mechanisms of government, or State; and they have done so in a way that defies the traditional understanding of the monopoly of power of the State.

The Zapatistas consistently refer to “*mandar obedeciendo*,” or rule by obeying, to describe the manner of their governing ideology. This term is used to describe government that is directed immediately by the people, and which is non-hierarchical, in contrast to liberal democracy and representative government. In accordance with this ideology, the Autonomist Communities converted into five *caracoles* and Juntas de Buen Gobierno, or Committees of Good Government.<sup>53</sup> The *caracoles* are “points of communication” that “are the seats for the five Juntas de Buen Gobierno.”<sup>54</sup> The Juntas are charged with the role of carrying out the mechanisms of state according to the demands of the populations affiliated with the Zapatistas [See Table 1]. The sentiments and history expressed by these designations are reflected in Subcomandante Marcos’ communiqué “La treceava estela.”<sup>55</sup>

*Dicen aquí que los más antiguos dicen que otros más anteriores dijeron que los más primeros de estas tierras tenían aprecio por la figura del caracol. Dicen que dicen que decían que el caracol representa el*

<sup>49</sup> *The medieval Assassins founded a “State” which consisted of a network of remote mountain valleys and castles, separated by thousands of miles, strategically invulnerable to invasion, connected by the information flow of secret agents, at war with all governments, and devoted only to knowledge.* Hakim Bey, T.A.Z.: Temporary Autonomous Zone, Ontological Anarchy, Poetic Terrorism, Pirate Utopias.

<sup>50</sup> Here, the long-term applies over the course of multiple hundreds to thousands of years, not the more recent long-term so often applied by nation-state theorists.

<sup>51</sup> Comité Clandestino Revolucionario Indígena-Comandancia General del Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional, Sexta Declaración de La Selva Lacandonia, <http://www.ezln.org/documentos/2005/sexta.es.htm>.

<sup>52</sup> Ibid.

<sup>53</sup> Speed, 2006: *xvi*.

<sup>54</sup> Ibid.

<sup>55</sup> Subcomandante Insurgente Marcos, “Chiapas: La Treceava Estela,” <http://palabra.ezln.org.mx/comunicados>.

*entrarse al corazón, que así le decían los más primeros al conocimiento. Y dicen que dicen que decían que el caracol también representa el salir del corazón para andar el mundo, que así llamaron los primeros a la vida. Y no sólo, dicen que dicen que decían que con el caracol se llamaba al colectivo para que la pa[la]bra fuera de uno a otro y naciera el acuerdo. Y también dicen que dicen que decían que el caracol era ayuda para que el oído escuchara incluso la palabra más lejana. Eso dicen que dicen que decían.*

This passage ties government not only to *mandar obedeciendo* but to the people and the region specifically. It also demonstrates the significance of the Zapatistas' perception of their history on how their socio-political organization functions.

With the establishment of the *caracoles* and the Juntas de Buen Gobierno, the Zapatistas have, then, established a system of socio-political organization that reflects their ideology, goals, and history. An additional aspect of the Zapatistas' organization is that of the Other Campaign, or La Otra Campaña, which functions as a link to other organizations and Non-Governmental Organizations, or NGOs.<sup>56</sup> The third, militaristic aspect of the Zapatistas is the Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional (EZLN). Effectively, these three branches reflect governmental, inter-relational, and military aspects of the Zapatistas, and the commitment to increasingly civil action: "...Somos soldados que quieren dejar de ser soldados..."<sup>57</sup>

These branches also reinforce a notion that is, in its establishment, particular to the Zapatistas. This is the idea of a State acting without violence. It may seem inherently wrong to argue that the Zapatistas – an armed insurgency fought by members of the EZLN – could be considered nonviolent. However, both because of their words and actions, the Zapatistas' aspirations to non-violent strategy are accepted in many spheres. The size and location of the EZLN prevents the Zapatistas from being a major threat to Federal Troops. The Zapatistas' initial action on January 1, 1994 consisted of the seizing of four<sup>58</sup> towns in Chiapas. These were held only briefly, however, and the Zapatistas very quickly turned to political and civil means of rebellion after a ceasefire was declared 12 days after the conflict

began.<sup>59</sup> The total number of deaths at that time, primarily of Zapatistas<sup>60</sup> and civilians<sup>61</sup>, was 145. The status of the Zapatistas as armed or unarmed varies by source, sometimes wildly. However, by establishing themselves as willing and desirous to use non-violent methods as their first choice, and often only choice, the Zapatistas have, to some degree, succeeded on establishing a monopoly of power for the purpose of dismantling this power.

One strategy that supports this aspiration to non-violence is the Zapatistas' ample and highly beneficial use of what can be considered their most successful non-violent weapon – the internet. It is because of the remarkable and skillful use of internet technology that the Zapatistas have achieved the international acclaim they have won, and also why they have gained such assistance from the international community.<sup>62</sup> This use of the internet and media is primarily responsible for the mythologizing of the Zapatistas internationally in radical and non-radical circles alike. Not only does the internet represent a highly successful use of non-violent strategy, it has also allowed the Zapatistas to document additional non-violent strategies that might otherwise have gone unnoticed, such as La Otra Campaña and the efforts made towards peace accords.

The San Andrés Peace Accords of 1996 are, arguably, the most notable example of the Zapatistas' ability to positively document their efforts towards peace. Despite the eventual failure of the Accords and the precariousness of ceasefires, the process by which they came about demonstrated the willingness to lay down arms on the part of the EZLN – a willingness that has been proven to be absent on the part of the Mexican government, as evidenced by Mexican military presence in the region [See Figure 9]. The Zapatistas' consistent efforts to defer authority to Civil Society and their encouragement of and participation in civil marches rather than continuing to employ military force makes the expressed goal of a non-violent State – not power or personal gain but for "una paz con justicia, dignidad, democracia y libertad" plausible.<sup>63</sup> The eventual creation of the civil aspect of La Otra Campaña as a civil and unarmed branch of organization further supports this goal. The desire for peace is distinct from the more traditional Weberian theory of State power, which argues that the State is legitimized by its monopoly of power. The non-hierarchical nature of

<sup>56</sup> Enlace Zapatista, <http://enlacezapatista.ezln.org.mx/>.

<sup>57</sup> Informe del diálogo para la paz, <http://www.ezln.org/documentos/1994/19940223.es.htm>.

<sup>58</sup> Although this number varies between four, five, and seven (Oliver Froehling, "The Cyberspace 'War of Ink and Internet' in Chiapas, Mexico," *Geographical Review* 87, no. 2 (1997): 291-307; Subcomandante Insurgente Marcos, *Nuestra Arma es Nuestra Palabra*; Shannon Speed, *Dissident Women*), four is given here as the more conservative.

<sup>59</sup> Karen Kampwirth, "Creating Space in Chiapas: An Analysis of the Strategies of the Zapatista Army and the Rebel Government in Transition," *Bulletin of Latin American Research* 15:2 (1996): 261-67.

<sup>60</sup> Froehling, 1997: 295.

<sup>61</sup> Adrián Boutoureira, *Chronology of the Zapatista Uprising: 1994-2006* (Washington DC: Committee of Indigenous Solidarity/DC Zapatistas, 2006).

<sup>62</sup> Elaine Katzenberger, *Introduction to First World, Ha Ha Ha!* (San Francisco: City Lights, 1995); Mongo Sanchez Lira and Rogelio Villareal, *Mexico 1994: The Ruins of the Future in First World, Ha Ha Ha!* 223-234; and Froehling, 1997: 295.

<sup>63</sup> Informe del diálogo para la paz, <http://www.ezln.org/documentos/1994/19940223.es.htm>.

the Zapatistas' socio-political order and *mandar obedeciendo* lend further credence to their calls for non-violence.<sup>64</sup>

Bart de Ligt cites Carl Schmitt to summarize the wielding of State power, arguing that, "supreme political authority is characterized by the *jus belli*, the right to declare and to wage war, and, by the right which every Government reserves, to demand at any moment from every citizen who is nothing but a subject after all, the *Todesbereitschaft* and *Törmungsbereitschaft*."<sup>65</sup> De Ligt highlights the use of force by a State, and also the use of force between States, carried out by the citizens of the State. He further states that, as a response to this, "Every 'right' has been won by violence and can only be defended by it: in our times still, law is imposed and maintained by force."<sup>66</sup> De Ligt's critique goes beyond analysis, and he proposes non-violence as the true alternative to State authority and power. In his chapter titled "Violence and Revolution,"<sup>67</sup> De Ligt advises that there is a distinction between Spiritual or Doctrinal Violence – necessary to change from one system of government, or State, to another – and Material Violence – which is both the primary instrument of State power and also not necessary for a revolution. He further argues that bloodshed can only be the result of a badly prepared and imperfect revolution. Effectively, for a revolution to be successful, or a "true" revolution, the revolutionary powers must abdicate the violent instruments of the State. In a later introduction to de Ligt's work, Aldeous Huxley expands on this argument, stating that violence only begets more violence and a growing determination to retain power. In an appeal of sorts to contemporary revolutionaries of his time, he lays out the trap that violence sets for revolutionaries: "Unfortunately, the fact is that (unless very speedily followed by acts of compensatory acts of non-violence) violence always produces the results of violence."<sup>68</sup>

The Zapatistas have found a balance that Huxley and De Ligt would likely have approved. They "very speedily" followed acts of "Spiritual" or "Doctrinal Violence" with "compensatory acts of non-violence." Their actions coincide as well with Hakim Bey's theory of the TAZ. The use of violence was sustained for the extent of time necessary to secure and convert a TAZ to a permanent Autonomous Zone, at which point non-violent tactics "speedily" became the preferred method of action.

### **An Alternative Dialectical Process and the Implications**

The comparison of the Zapatistas with the nation-state

has several implications. In terms of nationality, there are nationalistic ties, but these are focused specifically around participation or a sense of citizenship. The Zapatistas hold territory, which makes them greater than a "stateless nation"; but the lack of contiguous territory prevents them from possessing a traditional state. Socio-political organization functions in the role of a State, but without always acting like one. The Zapatistas have created a distinct socio-political organization that allows them to be compared to the nation-state. This comparison necessarily analyzes the Zapatistas according to various political theories, rather than a more traditional assessment according to social movement theory.

The argument that social movement theory is not sufficient to adequately assess the Zapatistas is, perhaps, difficult. The greatest source of difficulty is posed by the plethora of interpretations of what a social movement is; in that sense, the argument that a group is not, or is greater than, a social movement is rather complex. Although the Zapatistas are a part of a greater social movement and are representatives of that movement in Chiapas, the presence of mechanisms of State – the *caracoles* and the Juntas de Buen Gobierno – as well as the military branch – whether violent or no – indicate that the Zapatistas have moved beyond the realm of a social movement.

The concept of *Aufhebung* describes dialectical conclusions, syntheses or the Absolute, as "negating and retaining" all preceding elements of a dialectical process. The nation-state, however, is a Western concept, with the current form rooted in the Treaty of Westphalia.<sup>69</sup> The implication is that there is a great deal of history, especially from non-western cultures that has been discarded or ignored by the Western Dialectic. These are, however, a part of human history, and dialectical theory suggests that, until or unless *all* components of human history have resolved, the dialectical process and its inherent tensions will continue. It is necessary to realize that dialectical conflict – the conflict between thesis and antithesis – can be and often is violent, and nearly always carries the potential for violence. It is unlikely that dormant antitheses will become apparent until after they come into conflict with a recognized thesis. This unlikelihood is based, however, on the presumption that blinders will continue to bar theoreticians and students from recognizing alternative dialectical patterns. If, on the other hand, these alternative threads are recognized, then pending antitheses can be accounted for before coming into conflict and the resolution of these thus holds the potential to be less violent.

<sup>64</sup> George A. Collier and Jane F. Collier, "The Zapatista Rebellion in the Context of Globalization," *Journal of Peasant Studies* 32:3 (2005): 450-60.

<sup>65</sup> Readiness to kill, and readiness to be killed, respectively. De Ligt, 1989: 29.

<sup>66</sup> De Ligt, 1989: 33.

<sup>67</sup> Ibid.

<sup>68</sup> Aldeous Huxley, *Introduction to The Conquest of Violence* (London: Pluto Press, 1989), xxix.

<sup>69</sup> Krasner, 2000.

The inability to account for these alternative dialectical processes increases the likelihood that the resolution of conflict will be on a greater and more violent scale and the posed antithesis more likely to challenge the prevailing system as a whole – for example, to challenge the ideology of the liberal, democratic nation-state. As referenced above, the Democratic Peace Theory proposes that democracies do not go to war with each other.<sup>70</sup> However, it is also true that other types of similarly structured governments do not go to war with each other. For example, within the Soviet Bloc and other communist states there were no interstate wars once nations were incorporated as communist.<sup>71</sup> Working the problem from another perspective, it is also true that in Central America – where there have been remarkably few interstate wars – those that did occur were on a small scale and came about largely because of slight differences between styles of government.<sup>72</sup> On the heels of independence from Spain in the early 19<sup>th</sup> century, the States were organized as similarly structured Republics. At the same time, many of the Republics fluctuated between liberal and conservative styles of government.<sup>73</sup> Often, when a State oscillated between styles of government, the opposition would flee to a neighboring state with similarly structured government. This meant that, for example, a Liberal State's neighboring Conservatives would harbor the first State's Conservative opposition, allowing them to regroup and safely prepare a coup d'état. The result of this was a series of brief, minor interstate wars. The lack of intensity of these wars resulted from the similarities between the republics. As the Central American governments stabilized, conflict in the region became internalized, with only one (arguable<sup>74</sup>) interstate war occurring after the wars of federation.<sup>75</sup> The outcome is that 1) conflict occurs during power transitions and 2) *similar* governments are less likely to go to war. Moreover, because the resolution of the immediate dialectical tensions did not resolve underlying tensions like racism and classism, these latter tensions have continued to internally affect the Central American States.

Because “similar” is a comparative term, it implies that there are degrees of likeness. The governments of Central America at independence were more alike than were the liberal, democratic nation-states and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. The degree of similarity or distinction between nation-states may be related to the degree of similarity or distinction between the factors that form the theses and antitheses of their own dialectical threads. Similarly, the degree of conflict between a thesis and

antithesis, or between types of socio-political organizations for example, may be indicated by corresponding degrees of separation on the dialectical chart. Likewise, if violence often stems from dialectical conflicts, then the degree of violence would coincide with the degree of dialectical separation. In this context, degree of change refers to the difference between an original thesis and/or antithesis and the resulting synthesis. Conflict that occurs between two points on a shared dialectical thread thus will likely be less intense than conflict between two points on separate dialectical threads. Alternatively, the intersection between two distinct dialectical threads, as the origin of a new dialectical process, must resolve the original threads but must also resolve tensions that result from the meeting itself. These new tensions would be spawned by the process of junction, and would be incredibly likely to result in conflict, especially if there were little to no reference to relevant past resolutions. One example of this would be the Spanish conquest of Mexico and Latin America.

The Zapatistas do not demonstrate this degree of conflict for several reasons. The ideology they espouse depends heavily on notions of democratic governance, which is on the surface at least similar enough to traditional nation-state politics to prevent them from becoming the center of a global firestorm. Additionally, this group is small, and as stated above, has never posed a great military threat. Furthermore, the Mexican State has committed more conflict against the Zapatistas than has been committed by the Zapatistas. Conflict, therefore, may be experienced differently by two opposing dialectical actors. Thus, the effect of the Zapatistas' posed alternative will likely be played out on a more local level and on a smaller scale. Greater conflict becomes more likely in the intersection of two dialectical courses that are at their respective peaks. It is also significant to note that, although the dominant, Western Dialectic generally has not recognized alternative versions such as that which the Zapatistas represent, this does not imply that the alternatives do not recognize, respond to or resolve the more dominant Dialectical actors. The Zapatistas, for example, have incorporated Marxist ideology and democratic principles, as well as identifying as indigenous in response to and as defined by an alternative “other”, or non-indigenous identity construct. Although it is overwhelmingly one-sided, this incorporation demonstrates the overlap of two distinct dialectical processes in a way that establishes mutual ground on which to meet. Simultaneously, the disparate forces at play throughout the dialectical processes of conflict-

<sup>70</sup> Thomas S. Szayna et al., *The Emergence of Peer Competitors: A Framework for Analysis*, (Santa Monica: Rand, 2001), 148-49.

<sup>71</sup> Meredith Reid Sarkees, “The Correlates of War Data on War: An Update to 1997, Conflict Management and Peace Science,” <http://www.correlatesofwar.org>.

<sup>72</sup> Edwin Ryan, “Central America,” *The Americas* 4:3 (1948): 316-24, [www.jstor.org/search](http://www.jstor.org/search).

<sup>73</sup> Control by either of these parties represented more of a shift between governments rather than a shift between parties within a shared government, as is usual in the US, for example.

<sup>74</sup> Sarkees, 1997.

<sup>75</sup> Ibid.

resolution and their retention as a result of *Aufhebung* have shaped two processes that act and respond to internal forces and to each other in distinct ways.

The foremost conclusion of this analysis is the challenge to the hegemony of the nation-state as the basic unit of society, as a representative of the Western Dialectical process that has been imposed on people throughout the world. This challenge is limited to the extent that the Zapatistas are, arguably, the only example of a group actively asserting an alternative dialectical process with any degree of success. The world has been divided and subdivided into states that are controlled by States, and inhabited by nations. With the now questionable exceptions of the two poles, the world is generally considered to consist of nation-states and nation-state-controlled territories. Regions that are in flux are determined to want the power of an existing nation-state, or to form their own nation-states. Nations within states that are unsatisfactorily represented demand their own nation-states, as with Israel, Palestine, Tibet, Chechnya, etc. Territories that once were unrecognized as nation-states have long since been claimed by recognized nation-states with a very few rare and geographically isolated exceptions. Territories have been claimed, nation-states created, fought over, and lost, passing from the possession of one nation-state to another, to find that when they achieved nation-state sovereignty, it was widely unsuccessful. Yet, the process continues. The Zapatistas have fashioned Autonomous Zones, in which the inhabitants decide matters of their own governance, without government being imposed upon them. This contradiction to the nation-state status quo provides not only an alternative, but also the rekindling of the need to evolve and transform. The drive to not remain static, but to continually seek improvement, has driven human history up to this point and, hopefully, will continue. In sum, the Zapatistas have created an opening for creative evolution that the politicians and theorists of the era, inspired by nation-state dominance, had thought closed.

The imposition of the dialectic as it is currently understood demonstrates an inability on the part of academia and theoreticians to fully move beyond the racist and imperialist doctrines of centuries past. Furthermore, if the nation-state is seen as the culmination of this imposed dialectic, then the nation-state as well may be viewed as a remnant of the imperialist era. The dialectic, as it is currently conceived, must be revisited and remapped to incorporate alternative, parallel, and complex dialectical processes. Not only do such processes coexist with the recognized Western Dialectic, they also allow for a greater dialectical process that is in a state of constant refinement *and* expansion. Such a revision would not only adjust the current basis for relevant political, social, and theoretical thought, it would also give due credence to alternative processes. Revision would, in fact, constitute a step towards reconciling these parallel dialectical strains. The gap between recognizing the need to refashion the application of the dialectic and actually doing so is great

enough that it may be more appropriately labeled a chasm. However, the recognition of the dialectic as a multi-layered and multi-dimensional historical map will reduce the degree to which subaltern histories and the people those histories represent are marginalized by ignorance and inattention.

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## The Impact of World Literature in Secondary Schools in Oregon and Chile: A Comparative Case Study

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*The reading of world literature, literary works from cultures other than one's own, offers an effective means of creating greater awareness and sensitivity towards others. Research on the subject makes it clear that world literature can help lay the foundation for a sense of world citizenship in students. To what extent have U.S. high school students been exposed to world literature? Do they display more characteristics of world citizenship as a result? How do U.S. high school students compare to their peers abroad? To answer these questions, I conducted a case study of three high schools in the state of Oregon and three high schools in the Bio-Bio Region of Chile (Region VIII), where I administered a written survey to literature students. The survey included questions regarding students' backgrounds, experience with world literature, knowledge of world affairs, and personal opinions. While it is difficult to isolate reading world literature as an explicit cause of greater world citizenship, it is clear that world literature can and should play an important role in the development of global perspectives in students' lives.*

Over the past two centuries, the matrix of imperial powers and their colonies has faded away and the nation-state has emerged as the dominant actor on the world stage. In the world today, we most often categorize and identify people by their nationalities. Sometimes perceived cultural similarities and/or political affiliations, such as the European Union, cause regions rather than nations to be discussed. When it comes to the origin of a person or a literary work, however, nationality is usually the most important affiliation.

The division of the world based on arbitrary political lines results in a climate of antagonism and tension, an "us versus them" mentality. In the United States, for example, Iraqis, Iranians, Muslims, and even people who just *look* like they are from the Middle East are considered "others." J.B. Priestley writes that "the nation-states of today are for the most part far narrower in their outlook, far more inclined to allow prejudice against the foreigner to impoverish their own style of living, than the old imperial states were."<sup>1</sup> An example of this "impoverished style of living" can be found on msnbc.com, a popular news outlet in the United States. For the most part divided into sections according to region of the world, MSNBC's "World News" heading also includes sections on the "Conflict in Iraq" and "Terrorism," illustrating that these are top concerns for American readers of international news as interpreted by MSNBC.<sup>2</sup> Terrorism discussed in the context of the

United States' War on Terror has certainly perpetuated an "us versus them" way of thinking, as terrorists are discussed as the antithesis of America, hating us and everything we stand for and represent.

A foreign policy of isolation is obsolete, and globalization is the new world order. In the past century, international organizations such as the United Nations, the World Trade Organization, and the Group of Eight (G8) have been created which operate outside of the nation-state matrix and have become important global actors. Multi-national corporations, the increasing ease and speed at which the average citizen can interact with people from around the world (the internet, satellite systems, air travel), and the universal threats of global warming and limited natural resources are other factors that are forcing us to think of the globe as a single unit rather than a collection of separate entities.

A globally unified community will be important for the protection of the environment and for the well-being of people everywhere. A better acquaintance with and deeper understanding of people from different cultural traditions will provide a better opportunity for peace in the future; the events of September 11, 2001 showed U.S. citizens how dangerous it is to be uninformed about other people and nations.

The idea of world citizenship, or thinking of oneself as a citizen of the world first and foremost, and of a nation-state

<sup>1</sup> J.B. Priestley, "Wrong Ism," in *Arguing in Communities*, ed. Gary Layne Hatch (Mountain View, California: Mayfield Publishing Company, 1999), 85.

<sup>2</sup> "World News," *MSNBC*. <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/3032507>.

second,<sup>3</sup> is not only becoming increasingly popular, but is vital to the success and survival of the human race. Greater compassion, respect, understanding and empathy on the part of individuals for “the condition of all human beings, no matter where they live” will improve government, trade, and interpersonal relations across cultures.<sup>4</sup> An understanding of world citizenship will keep U.S. citizens competitive in the international business world and enable them to become promoters of peace and improved human rights conditions for all in the future.

Combating long-held and deeply engrained beliefs and attitudes is a tough task. It is an obligation American publishers are not fulfilling. It is estimated that 3-6% of all book translations worldwide are from foreign languages into English, compared to the 50-60% of all book translations which come from English originals.<sup>5</sup> In some markets, the number is even higher. In a study conducted in Serbia of 15,000 translations, 74% were from English originals.<sup>6</sup> This means that no matter how well-intentioned and globally-focused one may be, he or she is limited by the body of foreign literature available in translation. More disturbing is the ethnocentric nature of U.S. culture these numbers bring to light. Publishers are reacting to markets, publishing what they think will sell. It is a “chicken or the egg” scenario: is the reading public not interested in works in translation because not many are published, or are not many works in translation published because there would be little to no interest in them? “In short, in one way or other the world is reading us. But we’re not reading the world,” the Language Learning News website sums up (2007).<sup>7</sup> Little exposure to outside cultures and ideas, combined with the aggressive exportation of American culture, means that we U.S. citizens are known by our foreign counterparts better than we know them.

However, it is to our formal education system that “the role of creating a citizenry informed on international

affairs belongs” (Lambert 1993, 259). Yet the U.S. education system is falling short of its potential to create upstanding world citizens of today’s youth. In a recent study conducted by Ipsos Mori for the British Council, U.S. children aged 11-16 were ranked ninth out of ten for their level of global awareness, outranking only children from the United Kingdom.<sup>8</sup> In addition, only students from the U.S., the United Kingdom, and the Czech Republic saw themselves as primarily citizens of their own country, while students from the other seven nations were more likely to identify as “citizens of the world.”<sup>9</sup> This “global illiteracy” is harmful to the United States in many respects, including “trade, U.S. multinationals’ success in other countries, diplomacy, and security.”<sup>10</sup> According to Scott, “more than 80 federal agencies depend in part on proficiency in more than 100 foreign languages and are not staffed for the tasks.”<sup>11</sup>

In this thesis, I will focus on world literature as an avenue for developing world citizenship in U.S. and Chilean students. As Linda Christensen puts it, “reading and writing are ultimately political acts” and therefore provide a perfect opportunity for students to interact with different cultures.<sup>12</sup> Ernesto Montenegro explains:

creative literature may prove the best means to real understanding among distance people, if one considers that a too perfect symbol of a foreign nation will never touch our heart as does the intimate knowledge of real human beings, with their failings and shortcomings which make them so much like ourselves.<sup>13</sup>

A course in world literature can provide this “intimate knowledge” of people around the world to students better than can a dry history or political science course. World literature “presents human experience, intensified, clarified, interpreted.... It is the revelation of this inner spirit which unites humanity,

<sup>3</sup> Guru Nitya Chaitanya Yati was quoted in *World Citizenship Defined* (2005) as follows: “If a citizen of a state with political frontiers is expected to pay allegiance to the government of the state to which he or she belongs and is expected to take arms against aliens who might invade the territory of the state, a world citizen recognizes the entire world as one’s state and in principle does not recognize any member of one’s own species as an alien to the world community to which oneself belongs.” *The Association of World Citizens’ website* (2007) adds that world citizenship “is not a replacement for national citizenship, but rather a new responsibility in this interdependent world to work together across national boundaries to secure our common fate.”

<sup>4</sup> Delane Bender-Slack, “Using Literature to Teach Global Education: A Humanist Approach,” *English Journal*, vol. 91 no. 5 (May 2002): 71.

<sup>5</sup> Nick Currie, “Culture Flows Through English Channels, but Not for Long,” *Weblog Wired*, April 10, 2007. <http://www.wired.com/culture/culturereviews/commentary/imomus/2007/04/imomus0410>.

<sup>6</sup> Rüdiger Wischenbart, “Knowledge and its Price” (paper presented at the International Conference on the Digitization of Cultural Heritage, Salzburg, Austria, June 21, 2006). <http://www.signandsight.com/features/839.html>.

<sup>7</sup> “Language Learning News - November 2007: Lost in Translation,” *Weblog Languages Languages...* November 19, 2007, <http://languageslanguages.blogspot.com/2007/11/british-and-us-children-least-globally.html>.

<sup>8</sup> Nigerian children scored the highest, with an index of 5.15 on a scale of 0-7, followed by India (4.86), Brazil (4.53), Saudi Arabia (3.74), Spain (3.29), Germany (3.24), China (2.97), Czech Republic (2.51), the United States (2.22), and the United Kingdom (2.19) (UK pupils 2007).

<sup>9</sup> “UK pupils ‘least globally aware,’” *BBC News*, November 12, 2007, [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk\\_news/education/7087590.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/education/7087590.stm).

<sup>10</sup> Robert A. Scott, “Many Calls, Little Action: Global Illiteracy in the United States” (paper presented at the National Language Conference: A Call to Action, Adelphi, Maryland, June 22, 2004) [http://www.nlconference.org/docs/For\\_Lang\\_Pres\\_Speech.pdf](http://www.nlconference.org/docs/For_Lang_Pres_Speech.pdf), 4.

<sup>11</sup> Scott, 2004: 4.

<sup>12</sup> Linda Christensen, quoted in Delane Bender-Slack, “Using Literature to Teach Global Education: A Humanist Approach,” *English Journal*, vol. 91, no. 5 (May 2002): 70.

<sup>13</sup> Ernesto Montenegro, “Latin America Reveals Itself in its Literature,” *English Journal*, vol. 31, no. 5 (May 1942): 348.

even while it reveals its infinite variety, that gives a higher dimension to existence."<sup>14</sup> It is imperative that teachers, school boards, and government officials prioritize and implement a world literature curriculum in U.S. high schools in order to inspire a curiosity within students about the world outside of the United States. A high school curriculum of world literature would be an effective way to engender world citizenship.

## Literature Review

According to the University of Wisconsin's Department of Comparative Literature, the term "Comparative Literature" was first coined in the publication of French anthologies for the teaching of literature in 1816.<sup>15</sup> The term "world literature" was first used by Johann Wolfgang von Goethe in 1827 to signify "the literature which serves as a link between national literatures and thus between the nations themselves, for the exchange of ideal values."<sup>16</sup> Once considered the study of literature from different nations, the field of Comparative Literature has expanded since then. This correlates to debates over the expansion of the literary canon. The literary canon is understood as "a principle of selection by which some authors or texts were deemed worthier of preservation than others"<sup>17</sup> and has become a central debate in the fields of comparative literature and literary criticism over the years.<sup>18</sup> Which works should be included in lists of definitive "Great Books" and literature course curriculums? Which should not? What are the qualifications for making the list? Who makes these decisions? These questions about canon formation originated with eighteenth-century literary critics, according to Lee Morrissey. In the preface to his book *Debating the Canon: A Reader from Addison to Nafisi*, Morrissey cites the end of World War II as the "passing of an era" as several forces came together to cause "the" canon to come under serious question. Claims to European universalism were shaken in the postcolonial era, as "support for territorial self-determination was written into the Charter of the

new United Nations."<sup>19</sup> The appearance of non-European and non-Western authors and works in the literary world demanded new ways of thinking and critiquing. What we *should* read, (as the canon and Great Books are understood) came under scrutiny, found to be "thoroughly dominated by DWEM's (dead, white, European males)."<sup>20</sup> World literature, or "those works which are enjoyed in common, ideally by all mankind, practically by our own age group of culture, the European or Western"<sup>21</sup> historically ignored literature from many regions in the world, so was not a fair representation of *universal* literature, or "the sum total of all writings in all languages at all times."<sup>22</sup>

Courses and curricula in the United States have historically focused on works from England and continental Europe as "world literature," largely ignoring works from other literary traditions. "[S]ocieties accept what they need, recognize, and want from other cultures, and ... transmute or filter out resistant material."<sup>23</sup> Even when foreign literature is taught, it can be difficult to see the effects our own culture has on our reading. Maria Tymoczko elaborates: "receptor cultures often respond to source texts by projecting their own cultural experience into the source and recognizing in the source only those things that are substantially related to the receptor system."<sup>24</sup> For students and teachers alike to be informed and accurate readers of texts, it is important for them to recognize the politics in the process of canon-formation.<sup>25</sup>

Thanks to the efforts of those who recognize the merit of so-called "resistant material," non-Western works, authors, and marginalized authors within the Western tradition such as women and minorities are challenging traditional ideas of the canon.

Today, it is considered more appropriate to speak of canons rather than "the canon."<sup>26</sup> Much discussion and debate has taken place asking why certain texts are valued and included

<sup>14</sup> Hazel S. Alberson, "Non-Western Literature in the World Literature Program," in *The Teaching of World Literature*, ed. Haskell M. Block, (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1966), 48.

<sup>15</sup> "What was comparative literature?" *Department of Comparative Literature*. February 1, 2008. [http://complit.lss.wisc.edu/about/what\\_was\\_complit.php](http://complit.lss.wisc.edu/about/what_was_complit.php).

<sup>16</sup> Fritz Strich quoted in Sarah Lawall, "Introduction: Reading World Literature," in *Reading World Literature*, ed. Sarah Lawall (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1994), 49.

<sup>17</sup> John Guillory, "Canon," in *Critical Terms for Literary Study*, 2nd ed. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1995), 233.

<sup>18</sup> Canons can be measured "by the contents of anthologies, syllabi of surveys, recommended reading lists for graduate students in comparative literature, or frequency of discussion in general critical publications" (Tymoczko 1994, 164). Charles Bassett includes in his list of influences on the canon the 19th-century English literary critic Matthew Arnold, famous for his line "the best that is known and thought in the world", the *Encyclopedia Britannica Great Books of the Western World* (1952), Harold Bloom's *The Western Canon* (1994), and TV's Oprah's Book Club.

<sup>19</sup> Lee Morrissey, "Introduction: The Canon Brawl: Arguments over the Canon," in *Debating the Canon: A Reader from Addison to Nafisi*, ed. Lee Morrissey (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 6.

<sup>20</sup> Robert Harris, "A Glossary of Literary Terms," January 4, 2002, <http://www.virtualsalt.com/litterms.htm>.

<sup>21</sup> Albert Guérard, *Preface to World Literature* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, Inc., 1940), 15.

<sup>22</sup> Guérard, 1940: 16.

<sup>23</sup> Lawall, 1994: 116.

<sup>24</sup> Maria Tymoczko, "Celtic Literature and the European Canon," in *Reading World Literature*, ed. Sarah Lawall (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1994), 173.

<sup>25</sup> Lawall, 1994: 116.

<sup>26</sup> Charles Bassett, "The Canon Debate: What makes you think that book is so great?" *Colby College: Colby Magazine* Winter 1998, <http://www.colby.edu/colby.mag/issues/88n1/features/bassett/index.html>.

in the canon above others. Joan Dayan indicates that the point “is not the attack against an individual writer and the substitution of another.” Rather, she calls into question the standards for exclusion and inclusion. In her classroom she attempts to “reintroduce conflict and difference, to elicit questions and discomfort, instead of seeking accord.”<sup>27</sup>

In the last century, the literary community in the United States has become increasingly self-conscious and aware of the limited scope of the canons. In an effort to ensure a “representation of cultural pluralism,” courses and anthologies focusing on non-Western literary traditions (e.g. Asia, Africa, and Latin America) and marginalized authors (e.g. women and minorities) have been created.<sup>28</sup>

The origin of a literary work is not enough to classify it as “world literature.” A poem by Pablo Neruda, for instance, would not be considered “world literature” by a Chilean reader. “A work only has an *effective* life as world literature whenever, and wherever, it is actively present within a literary system beyond that of its original culture.”<sup>29</sup> Only when a work is consumed, (read, discussed, interacted with), can it hold the title of world literature. To take the example of Pablo Neruda again: just as his poems cannot be considered “world literature” by a fellow Chilean, neither can his poems be considered “world literature” if they never were to circulate outside Chile’s borders. Damrosch later urges readers to see world literature as a “mode of circulation and of reading” rather than “an infinite, ungraspable canon of works.”<sup>30</sup> In a report from the NEH Institute in the Theory and Teaching of World Literature, world literature is understood as a “framework of relationships.”<sup>31</sup> World literature, therefore, should be thought of as a process, not a classification which either applies to a literary work or does not. Sarah Lawall continues:

[T]he interconnected society and world view that Goethe hoped to bring about through the community discourse of world literature ... is not fixed by the canons or texts of the past but is constituted as a future-oriented process of transformation and change, brought about in a continuous rereading of one identity through the eyes of another.<sup>32</sup>

It is essential for the reader to be aware that he or she

is reading a work from a different culture or identity than his or her own, in order for the reading to represent an interaction of peoples and cultures that will propel readers into a forward thinking, progressive mindset.

It would be impossible to attempt to teach (or even read) a fair sampling of all that could be classified as “world literature.” Damrosch’s and Lawall’s definitions offer a practical (and practicable) solution. Rather than solely focusing on the literary works being read, (or, as is often the case, the works that have traditionally *not* been read, e.g. non-Western works), many world literature teachers have used supplemental readings and related activities to enhance the reading of world literature, acquainting their students with the different cultural traditions from which those works simultaneously spring and represent in real ways. Mark J. Bingen brings in outside speakers and films and has his students create PowerPoint presentations on cultural and philosophical subjects to create context for the works his class reads.<sup>33</sup> To accompany the reading of Chinua Achebe’s *Things Fall Apart*, Bingen’s students research traditional Ibo recipes and music and divide the labor in an attempt to experience the sounds and tastes of Achebe’s world, in this way acknowledging the culture and “domains of experience”<sup>34</sup> from which the literary work comes in order to begin to understand its significance, what it was trying to accomplish, and why it was written.

How does one go about reading or teaching world literature? Thomas M. Greene outlines many considerations to make in his article “Misunderstanding Poetry: Teaching outside the Western Canon.” The first thing teachers and students in the United States must do upon accepting the challenge of reading world literature is to acknowledge the biases and ethnocentrism inherent in their Western world view. Greene explains that “reading texts from remote cultures might be said to train our ethnocentrism, enlighten it, discipline it, broaden it, but never altogether dispel it.”<sup>35</sup> Try as they might, readers cannot completely divorce themselves or their viewpoints from their native culture. A position of cultural neutrality is impossible, and ultimately inhuman, as we are all “cultural animals.”<sup>36</sup> To read world literature in a responsible way, he writes that readers must both acknowledge that their ingrained biases will color their readings, and that no matter how aware they are of their own ethnocentrism, it will be impossible to ever completely

<sup>27</sup> Joan Dayan, “Playing Caliban: Césaire’s *Tempest*,” In *Reading World Literature*, ed. Sarah Lawall (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1994), 156.

<sup>28</sup> “Report on World Literature,” *ACLA Newsletter*. vol. 19, no. 2 (1988): 1.

<sup>29</sup> David Damrosch, *What is World Literature?* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003), 4.

<sup>30</sup> Damrosch, 2003: 5.

<sup>31</sup> Damrosch, 2003: 3. <sup>32</sup> Lawall, 1994: 46.

<sup>33</sup> Mark J. Bingen, “From Archetypes to Xenophobia: World Literature Is the ‘Rite’ Stuff,” *English Journal*. vol. 91, no. 5 (May 2002): 40-45.

<sup>34</sup> Lawall, 1994: 33.

<sup>35</sup> Thomas M. Greene, “Misunderstanding Poetry: Teaching outside the Western Canon,” In *Reading World Literature*, ed. Sarah Lawall (Austin, Texas: University of Texas Press, 1994), 72.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*

shed its influence. He describes this process as “try[ing] to bridge a division that we know in advance is not completely bridgeable.”<sup>37</sup> While readers can explore “other ways of seeing and being,”<sup>38</sup> it would be dangerous to assume that one could ever reach the point of full understanding or identification with different cultures based on cursory readings of their literature(s) alone.

After clarifying this, Greene outlines three important steps teachers and students need to take when reading world literature. First, rather than focusing solely on similarities between the host culture and the text, Greene urges teachers and students to concentrate on the aspects of the work that are the most strange and foreign, and therefore the most uncomfortable:

We need to look for the feature that defeats our ingrained habits; we need to be alert to that violation of our expectations and pause over it. In that very puzzlement may lie precisely the potential enlightenment the text can offer us.<sup>39</sup>

In reading world literature, it is important to recognize values different from one’s own and respect them, rather than disregard them or worse, judge them to be wrong. Delane Bender-Slack begins his world literature course every year by getting his students to agree that they are all humanists, or “concerned with the human condition.”<sup>40</sup> For Bender-Slack, “globalizing students” is the main goal of reading world literature, which will result in “respecting others’ rights to live those differences.”<sup>41</sup>

Greene’s second step is for readers to describe in their own words the differences and estrangement between themselves and the text. In this way they will “reveal [their] categories, [their] ways of understanding” the said culture and text.<sup>42</sup> The third and final step in reading world literature involves honoring the different worldview the work presents while recognizing similar themes and ideas within the text. “The foreign becomes familiar”<sup>43</sup> and students step “outside the familiar to view [their] culture as an outsider may.”<sup>44</sup> By causing students to turn a critical eye on their own culture’s practices, “world literature...will clarify a sense of personal identity

through awareness of one’s ‘situation in the world.’”<sup>45</sup>

Brad Coltrane argues that only in studying “American” and “world” literature side by side can one develop a literary curriculum “that begins to erase that line of ‘us’ and ‘them’ altogether, replacing it with a wide and ever-expanding circle.”<sup>46</sup> In his world literature course, Coltrane teaches three texts by American authors, each paired with a corresponding text from a different culture.<sup>47</sup> Categories are blurred as Coltrane (2002, 31) points out that “[o]f the three American authors, only one (O’Brien) was ever a United States citizen,” and that of the three international authors, “only Ninh writes primarily in his native language; Achebe and Emecheta write in English and generally reside in the United States and Britain, respectively.” Coltrane hopes that students will “learn to identify with all good literature” regardless of its origin.<sup>48</sup> However, it is important not to disregard the contributions made to the text by its culture, nation, and language of origin in order to learn from and honor those traditions.

Are these progressive classrooms across the country typical of literary classes in the United States? Do they represent norms or exceptions to the rules? If asked, would students show they have assimilated these teachings into their conceptions of self and other as the teachers have intended? The answers to these questions are what I set out to discover in my research.

## Methods

### *Project Design*

My premise was that reading literature from different traditions than the host culture early in a student’s education would engender a sense of world citizenship. But how could I support that? James D. Reese is skeptical that such a connection is possible to make:

It would be rather simplistic to suggest that studying works from many cultures alone dispels or even eases prejudices; for a variety of reasons, it is quite difficult to measure changes in attitude due to the impact of exploring such works.<sup>49</sup>

<sup>37</sup> Greene 1994: 73.

<sup>38</sup> James D. Reese, “Learning for Understanding: The Role of World Literature,” *English Journal*, vol. 91, no. 5 (May 2002): 63.

<sup>39</sup> Greene, 1994: 77.

<sup>40</sup> Bender-Slack, 2002: 71.

<sup>41</sup> Bender-Slack, 2002: 74.

<sup>42</sup> Greene, 1994: 80.

<sup>43</sup> Bingen, 2002: 44.

<sup>44</sup> Karen Downing, “Travelers, Not Tourists: A World Literature Curriculum,” *English Journal*, vol. 91, no. 5 (May 2002): 48.

<sup>45</sup> Lawall, 1994: 34.

<sup>46</sup> Brad Coltrane, “Literature beyond Labels: Blending American and World Literature,” *English Journal*, vol. 91, no. 5 (May 2002): 28.

<sup>47</sup> *Black Elk Speaks* by John Neihardt is paired with Nigerian Chinua Achebe’s *Things Fall Apart*; *The Narrative of the Life of Frederick Douglass, An American Slave* is taught alongside *The Slave Girl* by Buchi Emecheta (Nigeria), and *The Things They Carried* by Tim O’Brien is coupled with *The Sorrow of War* by Vietnamese author Bao Ninh.

<sup>48</sup> Coltrane, 2002: 32.

<sup>49</sup> Reese, 2002: 68.

Indeed in the course of this project I discovered that it is very difficult to show a connection between the literature someone reads and the sensitivity that person has for values and traditions other than his or her own.

I wrote a survey of questions to assess students' knowledge of world leaders, geography, and vocabulary, and attitudes about foreign countries and people, both of which are elements of world citizenship and are more easily quantified and evaluated than "world citizenship" itself. I was interested in seeing whether Oregonian or Chilean students have had more exposure to world literature, and which students knew more about international relations and have a greater sensitivity to differing views and people, and finally if there is a correlation between the literature the students have read and an interest in and knowledge of the world.

My research question, therefore, is tripartite: first, what, if any, world literature is being taught in high school literature classes? Second, if world literature is being taught, is it effective at engendering a sense of world citizenship in the students? Can a correlation between the reading of world literature and the elements of a person's world citizenship be found? Finally, how do students in the United States measure up to students in Chile regarding their knowledge of current world events and leaders?

*World Citizenship*, a study James C. Manry conducted in 1927 with college students proved to be an invaluable source. Manry's study was concerned with questions very similar to my own: "To what extent are our institutions of higher learning bringing their students into effective contact with world affairs? What are the most practicable lines of further advance in the development of world citizenship?"<sup>50</sup> Even though Manry's test was outdated, (an entire section was dedicated to European governments since 1914, the end of "the World War"), I was able to use it as a template for writing my own survey.

Manry's survey was designed to test students' level of world citizenship, which he defined as "wider knowledge and more competent opinion on world affairs."<sup>51</sup> Of the twelve sections of Manry's test, seven tested information and five tested "right judgment on international affairs."<sup>52</sup> There are five major differences between Manry's study and my own, which I took into account when writing my survey.

First, in the development of his test, Manry went to

extensive lengths to determine the "geographical incidence by periodical years of common allusions," or in other words, to determine how often certain countries were mentioned in periodicals across the U.S.<sup>53</sup> He used these data to determine how often he would mention those countries in his test. He was concerned that his test measure a "wide and representative sample of knowledge," because in his words "a test of international information, the questions of which chiefly concerned only two or three nations, or emphasized remote and unimportant facts, would lack validity."<sup>54</sup> In the creation of my survey instrument, unlike Manry, I did no formal studies to determine which countries and regions should be included and at what incidence. I relied on Manry's test as a model and on my own conjectures. For example, the Middle East is arguably a much-talked about region in the world, often featured in the (U.S.) news, so I felt it was particularly important for students to be acquainted with the geography of this region of the world. I also solicited feedback from Rebecca Sanderson, the director of Student Affairs Research and Evaluation at Oregon State University, who proved invaluable in the writing of my survey.

The next marked difference between Manry's test and my own is that he was measuring what students in the United States knew against what they *should* know. To do this, Manry gave his test to a control group of "competent judges," as he called them, and measured students' answers against theirs. "In validating the parts of the test measuring judgment the opinion of supposedly competent persons was obtained in order to determine the *correct* responses."<sup>55</sup> Manry solicited responses from "leaders in American organizations or movements of international scope, authorities in economics, political science, sociology, history, geography, anthropology ... prominent financiers and businessmen involved in international transactions, diplomats and international lawyers, government officials connected with foreign affairs, judges, [and] religious, social and moral leaders known to be directly interested in international problems."<sup>56</sup> He then compared the students' results with the responses of the competent judges, to establish if the students' knowledge of international affairs was adequate or not. I, on the other hand, was not interested in evaluating what U.S. students know against what they should know, but in comparing what they do know to what Chilean students know. I am not asserting, for example, that U.S. students should know who the president of Chile is (one of the questions in the survey). I am, however, interested in seeing whether there are more Chilean students who know who the U.S.

<sup>50</sup> James Campbell Manry, *World Citizenship, A Measurement of Certain Factors Determining Information and Judgment of International Affairs* (PhD Diss., University of Iowa, 1927), 9.

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>52</sup> Manry, 1927: 10.

<sup>53</sup> Manry, 1927: 13.

<sup>54</sup> Manry, 1927: 11.

<sup>55</sup> Manry, 1927: 19, emphasis mine.

<sup>56</sup> *Ibid.*

Secretary of State than U.S. students who know who the Chilean president is. Which students know more about the other country?

Third, the objective of Manry's study was to show trends across the United States. He therefore solicited responses from 14 "typical American colleges" and used the responses from 355 men and 421 women in his final analyses.<sup>57</sup> The scope of my study is significantly smaller: I conducted a case study of three high schools in the state of Oregon and three high schools in the Bío-Bío Region of Chile (Region VIII). I will not be able to draw any sweeping conclusions about the U.S. and Chilean education systems in general. Next, I had to keep in mind that I would be surveying high school seniors whereas Manry tested college students – a significant difference in age and education that merited consideration. My survey is shorter and less challenging than Manry's test, though still difficult.

Finally, Manry's study concerned itself with determining the students' world citizenship as a means of demonstrating whether U.S. institutions of higher education were doing an adequate job of teaching from and promoting an international perspective. I, however, was interested in my subjects' sense of world citizenship specifically as it had been influenced by any world literature they had read in their academic careers. Therefore, in addition to sections inspired by Manry's study to test students' sense of world citizenship, I wrote questions for my survey to test students' specific experiences with and knowledge of world literature.

### *The Sections of the Survey*

Each question in my survey (see Appendix A) can be classified in one of four categories: personal information, knowledge of international relations, literature experience, and self-reported personal interest in international relations.

The personal information section includes questions about the subject's heritage, travel experiences, and second-language proficiency to determine other contributing factors to the subject's knowledge and opinions of world affairs. I also asked the students if they planned on working or living abroad, and to agree or disagree with the following statement: "I want to get to know and understand cultures outside of my own."

I modeled a number of sets of questions after Manry's test, including a section where students were asked to match international relations terms to their definitions, and a section where students were asked to match names of current and recent world leaders to the positions they hold or have held.

As for literature, I asked students to list up to five literary works they have read in the last four years, to indicate whether the work was required reading or something they chose on their own, and to list the author's nationality, if known. I also inquired about each student's favorite book and the nationality of that author, to give students an opportunity to share something of themselves with me. Rebecca Sanderson helped me to keep in mind that it was not in my best interest for the students to feel defeated while taking this survey and give up. Throughout the survey, I was sure to use various question formats (multiple choice, true/false, free-response) and various difficulties (self-reported, with no wrong answers, and knowledge-based) to maintain the subjects' interest and help guarantee significant results.

### *Who to Survey*

I decided to examine high school literature classes, because I felt that a) *all* students should read world literature, and b) the sooner students are exposed to world literature, the better. High school literature classes are both appropriate and feasible venues to expand students' cultural awareness of the world around them. I also decided to examine schools that participate in the International Baccalaureate (IB) program, an internationally recognized and standardized curriculum with an explicit international focus, and schools that do not. In theory students in the IB program had been exposed to world literature, so I could expect more informed results from them. For confidentiality reasons, I could not use the names of the high schools where I conducted my research in this paper. I have therefore changed the names of the schools. The three Chilean schools I studied will be known in this paper as Allende School (AS), Neruda School (NS), and Mistral School (MS), after three influential literary figures in Chile. The three U.S. schools will be known by monikers of international authors of world literature: Camus School (CS), Rowling School (RS), and Homer School (HS).

I obtained permission from teachers to administer the survey during class. The survey took students anywhere from 20-45 minutes to complete. I specifically wanted to survey literature classes of students in their last year of secondary school, the group of students most likely to have encountered world literature and synthesized it with their everyday lives. In actuality, I was unable to find three perfect classes in each country and so I had to adapt. In Chile I ended up surveying two senior-level literature classes at public schools and one class of younger students (the equivalent of sophomore year of high school) at a private bilingual school in Chile. One of the public schools was an all girls' school. In Oregon, I surveyed one senior-level literature class, one junior/senior mixed literature elective class, and one junior/senior IB seminar class. These variables make analysis of the data complicated and imperfect, while

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
<sup>57</sup> Manry, 1927: 33.

at the same time adding new perspectives and insights (for example, the opportunity to compare the responses of the private- and public-schooled Chilean students).

I also gave a questionnaire to the teachers to learn their background knowledge of world literature. Teachers were given the questionnaire at the same time the students were taking the surveys. The aim of these questions was to understand the teachers' contributions to the course, and their perceptions of world literature and of their students.

## Data/Results

*Survey Questions 14-18 Objective: Who has read more international authors? From which regions do the international authors come? Which works are students reading?*



**Figure 1. Chilean versus U.S. Schools.** In this chart "Home" works refer to works by Chileans for the Chilean schools and works by U.S. authors for the U.S. schools.<sup>58</sup>

Students were asked to list up to five works of literature (novels, poems, stories, other books) that they had read in the last four years. In addition, students were requested to cite the nationality of the author of the work, if known. Students often left the nationality of the author blank if they did not know. Sometimes they identified the wrong nationality for the author (e.g. Venezuela for Gabriel García Márquez, who is actually from Colombia). This graph represents the true nationalities of the authors. Some works listed were unidentifiable (e.g. I could not read the handwriting or find a literary work with the written title), so those are not included in this count.

Chilean students reported over twice as many foreign works read than Chilean works. U.S. students had read more works from the United States than from other countries. Chilean students read a higher proportion of foreign works than U.S. students.

*Objective: From which regions do the international authors come from?*

<b>AS</b>	
Europe	15
Chile	10
Central and South America (not including Chile)	8
USA	6
Other	0

<b>NS</b>	
Chile	14
Europe	14
USA	9
Central and South America (not including Chile)	6
Other	0

<b>MS</b>	
Europe	16
Chile	6
USA	5
Central and South America (not including Chile)	3
Other	0

<b>CS</b>	
USA	27
Europe	15
Other	5
Central and South America (not including Chile)	1
Chile	1

<b>RS</b>	
USA	36
Europe	21
Other	7
Central and South America (not including Chile)	0
Chile	0

<b>HS</b>	
USA	26
Europe	17
Other	5
Central and South America (not including Chile)	3
Chile	0

**Figure 2.** Questions 14-18: Incidence of Regional Origins of Works Read.

<sup>58</sup> In the Data/Results Section and following Discussion and Conclusion sections, literary works will be referred to as "foreign literature" and "home literature." Literary works written in the United States would be considered home or domestic literature for U.S. students, but "world literature" for Chilean students, and vice versa. The term "world literature" is insufficient; it does not make this distinction clear.

In two of the Chilean schools, students reported works from Europe at the highest incidence, even ahead of works from their own country. At Neruda School, works from Chile and works from Europe were reported at the same incidence. Students from all three schools in Oregon reported works from the United States at the highest incidence, followed by works from Europe. Note that no Chilean students reported identifiable works from anywhere other than Europe, the U.S., or Central and South America. Some students at each of the schools in Oregon reported having read works from other areas of the world (e.g. Russia, Afghanistan, Canada, India). Students at only one Chilean school had read more works from Central or South America than the United States. Students from two schools in the United States reported having read works from Central or South America.

*Objective: Which works are students reading?*

Allende School Top Six Reported Works Read	Number of Students
Crónica de una muerte anunciada (Colombia)	17
Juana Lucero (Chile)	10
La Amortajada (Chile)	8
Palomita Blanca (Chile)	5
Francisca yo te amo (Chile)	4
La Noche Boca Arriba (Argentina)	4

**Figure 3.** Country of origin of the author is in parentheses. For complete lists of reported works from Chilean and U.S. students, please see Appendix B.

All of these works were reported by at least some students as being required reading for a class. Notice that four of the six most-read works are from Chile, and that the most-read work is by Gabriel García Márquez, a renowned author from Colombia.

Neruda School Top Six Reported Works Read	Number of Students
Cuentos con alma, puentes de luz (Chile)	11
El arte de amar (The Art of Loving) (Germany)	7
Juana Lucero (Chile)	5
Francisca yo te amo (Chile)	3
Juventud en extasis (Mexico)	3
Subterra (Chile)	3

**Figure 4.**

Similar to Allende School, four of the six most reported works were from Chile. All were reported as required reading. Notice the repetition of *Juana Lucero* and *Francisca yo te amo* at both public schools.

Mistral School Top Five Reported Works Read	Number of Students
Harry Potter (United Kingdom)	6
La Tregua (Uruguay)	5
Las Crónicas de Narnia (The Chronicles of Narnia) (United Kingdom)	5
La Cultura Huachaca (Chile)	4
Papelucho (Chile)	3

**Figure 5.**

*Harry Potter* and *The Chronicles of Narnia* were not required reading.

Camus School Top Five Reported Works Read	Number of Students
The Kite Runner (Afghanistan)	8
Harry Potter (United Kingdom)	7
The Lovely Bones (USA)	7
A Thousand Splendid Suns (Afghanistan)	6
The Perks of Being a Wallflower (USA)	4

**Figure 6.**

All except the Harry Potter books were cited as required reading. *The Lovely Bones*, *A Thousand Splendid Suns*, and *The Perks of Being a Wallflower* were all cited at least once as required and non-required reading. Only two of the five books are from the United States.

Rowling School Top Six Reported Works Read	Number of Students
1984 (United Kingdom)	6
Harry Potter (United Kingdom)	6
Animal Farm (United Kingdom)	4
The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn (USA)	4
The Scarlet Letter (USA)	4
To Kill a Mockingbird (USA)	4

**Figure 7.**


All except Harry Potter were cited as required reading.

Homer School Top Seven Reported Works Read	Number of Students
Brave New World (UK)	8
Chronicle of a Death Foretold (Colombia)	7
The Awakening (USA)	7
Things Fall Apart (Nigeria)	7
Song of Solomon (USA)	6
The Stranger (France)	6
Their Eyes Were Watching God (USA)	6

**Figure 8.**

All works were cited as required reading.

*Survey Questions 22-42, 46-55 Objective: How did students perform on the Knowledge of World Affairs section?*



**Figure 9.** Questions 22-42, 46-55 (Knowledge Based): Percentage of correct responses per school.

Questions which were not answered (had no response) were counted as wrong answers. The following three charts represent three of the more compelling knowledge-based questions and their responses.




Figure 10. Question 22.




Figure 11. Question 23.

A greater percentage of Chilean students than U.S. students (74.6% versus 67.2%) knew that Condoleezza Rice was the Secretary of State of the United States at the time of the research. All Chilean students knew that Michelle Bachelet was the president of their country, but none of the U.S. students responded correctly to that question.




Figure 12. Survey question 34.

The only Chilean students who could correctly identify five countries in Africa were from Neruda School. Homer School had the highest number of correct responses, with 19 of 23 students. Remember that students surveyed at Homer School were IB students. Rowling School students were split, with 11 correct and 11 incorrect answers. Five students at Camus School were able to correctly identify five African countries.

*Survey Question 5 Objective: How did students report their nationality?*




Figure 13. Response to "What is your nationality?" of Chilean and US students.

It was only at Mistral School, a private Chilean school, that there was any deviation from "Chileno/a" as a response to the question. "Multiple Identifications" refers to three students at Mistral School whose responses were: "Chileno, Español"; "Chileno/Norte Americano"; and "Chilena + Francesa." Each student had one Chilean parent and one parent from the other mentioned country. ("Norte Americano," though technically translated in English as North American, is used in Chile to refer to a U.S. citizen.) These students may have dual citizenship or they may just identify ethnically with their parents' origins. It is impossible to distinguish from the data collected.

U.S. students either answered with "American" or "USA" or they identified an ethnicity rather than a nationality in response to the question. Examples of identification with ethnicity responses include: "White," "Caucasian," "Irish/German," "Western European," and "Hispanic."

*Survey Question 12 Objective: How extensively have students traveled? Where have they traveled to?*

	AS	NS	MS	CS	RS	HS
<1 week	0	0	3	1	0	0
1 week	1	0	1	3	3	1
1+ - 2 weeks	0	0	1	2	4	5
2+ - 4 weeks	0	0	2	2	4	5
4+ - 8 weeks	0	3	2	2	2	5
9 - 24 weeks	0	0	1	0	0	1
>6 mos	0	0	1	5	1	4

Figure 14. Total length of stay (of all trips mentioned) spent outside of home country (Chile or the U.S.).

Of 21 students at Allende School, only one reported having traveled outside of Chile. At Neruda School three of 21 students had experience abroad, and of the class of 15 students at Mistral, 11 had traveled outside of Chile. As for the schools in Oregon, 15 of 19 students at Camus School had been abroad. At Rowling School, 14 of the 22 students had spent time outside of the U.S., and at Homer School 21 of 23 students reported having been abroad. International students have been included in these counts. There was one international student on exchange at Camus School, and one at Rowling School. There were two students at Homer School who were born and raised in Canada who, at the time of this writing, lived in the United States.

Survey Questions 43-45 *Objective: How extensively do students see themselves traveling in the future?*




Figure 15. Responses to question 43.

Chilean students see themselves as less likely to travel outside of their home country than U.S. students. None of the U.S. students responded with “very unlikely” while some of the Chilean students did.




Figure 16. Responses to question 44.

Most Chilean students think it is likely they will study and/or work outside of Chile. A sizable percentage thinks it is unlikely, and few think it is “very likely.” No U.S. students think it is “very unlikely,” while most think it is likely they will study and/or work outside of the United States.




Figure 17. Responses to question 45.

Most Chilean students think it is likely they will live outside of Chile for an extended period of time, but many think it is unlikely or very unlikely. More U.S. students think it is “very likely” they will live outside of their home country than Chilean students.

Survey Questions 58, 59 *Objective: What are students’ opinions about a global point of view?*




Figure 18. Responses to question 58.

Chilean and U.S. students followed the same pattern in response to this question: most strongly agree or agree that they want to get to know and understand cultures outside of their own. None of the U.S. students said they strongly disagree or disagree, but two Chilean students did.




Figure 19. Responses to question 59.

Most students in both countries strongly agree or agree that it is important for them in their lives to know what is going on in the world. Only one Chilean student strongly disagreed with this statement.

## Analysis/Discussion

### *Notes on the Subject Pools*

The first two schools at which I conducted my survey, Allende School and Neruda School, were public schools in Chile. In addition, Allende School was an all girls' school. The teachers at these two schools had diverging opinions on their students' knowledge of world affairs. The literature teacher at Neruda School thought her students had a good sense of what was going on in the world because she believed that they watched international news. Miguel Rojas, who has taught English at Neruda School, disagrees with this statement. In his opinion, the students are concerned only with themselves and their personal problems. The literature teacher at Allende School agrees: "I think that they don't have a full knowledge of current events because they lack the habit of being informed."

Both teachers, however, agree that their students feel like they belong to the international community, though the first teacher qualifies her statement, saying that she senses her students feel like part of an international community when they feel like Chile is rising out of poverty and a "third world" status. "When they see the national reality, they feel far from the international community," she reports. The two public school teachers also differed in their definitions of world literature. The teacher at Neruda School had a somewhat limited view of what world literature is. She defined it as "the most read Anglosaxon and Oriental literature." The teacher at Allende School, however, held a broader view, defining world literature as "the cultivation of bellas letras (belles-lettres, or fine works) in the world, with typical (local) terms and situations of diverse peoples." Due to the fact that students at Neruda School scored higher on the knowledge-based questions than the students at Allende School, the contributions of the literature teachers (their opinions and values) seem to be a negligible factor in the knowledge and opinions of the students, although Chilean students reported that teachers were one of their biggest sources of news about the world.

Mistral School is a private school in Chillán where classes are taught only in English (except for the Spanish language class). Private schools are much more common in Chile than they are in the United States. If they can afford it, middle and upper-class families send their children to

private schools. Mistral School is unique in that it is the only bilingual school in Chillán. The school teaches the equivalent of kindergarten through sophomore year of high school. Therefore, the students I surveyed at Mistral School were younger than the students at the other schools, with fewer opportunities to take language, history, and current event classes. The class I surveyed happened to be an English language class, not a literature class. The teacher could not tell me about the literature curriculum at Mistral School; however, she did say that in her class the students read short stories in the original English. This may mean that students at Mistral School are being exposed to broader views of the world, perhaps reading English works that are unavailable in Spanish. Even if the works are available in Spanish, reading them in translation would be reading them through a filter.

There is a significant disparity in economic status between the Oregon and Chilean students. The median family income in Oregon was US\$55,923 in 2006.<sup>59</sup> At the time of this study, the median family income in Chile was much lower, at US\$8,900.<sup>60</sup> Higher income allows students the opportunity to travel. See Figures 14 - 19 (see below for further discussion).

At Camus School world literature is taught as the tenth grade English class. It includes literature from China, Africa, Japan, India and the Middle East. In the twelfth grade year, Contemporary Literature, both American and international, is taught. The teacher defines world literature as literature from outside of the U.S. at the basic level, and non-Western literature as a broader definition. The teacher gave her senior-level students a seven out of 10 for how well informed they are about international events, but comments that on the whole, "we are fairly isolated in the U.S. from true international perspectives/experiences." She doesn't feel her students have traveled enough to develop the sense of membership in the international community.

At Rowling School I conducted my research in a Theatre Literature class, an elective course that can be counted for English credit if students so choose. The group of students surveyed, therefore, is not necessarily representative of the entire student body, as these students were motivated and/or interested enough in the subject (plays from ancient Greece through Shakespeare's day) to sign up for the elective course. In addition, the class was made up of juniors in addition to the seniors I had originally planned on surveying. The junior students have had one year less of instruction on world affairs and literature, and possibly one year less of foreign language study.

<sup>59</sup> "Income - Median Family Income in the Past 12 Months by Family Size," *U.S. Census Bureau*, 2006, <http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/medincsizeandstate.html>.

<sup>60</sup> Ivan Matus, e-mail message to author, February 27, 2008.

At Homer School I surveyed juniors and seniors in IB seminar, a “study hall for smart kids” as the teacher describes it. These IB-track students have taken a more rigorous course load than regular students and are “tougher intellectually” according to their teacher. Even so, the teacher reports that “well-informed students are the exception even among IB students.” The teacher at Homer School had the best definition of world literature of all the teachers I surveyed. He defined it as “literature of different cultural contexts – nationalities, racial groups – literature reflecting the values, beliefs, cultural truths, practices, etc. of peoples far different than my Western experiences.”

*Literature Read and International Affairs Knowledge: a correlation?*

Chilean students have read more foreign works than works from their own country (see Figure 1). The U.S. students have read more U.S. works than foreign works. It is important to remember, however, that the United States has over 300 million citizens, and Chile has approximately 16 million people. It is a question of logistics. Simply put, “Chile has fewer authors than the United States.”<sup>61</sup>

When broken down by region, the foreign works read by Chilean and U.S. students vary slightly. Europe is the most represented foreign region, trailing only works from Chile at Allende School and Mistral School, and tying with Chilean works at 14 each at Neruda School (see Figure 2). Europe also ranks second to U.S. works at all three Oregon schools. This is most likely related to ideas about the canon. Works from Europe (think Shakespeare, Homer, Sophocles, Cervantes, Hugo, etc.) are often thought of as “the classics,” and are therefore widely read and distributed. In addition, many fairy tales (“Little Red Riding Hood,” “The Three Little Pigs,” etc.) and many recent and contemporary authors (George Orwell, J.K. Rowling of *Harry Potter* fame, and Douglas Adams, author of *The Hitchhiker’s Guide to the Galaxy*) have their origins in Europe. Additionally, notice these last three authors write in English, which is another contributing factor to their widespread distribution. Recall the figures quoted above regarding translations into and out of English: a much higher percentage of works are translated from English into other languages than vice versa. This could be one reason why works from the United States came in third for students at Neruda School and Mistral School.

Students at Allende School had read more works from Central and South America than from the U.S. Miguel Rojas points out that works from these countries, (e.g. Colombia and Mexico) are written in Spanish and therefore more accessible to Chilean students. The shared Spanish

language (in spite of regional colloquial variations) helps create a sense of community across political boundaries.

Interestingly, no Chilean students had read any works from “other” regions (e.g. India, the Middle East, Africa, Asia), while many U.S. students had (*The Kite Runner*, a novel by an Afghani-American author, published in English, was required reading at Camus School). Miguel Rojas explains that this is most likely for two reasons: first, because works from these other regions are often translated into English first, and then translated into Spanish, and secondly, even if they are translated into Spanish, these works can be difficult to find in Chillán. Chilean students have less access to foreign works than U.S. students. For this reason, the fact that the Chilean students I surveyed have not read as many foreign works as the U.S. students should not necessarily be interpreted as a lack of interest in the world on the students’ parts.

Of the 61 questions on the survey, 31 were objective questions with correct and incorrect responses.<sup>62</sup> Figure 9 shows the average scores of students from each school on the objective sections of the survey. I was expecting Chilean students to outscore U.S. students on these questions, because I assumed Chilean students would be more informed about current international events than U.S. students. I was impressed by the U.S. students I surveyed. One of the questions on the survey concerned Fidel Castro, president of Cuba. He announced on February 19, 2008 that he was stepping down from the presidency, a day before I surveyed students at Homer School. Some students commented next to the question that it was outdated.

*Michelle versus Condy*

Answers to questions 22 and 23 (Figures 10 and 11, respectively) were enlightening. I wanted to write two questions that asked specifically about both countries I was surveying. This would show me what the U.S. students know about the Chilean students and vice versa. I did not want to ask who the president of the United States was, however, because the United States’ position as “leader of the free world” meant that most (if not all) Chilean students would know that. I decided to ask who the U.S. Secretary of State was, a position that is in the news often and which U.S. students should know and Chilean students might know.

One hundred percent of Chilean students knew who their own president was. Not a single U.S. student even guessed correctly, perhaps thrown off by the fact that Michelle Bachelet was the only woman on the list. Hugo Chávez, president of Venezuela and another choice, is a

<sup>61</sup> Miguel Rojas, personal interview, February 22, 2008.

<sup>62</sup> The other 30 questions were subjective, in which the students volunteered information about themselves, their families, and their education, and therefore did not have correct or incorrect answers per se.

name often heard in the news, which may be why some students guessed it was him.

More Chilean students knew who the U.S. Secretary of State was than U.S. students (74.58% compared to 67.19%). It could be inferred that not only do Chileans know more about us than we know about them, but they also know more about us than we know about ourselves. This should be cause for pause and critical evaluation. Why don't U.S. students know about their own government officials? Why aren't U.S. students being trained to actively and critically consume the news?

#### *How likely is it that you will...*

Knowledge is not the only measurable aspect of world citizenship, attitudes also play a major role in a person's sense of membership in the world community. Questions 43–45 (see Figures 15-17) were written to draw out students' attitudes about international travel and living. Responses to these questions can be interpreted as students' perceptions of their desire and ability to travel. In hindsight, the two should have been drawn out in different questions: students who responded "5-very likely" to the question "how likely is it that you will ever travel outside of your home country?" (Figure 15) demonstrate not only that they want to travel internationally, but that they feel they will be able to in the future. In other words they believe they will have the resources (e.g. money, a flexible job, supportive family and friends, government documents, etc.) to allow them to travel abroad. In the way the question was worded, it was impossible to tell from the data to what extent each of these two factors contributed to students' responses, though it can be inferred that economic status does account for the difference between the percentage of U.S. and Chilean students who responded to the question with a response of "5-very likely" (82.81% of U.S. students versus 25.42% of Chilean students).

Chilean students who responded "4-likely" may have a comparable desire to travel to U.S. students who responded "5-very likely," but may not feel that international travel will be a viable option, whereas more U.S. students have already traveled abroad (see Figures 15 and 16) and therefore probably see it as a strong possibility in the future. If I were to conduct a similar study again, I would split this question into two: "Do you *want* to travel outside of your home country?" and "Will you be likely to travel outside of your home country?" with responses to the latter question on the following scale: 1-no/2-probably not/3-unsure/4-probably/5-yes.

Questions 44 and 45 get more specific. Traveling outside

of the home country is one thing; studying, working, or "living for an extended period of time outside of your home country" require more desire, dedication, and bravery. For Question 44 (Figure 16), no U.S. students responded "very unlikely," while some Chilean students did. 56.25% of U.S. students responded either "likely" or "very likely," compared to the 45.76% of Chilean students. Question 45 (Figure 17) follows the same trend: 56.25% of U.S. students responded "likely" or "very likely," as compared to 44.07% of Chilean students.

Fewer Chilean students saw themselves traveling, working, studying and living abroad than U.S. students, even though they had read more foreign literature than the U.S. students. This leads me to believe that other factors (e.g. economic status, political beliefs, etc.) contribute more to the students' opinions on future world exploration than does the world literature they have read.

#### *Where do you want to learn about/study?*

Western Europe scored high at all six schools. Many of the "Great Books" and "Classics" that continue to be taught today have their origins in Western Europe, as did the ancestors of many of the U.S. and Chilean students. However, this is no reason to continue prioritizing works from Western Europe over others. Richard Lambert commented that "in a world in which the non-European countries will play an ever-increasing role in global affairs, our continued absorption with Europe is dysfunctional."<sup>63</sup> Following Figure 2, the regions from which Chilean students have read the most foreign works are Europe, the United States, and Central and South America. The top region Chilean students at all three schools want to learn about and visit is the 'United States and Canada.' Western Europe is second at Allende School and Mistral School, and ties for second place with 'Australia and New Zealand' and Eastern Europe at Neruda School. 'Mexico and Central America' and 'South America,' on the other hand, scored relatively low, except at Allende School, where 'Mexico and Central America' tied for third most popular destination. The U.S. and Europe are the top two regions in the world to which students wanted to travel (or learn more about) or from which students had read the most literary works. Therefore the data shows a correlation between regions studied and personal interest in those regions. Not many Chilean students wanted to go to Southeast Asia or Sub-Saharan Africa, but then again, how often are those regions studied or talked about in the classroom? None of the Chilean students had read literary works from those areas of the world.

For U.S. students, literary works from the U.S. were the most popular, followed by works from Europe and

<sup>63</sup> Richard Lambert, "International Studies and the Undergraduate," In *Language and International Studies: A Richard Lambert Perspective*, ed. Sarah Jane Moore and Christine Morfit (Washington, D.C.: The National Foreign Language Center, Johns Hopkins University, 1993), 262.

then works from 'Other.' As for desired future travel destinations, Western Europe again did well, taking first place (or tying for first in Camus School's case). 'Australia and New Zealand' did well at all three U.S. schools, perhaps because they offer the combination of an exotic locale with a familiar native language. Most U.S. students are not proficient in a foreign language (see 'Languages Spoken and Studied' section below). South America came in third at Camus School, Eastern Europe tied for second at Rowling School, and 'North Africa and the Mediterranean' did well at Homer School. For both U.S. and Chilean schools, a trend emerges: popular regions for future study and travel coincide with the majority of books read by students. Take the Middle East for instance. *The Kite Runner* by Khaled Hosseini, an Afghani-American, was the second-most read novel in the U.S. schools, trailing the entire *Harry Potter* series. Students at all three schools reported having read this book, which was even required reading at Camus School. Overall, 16 U.S. students reported wanting to learn about/visit the Middle East, compared to only six Chilean students.

### *Languages Spoken and Studied*

In general, U.S. students have studied a larger variety of foreign languages than Chilean students. The U.S. students I surveyed have studied Spanish, German, French, and Japanese at the highest incidences. A handful of international students also bring their native languages to the mix of languages spoken. Mistral School was the only school I surveyed in Chile where students had studied any foreign language other than English, with French taking second place. Latin, Russian, and Mapudungun (the language of the Mapuche people, indigenous to the Bío-Bío region), had also been studied by students at Mistral School, though it was not asked whether these languages were studied in a school or private setting.

Students at the Allende School and Neruda School had only studied English as a foreign language, if they had studied a foreign language at all. Only six and nine students at each school respectively reported being able to speak a foreign language at Allende School and Neruda School, even though "they all have three to four hours of English class per week."<sup>64</sup> The discrepancy most likely comes in the phrasing of the question. I wrote: "list the languages you speak, and the proficiency with which you speak them, (example: Spanish, native; French, 4 years of study)." Many students may not consider themselves to be able to speak English or a foreign language proficiently, even after years of study. This apprehension was evident

in some (both Chilean and U.S.) students' interpretations of "proficiency." Proficiency was most often reported in terms of years of study, but a few students wrote things like "very bad"; "1/2 a year I am awful"; "a wee little bit"; "7 yrs (still horrible)"; and "almost never" to express their misgivings about their language skills. In addition, notice that "study" is only in the last part of the question, so many students may not have finished the question and passed over it. Therefore, even though only a few students reported studying a foreign language at Allende School and Neruda School, we can safely assume that all of the students began taking English classes at approximately age 10 whether they reported it or not.<sup>65</sup> On average, the Chilean students have studied languages for a longer period of time than the U.S. students.

As has been shown, Chilean students have fewer options for foreign language study. English is the only language Chilean students need, Miguel Rojas explains, because it is so widespread and important for international business and government transactions. "Students in the U.S. already know English, so it really does not matter what they choose to study as a second language," Rojas explains. The fact that English is used as a lingua franca in international business and politics may be a reason why U.S. students only study a foreign language for a few years.

Most public schools in the United States do not offer foreign language classes until middle school or high school. In many cases students can get by without having to take a foreign language course until high school. "As a society, we rely upon higher education for students to achieve second language competence when most other nations start such study in the early grades."<sup>66</sup> Two years of foreign language study is a minimum requirement for entrance into most universities in the U.S. In January 2007, the Oregon State Board of Education passed increased high school graduation requirements. The graduating class of 2012 will be required to take three credits (currently one credit) in the Art, Second Languages, or Professional Technical Education.<sup>67</sup> For these reasons the three Oregonian schools have high percentages of students studying foreign languages (17 of 19 students at Camus School; 21 of 22 students at Rowling School, and 100% of the students at Homer School), but lower averages of years spent studying a foreign language.

Mistral School is a bilingual school, therefore 100% of students reported studying or speaking a foreign language. Remember that the students I surveyed at Mistral School were in the equivalent of their sophomore year of high school (the highest grade taught at that school), and that

<sup>64</sup> Rojas, 2008.

<sup>65</sup> Rojas, 2008.

<sup>66</sup> Scott, 2004: 3.

<sup>67</sup> "New High School Diploma Requirements - January 2007," *Oregon Department of Education*. April 12, 2007, <http://www.ode.state.or.us/search/page/?id=1119>.

is why the data illustrates that they have studied foreign language for a shorter amount of time.

### *“Nationality” and Ethnicity*

An interesting difference between the Chilean and U.S. students emerged in the fifth question of the survey, “What is your nationality?” I thought it was a fairly straightforward question, and I was expecting “American” or “Chileno/a” in response. The answers of the Chilean students fulfilled my expectations, with few deviations. In the two public schools 100% of students identified their nationality as Chilean. At the third school, 12 of 15 students reported their nationality as Chilean. The U.S. students’ responses surprised me, however. Only 46.88% of students identified “American” or “USA” as their nationality. At Rowling School, more students indicated an ethnicity (e.g. Irish, Hispanic, Caucasian, and even “Western European”) in response to the question. Except for one “Hispanic” and one “Mexican” response,<sup>68</sup> these responses referred to white European ethnicities.

The United States is a pluralistic society.<sup>69</sup> In his textbook *Strangers to these shores: race and ethnic relations in the United States*, Vincent N. Parrillo suggests that perhaps ethnic heritage becomes more important for white Americans in their interactions with new immigrants, minorities, and international students who may appear to have a clearer sense of identity. Symbolic ethnicity gives a “special sense of self in the homogenized cultural world of white America.”<sup>70</sup> This may explain why many students in Oregon, which is made up of 90.5% white persons, or 81% white persons not Hispanic, identified their ethnic heritage when asked to state their nationality.<sup>71</sup>

On the other hand, Chile has historically promoted itself as a homogenous society of European origin, even thinking of themselves as the “English of South America,” denying their mestizo and indigenous heritages.<sup>72</sup> Chile’s flag features a single white five-pointed star, to represent that

Chile is a unitary republic, as opposed to a federation of states, like the United States. Chilean national identity has been perpetuated throughout the years by academics and political figures alike. Nicolas Palacios’ book *Raza chilena*, published in 1904, “a history and sociology of the Chilean ‘race,’ became an instant best-seller that influenced Chilean politics and culture for many decades” and “elaborated a political ideology based on the notion that Chileans had a peculiar genetic heritage.”<sup>73</sup> One of Pinochet’s ministers once said: “in Chile there are no indigenous, everyone is Chilean.”<sup>74 75</sup>

The responses of the U.S. students bring the question of identity (especially national identity) to light. What about multiple identities? As I defined “nationality” as country of birth/nation in which a student has citizenship, I encountered a few students who presented me with ambiguities. There was the “Mexican” student at Camus School, and three students at Mistral School who claimed two nationalities. Though all born in Chile, who is to say they do not hold dual citizenship in Chile and the other country? How then should nationality be defined and understood? How should citizenship be understood? As the world becomes more and more a globalized society, will world citizenship ever supplant national identity as a person’s primary identity?

### **Conclusion**

The results of the survey I conducted show that the world literature a student reads does influence which regions the student knows about and the way in which that student thinks about the world. However, it is only one of many factors that contribute to a person’s sense of world citizenship, making it difficult to draw exact correlations between the amount and content of the literature read and the knowledge of and attitudes about the world.

The identities to which we ascribe depend upon the context in which they were created. Just as Pablo Neruda is not an international sensation within Chile’s borders,

<sup>68</sup> The student was born in Eagle Pass, Texas, on the Mexican border, and identified his parents as Mexican. He has lived in Mexico and cites Spanish as his native language. While he may be a citizen of Mexico, it is clear by his birthplace that he has U.S. citizenship as well. It is impossible to know from the data collected whether “Mexican” technically indicates his ethnicity or his citizenry.

<sup>69</sup> “Pluralism recognizes the persistence of racial and ethnic diversity...minorities can maintain their distinctive subcultures and simultaneously interact with relative equality in the larger society” (Parrillo, 1990: 57).

<sup>70</sup> Vincent N. Parrillo, *Strangers to these shores: race and ethnic relations in the United States*, 3rd ed. (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1990), 526.

<sup>71</sup> “Oregon Quickfacts,” *U.S. Census Bureau*, 2006, <http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/41000.html>.

<sup>72</sup> José Aylwin, “Indigenous peoples rights in Chile: progresses and contradictions in a context of economic globalization” (Paper presented at the Canadian Association for Latin American and Caribbean Studies XXVIII Congress, Vancouver, B.C. March 19-21, 1998), <http://www.xs4all.nl/~rehue/art/ayl2.html>.

<sup>73</sup> Patrick Barr-Melej, *Reforming Chile: Cultural Politics, Nationalism, and the rise of the Middle Class*, (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 58.

<sup>74</sup> Raul Zibechi, “The Mapuche in Chile: What Their Resistance Can Teach Us,” *ZNet: A Community of People Committed to Social Change*, 1 Aug 2007, <http://www.zmag.org/content/showarticle.cfm?SectionID=20&ItemID=13420>.

<sup>75</sup> The historically perceived unity of the Chilean national identity is beginning to be challenged and questioned by scholars and indigenous activists. According to the 1992 census, indigenous people make up 7.5% of the Chilean population (Newbold, 2003: 175). In his book *Identidad Chilena* (as yet to be translated into English), Jorge Larraín discusses four versions of Chilean identity. The process has begun, but Chile’s transformation from a self-perceived homogenous culture to a multifaceted one will take some time.

neither can we truly be world citizens without coming into contact with people, values, and ideas from *without* our own nation-state. International travel is not the only way to engage with foreign cultures. The immediacy of world news (through the internet and other channels) and the impending effects of global warming are two contexts in which we are being interpellated (or created) as world citizens.<sup>76</sup>

World literature offers students another concrete way to be interpellated as world citizens. One need only pick up a book to be transported to a distant land, come into contact with different points of view, and experience new traditions and cultures. A formal approach in which the teaching of world literature is prioritized by high school administrators and teachers would give students a structured, informed, and critical environment (or context) in which to become world citizens. In so doing, schools would fulfill their duty to future generations by building a foundation of cultural sensitivity, curiosity, tolerance and appreciation that will serve the individual student and the world community as a whole.

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<sup>76</sup> “Interpellation is Althusser’s term to describe a mechanism whereby the human subject is ‘constituted’ (constructed) by pre-given structures” (“Interpellation (Althusser)”: 2003). Interpellation is the idea that the identities a person has are created when they are recognized by other, outside sources. Students will identify as world citizens when contexts and situations interpellate them as members of an international community. Just as I would not be a sister without a brother, world citizens will not exist without a growing awareness of the world community.



A. Book Title	B. Required for school?		C. Author's Nationality
14. _____	Yes	No	_____
15. _____	Yes	No	_____
16. _____	Yes	No	_____
17. _____	Yes	No	_____
18. _____	Yes	No	_____

19. What is your favorite book or author of all time? \_\_\_\_\_

20. What is the nationality of this author (if known)? \_\_\_\_\_

21. Name other books and authors you have heard of that do not come from your country, and list what country they are from.

Book Title and/or Author	Country of Origin
_____	_____
_____	_____
_____	_____
_____	_____
_____	_____

22. Who is the United States Secretary of State?

- A. Robert Gates
- B. Condoleezza Rice
- C. Dick Cheney
- D. Nancy Pelosi

23. Who is the president of Chile?

- A. Hugo Chavez
- B. Felipe Calderón
- C. Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva
- D. Michelle Bachelet

24. Which of the following countries is NOT in Asia?

- A. Russia
- B. China
- C. Thailand
- D. Papua New Guinea
- E. Turkmenistan

Match the following current or former international leaders (prime ministers, chancellors, or presidents) to their respective countries or organizations.

\_\_\_\_ 25. Tony Blair

\_\_\_\_ 26. Fidel Castro

\_\_\_\_ 27. Nicholas Sarkozy

\_\_\_\_ 28. Felipe Calderón

\_\_\_\_ 29. Nelson Mandela

\_\_\_\_ 30. Angela Merkel

\_\_\_ 31. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad

\_\_\_ 32. Kofi Annan

\_\_\_ 33. Robert Mugabe

- A. President of Mexico
- B. Former UN Secretary-General
- C. President of France
- D. Chancellor of Germany
- E. President of Iran
- F. Former Prime Minister of the United Kingdom
- G. Former President of South Africa
- H. President of Cuba
- I. President of Zimbabwe

34. Name 5 countries in Africa.

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
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\_\_\_ 35. Central America geographically belongs to which continent? A. North America or B. South America

Identify the Middle Eastern countries labeled on the map (put the letter next to the name of the correct country)



36. Saudi Arabia \_\_\_\_\_
37. Iran \_\_\_\_\_
38. Kuwait \_\_\_\_\_
39. Egypt \_\_\_\_\_
40. Turkey \_\_\_\_\_
41. Iraq \_\_\_\_\_
42. Israel \_\_\_\_\_

How likely is it that you will ever:

<i>Very Unlikely</i>	<i>Unlikely</i>	<i>Neutral</i>	<i>Likely</i>	<i>Very Likely</i>
1	2	3	4	5

- \_\_\_\_\_ 43. Travel outside of your home country?
- \_\_\_\_\_ 44. Study/work outside of your home country?
- \_\_\_\_\_ 45. Live for an extended period of time outside of your home country?

Match the following words to their definitions.

- \_\_\_\_\_ 46. Democracy
- \_\_\_\_\_ 47. Diplomacy
- \_\_\_\_\_ 48. Foreign policy
- \_\_\_\_\_ 49. Globalization
- \_\_\_\_\_ 50. Neocolonialism
- \_\_\_\_\_ 51. OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries)
- \_\_\_\_\_ 52. Socialism
- \_\_\_\_\_ 53. UN (United Nations)
- \_\_\_\_\_ 54. WTO (World Trade Organization)
- \_\_\_\_\_ 55. Xenophobia

- A. An organization composed of most of the countries of the world; founded in 1945 to promote peace, security, and economic development
- B. State or collective ownership of the means of production and distribution
- C. An unreasonable fear or hatred of foreigners or strangers or of that which is foreign or strange
- D. Strategy pursued by a nation in its dealings with other nations, designed to achieve national objectives
- E. Control by a powerful country of its former colonies (or other less developed countries) by economic pressures
- F. An organization formed to establish oil-exporting policies and set prices
- G. Growth to a global or worldwide scale
- H. Government by the people, exercised either directly or through elected representatives
- I. An organization that monitors and enforces rules governing global trade
- J. The art or practice of conducting international relations, as in negotiating alliances, treaties, and agreement

56. Describe your country's relationship with its neighboring countries.

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57. What discussions has your family had about these neighboring countries?

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-Please answer the following questions to the best of your ability.

*Strongly Disagree*      *Disagree*      *Neutral*      *Agree*      *Strongly Agree*  
 1                      2                      3                      4                      5

\_\_\_ 58. I want to get to know and understand cultures outside of my own.

\_\_\_ 59. It is important for me in my life to know what is going on in the world.

60. What areas of the world are you most interested in learning more about and/or visiting? (Check up to 4)

- \_\_\_ Australia and New Zealand
- \_\_\_ China
- \_\_\_ Eastern Europe
- \_\_\_ India
- \_\_\_ Japan
- \_\_\_ U.S. and Canada
- \_\_\_ Mexico and Central America
- \_\_\_ Middle East
- \_\_\_ North Africa and the Mediterranean
- \_\_\_ Pacific Islands
- \_\_\_ Russia
- \_\_\_ South America
- \_\_\_ Southeast Asia
- \_\_\_ Sub-Saharan Africa
- \_\_\_ Western Europe

61. How do you find out about things happening in the world? (check all that apply)

- Books \_\_\_\_\_
- Movies \_\_\_\_\_
- Family \_\_\_\_\_
- Friends \_\_\_\_\_
- Teachers \_\_\_\_\_
- Newspaper (local) \_\_\_\_\_
- Newspaper (regional/national) \_\_\_\_\_
- TV news (local) \_\_\_\_\_
- TV news (regional/national) \_\_\_\_\_
- TV shows \_\_\_\_\_
- Internet \_\_\_\_\_ (please specify websites: \_\_\_\_\_)
- Other \_\_\_\_\_ (please specify: \_\_\_\_\_)

Any additional comments:

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*Congratulations, you're done! Please return the survey to the envelope at the front of the room. Thank you for your assistance! This helps me out a lot!*

## Appendix B: Lists of Top Works Read by the Students

Chilean Schools	Number of Students
Crónica de una muerte anunciada (Colombia)	18
Juana Lucero (Chile)	15
Cuentos con alma, puentes de luz (Chile)	11
Francisca yo te amo (Chile)	8
Harry Potter (United Kingdom)	8
La Amortajada (Chile)	8
El arte de amar (The Art of Loving) (Germany)	7
Don Quijote de la Mancha (Spain)	5
La Tregua (Uruguay)	5
Las Crónicas de Narnia (The Chronicles of Narnia) (United Kingdom)	5
Palomita Blanca (Chile)	5
Juventud en extasis (Mexico)	4
La Cultura Huachaca (Chile)	4
La Noche Boca Arriba (Argentina)	4
Papelucho (Chile)	4
Subterra (Chile)	4
Como agua para chocolate (Mexico)	3
Edipo Rey (Oedipus Rex) (Greece)	3
Los invasores (Spain)	3
Preguntale a Alicia (Go Ask Alice) (USA)	3
Angeles y demonios (Angels and Demons) (USA)	2
Demian (Germany)	2
Diálogo Platónico (Dialogues of Plato) (Greece)	2
Donde termina el arco iris (Where Rainbows End) (Ireland)	2
El Alquimista (Brazil)	2
El caballero de la armadura oxidada (The Knight in Rusty Armor) (USA)	2
El código de Da Vinci (The Da Vinci Code) (USA)	2
El diario de Ana Frank (The Diary of Ann Frank) (The Netherlands)	2
El principito (Le Petit Prince; The Little Prince) (France)	2
El Ruiseñor (The Nightingale and other stories) (The Netherlands)	2
El túnel (Argentina)	2
Hijo de ladrón (Chile)	2
La Casa de los Espíritus (Chile)	2
La Reina de la Casa (The Undomestic Goddess) (United Kingdom)	2
La vida de Lazarillo de Tormes (Spain)	2
Mala onda (Chile)	2
P.D. te amo (P.S. I love you) (Ireland)	2
Un viejo que leía novelas de amor (Chile)	2

<b>US Schools</b>	<b>Number of Students</b>
Harry Potter (United Kingdom)	17
The Kite Runner (Afghanistan)	10
1984 (United Kingdom)	9
Brave New World (United Kingdom)	9
A Thousand Splendid Suns (Afghanistan)	8
Chronicle of a Death Foretold (Colombia)	7
Lord of the Flies (United Kingdom)	7
The Awakening (USA)	7
The Lovely Bones (USA)	7
Things Fall Apart (Nigeria)	7
The Stranger (France)	6
Their Eyes Were Watching God (USA)	6
Song of Solomon (USA)	6
Macbeth (United Kingdom)	5
To Kill a Mockingbird (USA)	5
Animal Farm (United Kingdom)	4
Extremely loud and incredibly close (USA)	4
Life of Pi (Canada)	4
The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn (USA)	4
The Perks of Being a Wallflower (USA)	4
The Scarlet Letter (USA)	4
Fear and Loathing in Las Vegas (USA)	3
His Dark Materials series (United Kingdom)	3
Of Mice and Men (USA)	3
One flew over the cuckoo's nest (USA)	3
The Glass Castle: a memoir (USA)	3
The Road (USA)	3
Water for Elephants (USA)	3
We (Russia)	3
A prayer for Owen Meany (USA)	2
Billy Budd (USA)	2
Eat, pray, love (USA)	2
Fahrenheit 451 (USA)	2
Hamlet (United Kingdom)	2
Into the Wild (USA)	2
Medea (Greece)	2
Romeo and Juliet (United Kingdom)	2
State of Fear (USA)	2
The Absolutely True Diary of a Part-time Indian (USA)	2
The Catcher in the Rye (USA)	2
The Crucible (USA)	2
The Da Vinci Code (USA)	2
The five people you meet in Heaven (USA)	2
The Great Gatsby (USA)	2
The Joy Luck Club (USA)	2
The Lords of Discipline (USA)	2
The Old Man and the Sea (USA)	2
The Things They Carried (USA)	2
The Virgin Suicides (USA)	2

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# Modern Slavery in India

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*Human trafficking has become one of the largest illegal industries worldwide. Considering the grave human rights violations that come from generating huge profits at the expense of human misery, it is of marked concern. This study specifically focuses on human trafficking in India where it is estimated that over half of all trafficking occurs. By examining the anti-trafficking legal framework that exists in India, it becomes possible to identify areas in which improvements could be made. Bonded labor is a particular area of concern as it does not receive the attention it deserves.*

The use of people as commodities has been documented extensively in antiquity, with written references to it dating as far back as Mycenaean Greece (around 1200BC). However, only within the last 200 years, as the right of individual freedom developed, has slavery come to be considered an unethical practice. Modern day slavery is often referred to as “human trafficking,” a legal term which, in essence, describes the process of enslavement. Despite recent laws that condemn this practice, the enslavement of people worldwide continues. The reality of approximately 27 million enslaved people worldwide is shocking to comprehend.<sup>1</sup> As a result of globalization processes over the last 50 years, slavery has rapidly evolved and adapted into new forms.

The ease of trans-national movement in the 21<sup>st</sup> century has caused human trafficking to become a highly complex issue. The practice generates an estimated \$9 to 31 billion per year for the criminals involved.<sup>2</sup> With human trafficking criminals generating a powerful grasp of the underground economy, overwhelming problems arise, such as rampant bribery and corruption, as well as cultural, race and gender discrimination against those enslaved. However, many people are uniting to fight this global economic phenomenon. Laws have been introduced worldwide to regulate and combat slavery; however, in certain parts of the world they have been difficult to enforce.

To understand how the practice of modern slavery has evolved, this paper will focus on two prevalent forms of slavery in India: sex trafficking and bonded labor. More specifically, I will explore the reasons why human

trafficking is such an abundant practice in India, examine the effectiveness of Indian anti-trafficking policies, and seek areas in which improvements could be made. I will begin by inspecting the international legal framework that defines modern slavery and discussing some of the factors involved in the exploitation of people. As a result of the global and borderless nature of the modern slave trade, it is necessary to discuss the primary countries through which slaves are trafficked into India and explore the methods by which people are enslaved. Finally, I will examine Indian policies that directly target sex trafficking and bonded labor. Furthermore, by comparing Indian anti-trafficking policies to UN anti-trafficking policies, I hope to suggest ways to address the rights of human trafficking victims.

## Literature Review

Globalization has created a world in which traveling great distances and across borders has become much easier. Although globalization has provided many positive changes, the ease of movement has aided criminals in establishing vast networks that span the globe and facilitate human trafficking. Due to corruption, porous borders, the ease of travel and criminal syndicates running highly organized operations, human trafficking affects a considerable number of nation states worldwide. Although human trafficking is a global phenomenon, the majority of trafficking occurs in India.<sup>3</sup> The complexity of the issue, its relationship to HIV/AIDS (via sex trafficking) and the large number of people currently enslaved worldwide make human trafficking one of the most important issues facing our generation.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> David Batstone, *Not For Sale* (San Francisco: HarperCollins, 2007).

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

<sup>3</sup> Kevin Bales, *Understanding Global Slavery* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005).

<sup>4</sup> Batstone, 2007.

To begin to understand the complex modern slave trade, it is important to define what legally constitutes human trafficking. Defining what constitutes human trafficking has been problematic due to some similarities it shares with smuggling. The UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime contains the UN Trafficking Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children. In this protocol, the following legal definition has been used to establish an international legal framework for defining human trafficking:

Trafficking in persons shall mean the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs.<sup>5</sup>

This legal definition has aided in differentiating human trafficking from human smuggling. It is important to note that people ensnared by human trafficking are often coerced or forced into the situation. This is in contrast to smuggled individuals who generally cooperate to gain illegal entry into a country. Human smuggling always consists of crossing an international border whereas human trafficking does not always necessitate movement across borders.<sup>6</sup>

The environment in which traffickers are able to trap and exploit people is an important aspect to understand when exploring human trafficking. The general consensus is that there are two differing factors that largely determine whether a person will be at risk of being trafficked. Individual/personal factors include poverty, lack of education or illiteracy, disabilities and a variety of problems stemming from dysfunctional family life (physical and sexual abuse).<sup>7</sup> Some of the societal/external factors are gender discrimination, ease of movement and migration, inflation, disasters (environmental, economic or political) and the loss of a long-established livelihood. Individual

factors do play roles in determining whether one is more likely to be at risk of being trafficked; however, there is often a cross-over with uncontrollable environmental and societal factors, such as corruption and entrenched cultural gender discrimination.<sup>8</sup>

Traffickers are able to generate tremendous profits and as such they have developed many different types of strategies to ensnare at-risk persons. At times, traffickers will engage in violent methods such as kidnapping, however, coercion and deception are two of the most prevalent forms. Traffickers often entice at-risk persons with jobs in more prosperous countries— thus enticing victims with the prospect of success, economic gain and social mobility. Frequently these job offers will be for modeling, restaurant work, bartending, factory work, domestic work, nannying and the like. Since they are individually or socially vulnerable, the targeted individuals are often unable to discern that they are being duped.<sup>9</sup>

The source of the demand for humans as commodities is one of the most disturbing factors when exploring human trafficking. This is not a new phenomenon. The use of human beings as commodities for absolute financial gain or sexual gratification dates back thousands of years. The mentality of perceiving humans as acceptable, cheap commodities for financial exploitation enables the practice to continue. The U.S. State Department estimates that approximately 800,000 people are trafficked across international borders every year.<sup>10</sup>

A prevalent sub-category of human trafficking is that of sex trafficking. Sex trafficking forces the victims (mostly women and children, but also includes men to a much smaller degree) to perform sexual services. A particular issue with sex trafficking is that often the victims are not aware they will be forced into prostitution. In these cases, rape is often used to indoctrinate victims into the trade. Sex trafficking is fueled by the demand for sex worldwide and especially proliferates in countries where prostitution is legal. Furthermore, it is linked to sex tourism and especially child sex tourism. Sex tourism involves citizens who travel from their country to another specifically to pursue sexual services. This is a practice that particularly attracts sex tourists who wish to engage in sexual acts with children. This horrific practice is enabled by corruption, weak laws and enforcement, the Internet (child pornography rings) and poverty.<sup>11</sup>

<sup>5</sup> United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, «UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime,» United Nations, [http://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/a\\_res\\_55/res5525e.pdf](http://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/a_res_55/res5525e.pdf).

<sup>6</sup> U.S. Department of State, «Distinctions Between Human Smuggling and Human Trafficking,» <http://www.state.gov/g/tip/rls/fs/2005/57345.htm>.

<sup>7</sup> P.M. Nair, *Trafficking in Women and Children in India* (New Delhi: Orient Longman, 2005).

<sup>8</sup> Ibid.

<sup>9</sup> Kevin Bales, *Disposable People: New Slavery in the Global Economy* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999).

<sup>10</sup> U.S. Department of State, *Trafficking in Persons Report 2007*, «Introduction,» <http://www.state.gov/g/tip/rls/tiprpt/2007/82799.htm>.

<sup>11</sup> U.S. Department of State, *Trafficking in Persons Report 2007*, «The Forms and Impact of Human Trafficking,» <http://www.state.gov/g/tip/rls/tiprpt/2007/82809.htm>.

Another form of trafficking includes debt bondage, also known as bonded labor. This practice flourishes in poor areas where there is abundant illiteracy and lack of education. It involves duping victims into signing contracts, which they often do not understand, and then keeping them in bondage while traffickers charge exorbitant interest rates. The true atrocity of this form of trafficking is that generation after generation can remain enslaved for only initially borrowing a meager sum of money.<sup>12</sup>

Domestic servitude is another form of trafficking. This involves coercion and deception, sometimes with the promise of education. Children are particularly vulnerable to this form of exploitation. Since the victims spend most of their time locked in a house, this is one of the most difficult forms of trafficking for law enforcement agents and citizens to detect. There is a particular demand for trafficked domestic servants in wealthy Asian and Middle Eastern countries.<sup>13</sup>

The use of children as soldiers is yet another particularly troubling form of trafficking. Children are often abducted or coerced to serve in armed conflicts. UNICEF estimates that there are approximately 300,000 children (under 18) involved in armed conflicts worldwide. The children are often psychologically forced to partake in atrocities against their communities so that they cannot return. Female children are often used as sex slaves or married to male combatants and forced to engage in sexual acts.<sup>14</sup>

Similar to horse racing in the United States, camel racing is a popular betting sport in the Middle East. Consequently, a unique form of trafficking has emerged from camel racing. In the quest for faster-performing camels, those in the industry seek the lightest jockeys and as a result children are specifically targeted to become camel jockeys in the Middle East. This demand for child camel jockeys comes from the popularity of betting on camel racing by members of the elite classes. Camel jockeys need to be very light and thus, children (often from Bangladesh and other nearby less developed countries) are trafficked and kept as slaves. Unfortunately, the desire for lightweight jockeys to enable the camel to run faster fuels the trafficking of children as young as three years old.<sup>15</sup>

Traffickers often take advantage of weakly enforced

borders. As a result of this, migration patterns are an important dimension to explore. In 2006 there were an estimated 191 million immigrants worldwide.<sup>16</sup> However, reducing this number to those trafficked is problematic due to the secretive nature of the illegal trade and only approximations can be made. Often the migration patterns used by traffickers demonstrate the movement of trafficked persons from poorer countries to wealthier ones. This pattern is a result of economic migration, in which workers migrate to find better wages elsewhere, and one that traffickers exploit to bait potential victims. An example of economic migration can be seen in earnings by Thai construction workers in Japan. The Thai construction workers are paid less than 50 percent of what Japanese workers earn; this amount is the equivalent of up to ten times what they could potentially earn in Thailand. This lure of economic migration, earning money and, traveling, is used as bait by traffickers.<sup>17</sup>

When trafficking constitutes cross-border movement, another important aspect is added: illegal immigration. Traffickers often use high travel costs and the need for fake documents as leverage to cement the debt that must be worked off. Once in the destination, the fear of being imprisoned or deported for illegal immigration is often used as a psychological tool of control by traffickers.<sup>18</sup> Furthermore, being in a foreign environment with a language barrier can solidify a sense of hopelessness.<sup>19</sup>

Considering the many nuances involved, current efforts to combat trafficking as effectively as possible have led to specific migration identification labels. Migration labels are used to determine if a country is a source, destination or transit country. A source country indicates that traffickers specifically target people there to be trafficked either internally or internationally. The Ukraine is an example of a source country. Being a destination country designates that traffickers use the country primarily as a receiving and final destination country. The United States is an example of a destination country. Transit countries are generally thoroughfares to other countries. Sometimes countries can function as destination, source and transit, such as Thailand; however, cases like this are rare. Each of these trafficking patterns requires a different approach in combating the phenomenon; thus, by defining a country as a source, destination or transit country, the most effective tools can be employed.<sup>20</sup>

<sup>12</sup> Bales, 1999.

<sup>13</sup> U.S. Department of State, *Trafficking in Persons Report 2007*, "The Forms and Impact of Human Trafficking," <http://www.state.gov/g/tip/rls/tiprpt/2007/82809.htm>.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid.

<sup>15</sup> Ansar Burney Welfare Trust, <http://www.ansarburney.com/>.

<sup>16</sup> Loring Jones et al, «Globalization and Human Trafficking.» *Journal of Sociology and Social Welfare*, vol. 34, no. 2 (2007): 107-22.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid.

<sup>19</sup> Batstone, 2007.

<sup>20</sup> Jones et al, 2007: 107-22.

The ramifications on the health of trafficked persons are an important aspect of human trafficking. This is of particular concern in a practice that uses violence as a tool of control and severely restricts the movements of individuals. Research has been conducted on females trafficked for prostitution (sex trafficking) who are especially at a heightened risk of sexually transmitted diseases (STDs) through forced unprotected sex. One STD of marked concern is the contraction and spread of HIV/AIDS; in this context, it contributes to a global epidemic and becomes more difficult to track and control. In addition to the health concerns inherent with the trade, there have been documented cases of substance abuse being forced upon trafficked persons as an additional mechanism of control via dependence upon the substance. Substance abuse, in addition to the social isolation, fear of violence and deportation and physical and sexual assaults (such as gang rape, forced oral and anal sex, and forced unprotected sex) has profound health consequences.<sup>21</sup>

In a study conducted by public health officials in the U.S. on trafficked women for the purpose of sex or domestic work the most common symptoms experienced by the interviewed trafficked women were headaches, fatigue, dizzy spells, back pain, memory difficulty, stomach pain, pelvic pain and gynecological infections. Of the 192 women interviewed, over 95 percent stated that they had been physically and sexually assaulted whilst under the control of traffickers.<sup>22</sup> Assuming they are reintegrated, severe societal reintegration and trust issues emerge as a result of physical violence and emotional tolls on a trafficked person.<sup>23</sup> The lack of attention to the health of trafficked persons by the traffickers is most likely a result of the ease of replacing someone (either worked to death or unable to continue work) and also not wanting to risk them speaking with a healthcare provider. This ease in replacing workers demonstrates the large number of vulnerable people worldwide traffickers can exploit.<sup>24</sup>

As a result of differing forms of trafficking, regional nuances, migration patterns, health issues and the widespread nature of the illegal trade, combating trafficking in persons requires a multi-disciplinary approach. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), in its work to combat human trafficking, has seen the need for specialized units working in conjunction with NGOs and other agencies to be successful in reducing the number of trafficked persons worldwide. The UNODC has made

recommendations on how to begin to combat this trade by providing macro models which can then be tweaked and adjusted as necessary at the individual country level. In order to have the greatest impact, a strong model the UNODC has been advocating is the three “P” model. This model consists of prevention, prosecution and protection. India, for example, has implemented a particular UNODC program called the Integrated Anti-Human Trafficking Unit. As a result of focusing on prevention, prosecution and protection, these specialized units can focus on improving policing and prosecution techniques to establish a decline in the prevalence of human trafficking over time.<sup>25</sup>

## Methodology

I will focus on India as my case study because of the vast number of slaves currently in the country. Of the 27 million estimated worldwide slaves, approximately 18 million of them are in India. The population of India is huge (approximately 1.1 billion<sup>26</sup>), so the percentage of the populace enslaved may not seem particularly high. Consider, however, that China, with a comparably large populace, has only approximately 250,000 slaves; therefore, a closer inspection and case study of India are warranted.<sup>27</sup>

The methods I will be using to conduct my case study are examining legal documents (laws and policies), the structure of law enforcement agencies, specifically the Internal Anti-Human Trafficking Units, government and other agencies such as NGOs. I will also look at the Indian response to UN policies such as the 2000 UN Protocol to Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children. To obtain figures which attempt to detect the number of people trafficked in India, I will use quantitative statistical reports. In addition to this, I will draw upon qualitative research consisting of interviews conducted by others.

I will focus specifically on the two most prevalent forms of human trafficking in India: sex trafficking and bonded labor. To investigate and understand why India has a particularly high number of slaves, I will conduct sub-case studies on sex trafficking and bonded labor in an attempt to determine how and why they continue to proliferate in the region. Due to the size of the country, I will also concentrate my research on the regional hotspots. Regional hotspots are areas of particularly high trafficking activity and are most likely to be near international borders and large urban centers.

<sup>21</sup> Elizabeth Miller et al, «Migration, Sexual Exploitation and Women's Health,» *Violence Against Women*, vol. 13, no. 5 (2007): 486-97.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid.

<sup>23</sup> Jones et al, 2007: 107-22.

<sup>24</sup> Bales, 1999.

<sup>25</sup> United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, «Protocol for Integrated Anti Human Trafficking Unit,» United Nations, [http://www.unodc.org/pdf/india/iahtu\\_241207.pdf](http://www.unodc.org/pdf/india/iahtu_241207.pdf).

<sup>26</sup> CIA World Factbook, «India,» CIA, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/in.html>.

<sup>27</sup> Bales, 2005.

Attaining precise data is a particularly challenging aspect in studying human trafficking, due to its illegal nature. In addition to this, the psychological damage done to trafficking victims can be so immense that simply gaining a small level of trust can be a monumental challenge. However, even though the research conducted in India that I will draw upon to formulate my case study may not be perfect, a starting point is necessary to begin to propose options and take steps to remedy the problem.

The process of forming my case study shall begin by initially attempting to generate an understanding of the underlying vulnerabilities within India that cause people to become vulnerable and at risk of being trafficked. With this information, I will then investigate the methods traffickers employ to enslave people, focusing on sex trafficking and debt-bondage. After examining the conditions that enable trafficking to exist in India and how the traffickers actually enslave people, I will explore what is being done to combat trafficking and then finally attempt to discern why the practice continues to proliferate.

### Case Study: India

With approximately one sixth of the world's population (1.1 billion), India is as diverse as it is large. A large majority of the population is Hindu while Muslims, Christians, Sikhs and other religions make up the religious minority.<sup>28</sup> There are over one thousand languages and dialects spoken in India, and simply traveling short distances can mean entering an area with totally different customs and languages.<sup>29</sup> I will focus on two prevalent forms of slavery in India: bondage in the form of labor and bondage in the form of prostitution. Furthermore, I will examine the trafficking migration patterns and the current legal policies the Indian government has in place. By examining the specific trafficking issues related to India, I will suggest ways to enhance the efforts made to help human trafficking victims.

To begin to understand the issue of slavery in India, it is important to note how entrenched it has become in the country. Although historically India has allowed slavery as an institution, its current form and extent is a product of our times. Due to the sheer size of India, the different cultural and linguistic traditions and increasing urbanization, bonded labor has undergone many transformations.

Bondage is a form of slavery that often begins with a

loan; as a result of this, bondage is often referred to as "debt bondage." Since there are international, national and local aspects of debt bondage, it can occur in localized situations when villagers become desperate to buy medicines or food. In local villages the lender forces the borrower, his/her child, or sometimes even the family taking out the loan, to work for him/her as collateral until the debt can be repaid.<sup>30</sup> However, since many of the people and/or families are illiterate, borrowers sometimes sign contracts for loans, that in most cases have high interest rates; consequently, the loan is often one of pure extortion and will be very difficult to pay off.<sup>31</sup> Furthermore, the lenders often maintain fraudulent records and/or charge outrageous prices for food, which they force their workers buy from them. The power the lenders hold is so strong and embedded in the society those debts can even be passed through generations.<sup>32</sup>

For the most part, bonded labor in India consists of agricultural maintenance, domestic service and other forms of manual labor such as brick building and carpet weaving. In rural areas one of the oldest forms of bonded labor, in which the loaner provides his laborers with food and shelter in return for working the land is still prevalent. The laborers cannot do any other work or leave without the permission of the loaner; thus, the laborers lose their freedom of movement. The almost feudal aspect of the practice, coupled with repeated threats of violence, enables the perpetuation of debt bondage in rural India.<sup>33</sup>

The feudal aspects of the practice date back some 1,500 years in Indian history. As a result of the vast history associated with bonded labor, it is closely associated with the caste system. An estimated 80 percent of India's current bonded laborers belong to the *Dalit* caste, the lowest caste previously known as "untouchables," and the *adivasi*, who are indigenous tribesmen. It is because of these age-old relationships entrenched by the caste system that recent laws outlawing the practice are not seriously enforced and lenders are rarely prosecuted.<sup>34</sup>

The Indian government outlawed the practice of bonded labor in 1976 with the creation of the Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act. This act freed bonded laborers by erasing all debts that the laborers owed. It goes even further by mandating that freed laborers receive an economic package from the state, which attempts to enable the laborers to become sustainably independent. Furthermore, the legislation states that anyone using bonded labor is liable to be criminally prosecuted.<sup>35</sup>

<sup>28</sup> CIA World Factbook, «India», CIA, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/in.html>.

<sup>29</sup> Bales, 1999.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid.

<sup>31</sup> Bales, 1999.

<sup>32</sup> Bales, 2005.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid.

<sup>34</sup> Lee Tucker, «Child Slaves in Modern India: The Bonded Labor Problem,» *Human Rights Quarterly*, vol. 19, no. 3 (1997): 572-629.

<sup>35</sup> Ibid.

Bonded labor is clearly a problem that legislators have attempted to address with the Bonded Labour System Act. However, the enforcement of this law has not enabled it to be as successful as it can be. This lack of enforcement is a result of a stratified hierarchy that renders the law extremely ineffective. The law is mandated to be administered by district magistrates (civil servants) who are responsible for prosecuting violators and identifying and freeing bonded laborers in their districts. Furthermore, the district magistrates are responsible for administering economic packages to prevent freed laborers from becoming ensnared again. Considering the size of this task, the law that mandates the district magistrate creates vigilance committees to oversee all parts of the process. In application, the biggest problem with the law has been a lack of total execution; in short, only a small number of vigilance committees have been created and are operational. Likely reasons for this are corruption, lack of political will and an unwillingness among the educated upper castes to prosecute those within their caste who engage in illegal bonded labor practices.<sup>36</sup>

Some forms of bonded slavery in India even exploit situations related to the cultural heritage such as the tradition of the *devadasi*. The ancient Hindu tradition of *devadasi* consists of very poor girls marrying a god to serve him for life. After the marriage the girls move into a temple where they are declared saints and are prohibited from divorcing the god in order to remarry a man. They are barred from leaving the village where the temple is and for centuries the men who run the Hindu temples have used the temples as brothels, turning the women into prostitutes. In order to ensure a steady supply of women and continued income from prostitution, any females born to the women become *devadasi* and are automatically enslaved.<sup>37</sup>

The forms of slavery discussed thus far are some of the types of localized slavery currently occurring in India. However, to understand the greater picture of slavery in India, it is important to explore the migration patterns of persons trafficked to, through, or from India. Not only does this shed light on one of India's most prevalent forms of slavery, but it is critical to finding the trafficking source hotspots and enabling preventative initiatives in these areas. According to the 2007 U.S. State Department Trafficking in Persons Report, India is described as a destination, transit and source country for trafficking. Victims of trafficking not only include women and children, but also men, who are frequently forgotten in the dominant rhetoric of sex trafficking.<sup>38</sup>

Generally, the most economically vulnerable persons are exploited in rural regions and then trafficked across international borders to more economically developed countries. By trafficking persons from poor areas to wealthier countries, and particularly urban areas, traffickers are able to generate huge profits. As posited earlier, it is estimated that trafficking in persons generates an estimated \$9 to 31 billion per year.<sup>39</sup> The main two countries that supply India with trafficked persons are Bangladesh and Nepal, due to their close proximity. Since India is also a transit country, many persons trafficked through India find themselves in the Middle East or sometimes even the U.S. and European countries.<sup>40</sup>

Stopping trafficking across international borders is hindered by the difficulties inherent in efficient border control. Porous borders coupled with corruption make preventing illegal border crossings from Bangladesh into the state of West Bengal in India extremely difficult. To put this in perspective, the Bangladeshi border with India is 4,156km. There are only a few legal border crossings scattered across the border and local smugglers are benefiting from the illegal crossings. The smugglers charge around 50 Rupees per person (equal to roughly one dollar and twenty-five cents) and bribe border officials; this is a highly effective system for traffickers to take advantage of and is clearly an issue which both governments need to address.<sup>41</sup>

The situation on the border between India and Nepal is somewhat unorthodox. The border between these countries is also large, but there are only 14 legal entry points. Although the few legal entry points leads to illegal border crossings by citizens who are not Indian or Nepalese, this border is virtually non-existent for people from India and Nepal. This is a result of an agreement made in 1950 between India and Nepal, which enables citizens from these two countries to flow freely across the borders. The free flow of people from India and Nepal ultimately means that there is a lack of immigration control. The lack of records for Nepalese moving across the border into India is problematic for tracking migration patterns and most importantly, trafficked persons. As a result of India being a wealthier country, the trafficking migration pattern appears to be only one-way from Nepal and Bangladesh and not reciprocal.<sup>42</sup>

One of the most alarming facts concerning trafficking in India is that only a very small percentage of trafficked persons are estimated to be from neighboring countries. It

<sup>36</sup> Ibid.

<sup>37</sup> Bales, 2005.

<sup>38</sup> U.S. Department of State, *Trafficking In Persons Report 2007*, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/82902.pdf>.

<sup>39</sup> Batstone, 2007.

<sup>40</sup> Nair, 2005.

<sup>41</sup> Ibid.

<sup>42</sup> Ibid.

is estimated that only 2.6 percent come from Nepal and 2.17 percent come from Bangladesh. With such a small percentage being trafficked from Bangladesh and Nepal it means that the majority, an estimated 89 percent of trafficked persons in India, are trafficked internally between states. To generate a better understanding of this interstate trafficking and to determine the regional hotspots, I have compiled some statistics gathered from interviews conducted with 1,402 trafficked persons from 11 different Indian states.<sup>43</sup>

Region	Number of People Trafficked To	Number of People Trafficked From	Percentage Difference
Andhra Pradesh	194 (13.8%)	329 (24.5%)	-10.70%
Assam and Meghalaya	41 (2.9%)	43 (3.2%)	-0.30%
Bihar	101 (7.2%)	76 (5.6%)	1.60%
Delhi	169 (12%)	5 (0.3%)	11.70%
Goa	89 (6.3%)	7 (0.5%)	5.80%
Karnataka	113 (8%)	190 (14.1%)	-6.10%
Maharashtra	181 (12.9%)	92 (6.8%)	6.10%
Rajasthan	106 (7.5%)	114 (8.5%)	-1%
Tamil Nadu	181 (12.9%)	156 (11.6%)	1.30%
Uttar Pradesh	133 (9.4%)	98 (7.3%)	2.10%
West Bengal	94 (6.7%)	159 (11.8%)	-5.10%
Bangladesh		15 (1.1%)	
Nepal		55 (4.1%)	
Total	1402	1339	

Table 1. Indian inter-state trafficking patterns

Table 1 shows that only approximately 5 percent of trafficked persons came from Nepal or Bangladesh in this small sample that was compiled in a 2005 study.<sup>44</sup> The low number of trafficked persons from Bangladesh and Nepal could indicate how widespread internal trafficking is within India. Although the statistics indicate that the highest areas where people are trafficked are Andhra Pradesh, Delhi, Maharashtra and Tamil Nadu, the accuracy of these findings may be problematic due to the small sample size. Furthermore, only 11 states of the 28 states in India are represented in this study.

Through this study one can attempt to differentiate which areas are destination hotspots and transit hubs. The state of Delhi, hosting the capital city New Delhi, appears to be a destination-only hub. Maharashtra, host to the largest city in India, Mumbai, also seems to be a destination hub along with Goa. The states that appear to be transit hubs are most obviously Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka and West Bengal. One of the reasons that West Bengal is most likely a transit hub is due to its proximity to Bangladesh in addition to the city of Calcutta. Due to the southern location of Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka, it is likely that many people are trafficked through and from these states to the larger cities

such as Mumbai, New Delhi and Kolkata in the north.

Many of the persons trafficked to the larger cities in India are brought for the purpose of commercial sexual exploitation (prostitution). Sex trafficking, according to the 2000 U.S. Trafficking and Victims Protection Act, is the “recruitment, harboring, transportation, provision, or obtaining of a person for the purpose of a commercial sex act.”<sup>45</sup> In 1999 there were an estimated 900,000 prostitutes in India. A study conducted in 1996 yielded some important sex trafficking statistical findings. Even though this study is out of date, it demonstrates that the practice of trafficking persons to the larger cities such as Mumbai from states such as Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh has not been adequately addressed. This same study found that 45.6 percent of prostitutes in Mumbai (in the state of Maharashtra) were trafficked from the neighboring state Karnataka. Furthermore, in the city of Bangalore (in the state of Karnataka), a staggering 72.1 percent of prostitutes were from a different state.<sup>46</sup>

The interstate trafficking patterns within India demonstrate that there is a need to focus on curbing trafficking in India itself. According to the U.S. State Department’s yearly Trafficking in Persons Report, countries are analyzed and rated by their efforts to combat the scourge of human trafficking. These tiers correspond to criteria based upon government efforts to combat trafficking such as prevention programs and prosecutions. The first-tier country governments are considered to be addressing the issue strongly, while the third-tier countries have not been adequately confronting the issue. India falls into the tier-two watch list. This means that the Indian government is making some progress in confronting trafficking but not adequately fulfilling its potential. Furthermore, the report suggests that India is focusing too much on sex trafficking and not enough on bonded labor. As mentioned earlier, in 1999 there were an estimated 900,000 prostitutes, whereas the U.S. State Department estimates that there are approximately 20 million bonded laborers. Thus, bonded labor clearly affects a considerably larger portion of the populace than sex trafficking.<sup>47</sup>

Perhaps one of the reasons why India is focusing a great deal of resources on sex trafficking is because of the particularly heinous aspects inherent in the practice. The concept of sex slaves constantly being sexually assaulted and violated conjures up strong emotions in the international community and creates more pressure to curb sex trafficking. Furthermore, from an international public relations standpoint, press releases touting brothel

<sup>43</sup> Ibid.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid.

<sup>45</sup> U.S. Department of State, «Victims Of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000,» <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/10492.pdf>.

<sup>46</sup> Nair, 2005.

<sup>47</sup> U.S. Department of State, *Trafficking In Persons Report 2007*, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/82902.pdf>.

raids are likely to generate more exciting news than raids on agricultural bonded labors which focus attention on India's caste system and entrenched internal issues.

Having examined the two most prevalent forms of trafficking in India and the destination and transport hubs, it is important to explore what India is currently doing and what it can do to further enhance its efforts in combating trafficking. With the help of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) India is currently creating and implementing Integrated Anti Human Trafficking Units (IAHTU) at the state level. The creation of IAHTUs in Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Goa, Maharashtra, and West Bengal is designed to improve policing and prosecution, which should result in a reduction of human trafficking.<sup>48</sup> Although the creation and implementation of IAHTUs targets some important regional hotspots, it fails to address the problem in Delhi. Thus, it is likely that the creation of an IAHTU in Delhi itself would help to seriously curb human trafficking in the area.

Considering the extent of different resources necessary for each level, the IAHTU seeks to bring about cooperation amongst many governmental agencies, NGOs and external parties, such as independent media, which can often be problematic. It is important that the IAHTU (set up within state police departments) maintains the ability to police within a state, but also tracks investigations spilling over state demarcations. This non-state bound jurisdiction is imperative considering the vast majority of trafficking in India occurs within the country between states.<sup>49</sup>

In order for the units to function most efficiently, it is suggested that the IAHTU consist of a broad coalition of police, prosecutors, NGOs, labor representatives, health and welfare workers and others with a vested interest in stopping trafficking. In addition, it is also of the utmost importance that governmental agencies (e.g. health and welfare) and NGOs assist each other by sharing information and intelligence. Local government is essential in locating trafficking hotspots, and the media play an important role by raising awareness and creating a "zero tolerance" approach. Lastly, a key role of the IAHTU is the sharing of database information on not only known traffickers in an attempt to thwart complex organized crime syndicates, but also information on victims and at-risk communities/persons.<sup>50</sup>

## Conclusions

Slavery is not legal in India and there are several laws that prohibit the practice. Article 23 of the Indian constitution specifically states that "traffic in human beings and... other similar forms of forced labour are prohibited and any contravention of this provision shall be an offence punishable in accordance with law."<sup>51</sup> However, in regards to international law, India has room to make improvements. India is one of very few countries that has signed but failed to ratify the 2000 UN Protocol to Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children.<sup>52</sup> By ratifying this treaty, it would demonstrate to the world a heightened commitment to fight trafficking and hold the country to a higher standard.

Since enforcement of the laws and overcoming corruption are the two largest structural policy issues facing the government, a great deal is riding on the success of the IAHTUs. India has a dismal record for prosecuting and convicting traffickers, and the U.S. State Department Trafficking in Persons Report of 2007 presents staggering findings in this area. Considering the size of the trafficking problem in India, with only 629 prosecutions and 275 convictions throughout the entire South Asian region, clearly not enough is being done.<sup>53</sup>

Tightening the borders shared with Bangladesh and Nepal could possibly yield some small results in reducing trafficking across borders; however, to help the most people affected by slavery, more focus is needed on bonded laborers. As a result of the entrenched nature of the debt bondage system in India, this is one area where enforcement is pivotal in securing the rights and the futures of the poorest people. The Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act of 1976 needs to be readdressed in order to enhance its ability to protect the poorest people in India. Since the Bonded Labour System Act is coupled with the highly complex cultural construct of the caste system, high levels of pressure and political will are necessary to prompt positive change. Until these issues are seriously addressed by the upper castes, many of the poorest Indians will not have their right to life and liberty as guaranteed to them by the 21<sup>st</sup> article in the Indian Constitution.<sup>54</sup> This is not an issue that will be quickly and easily overcome, but rather a process which, once fervently begun, has the potential to liberate the most outcast persons in Indian society.

<sup>48</sup> United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, «Protocol for Integrated Anti Human Trafficking Unit,» United Nations, [http://www.unodc.org/pdf/india/iahtu\\_241207.pdf](http://www.unodc.org/pdf/india/iahtu_241207.pdf).

<sup>49</sup> Ibid.

<sup>50</sup> Ibid.

<sup>51</sup> Ministry of Law, «Articles 1-242,» Government of India, [http://lawmin.nic.in/legislative/Art1-242%20\(1-88\).doc](http://lawmin.nic.in/legislative/Art1-242%20(1-88).doc).

<sup>52</sup> United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, «Signatories to the CTOC Trafficking Protocol,» United Nations, <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CTOC/countrylist-traffickingprotocol.html>.

<sup>53</sup> U.S. Department of State, *Trafficking In Persons Report 2007*, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/82902.pdf>.

<sup>54</sup> Ministry of Law, «Articles 1-242,» Government of India, [http://lawmin.nic.in/legislative/Art1-242%20\(1-88\).doc](http://lawmin.nic.in/legislative/Art1-242%20(1-88).doc).

The demand for sex is not likely to disappear any time soon. Thus, tackling the issue of sex trafficking carries much more complex dimensions. However, through education, improved women's rights and gender equality, and increased prosecution of sex traffickers coupled with lengthy prison sentences, encouraging results could see the decline of sex trafficking.

Undeniably, the continuation of slavery into the 21<sup>st</sup> century is not something to be proud of. Thus it is imperative that countries worldwide confront the issue instead of ignoring it or attempting to hide it. With the legal tools already in place to wage this fight and high-profile figures working in conjunction with activists to raise awareness of the issue, there is hope and reason to believe that modern slavery can be eradicated within our lifetime. A passionate activist, Gary Haugen, president of the International Justice Mission, stated, "the greatest and most shameful regrets of history are always about the truth we failed to tell, the evil we failed to name. The greatest enemy in our struggle to stop oppression and injustice is always the insidious etiquette of silence."<sup>55</sup>

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<sup>55</sup> Gary Haugen, *Terrify No More*, (Thomas Nelson, 2005).

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# Tómela con Confianza: EMAPA-I and the State of Potable Water in Ibarra, Ecuador

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*Potable water is an ongoing concern for Ecuadorians living in the highlands. Despite an abundant natural water supply from lakes and rivers, disparities exist in the distribution, quality and abundance of potable water in Ecuador's urban and remote sectors. Specifically, this research investigates the state of the potable-water industry in Ibarra, a city located in Ecuador's Sierra, or mountain, region. A publicly owned company by the name of Empresa Municipal de Agua Potable y Alcantarillado de Ibarra (EMAPA-I) acts as the sole provider of potable water to the Ibarra's residents. EMAPA-I essentially controls three types of sites relating to potable water — treatment plants, vertientes naturales ("natural springs") and pozos profundos ("deep wells") — and this research investigates and analyzes each, with the purpose of illustrating how untreated water is initially extracted from the earth, treated chemically and distributed to homes and businesses within the Ibarra cantón. The overall purpose of this research is to provide readers with an inside look at Ecuador's approach to managing potable water, a basic service often taken for granted but one of undeniable importance for a healthy lifestyle.*

## The Problem and Its Setting

Potable water is an ongoing concern for Ecuadorians living in the highlands. Despite an abundant natural water supply from lakes and rivers, the distribution of potable water within urban and rural sectors of Ecuador is often unreliable, due to inadequate tubing systems. The installation of new tubing systems is costly, and financial aid from foreign businesses is often required. Additionally, the quality of Ecuador's potable water is a significant concern. Antiquated tubing systems, typically containing asbestos, have led to serious health problems such as stomach cancer for long-time consumers. Other sources of water contamination in Ecuador include the following: untreated industrial runoff (*aguas negras*) flowing into rivers; pesticides, herbicides and fertilizers from the agricultural industry; and the mixing of potable water and sewage, the tubing systems of which sometimes run adjacent to one another. Finally, the quantity of Ecuador's potable water must be monitored closely to ensure that an adequate amount exists for future generations. The poor management of natural resources, along with environmentally harmful activities such as overfarming, has served to deplete natural water reserves (e.g. superficial and subterranean springs). This study will provide a holistic look at the potable-water industry in Ibarra, Ecuador, and determine which businesses are involved and what steps they have taken to remedy the problems mentioned above. Additionally, this study will highlight specific water treatment and distribution methods, with the purpose of illustrating how untreated water is initially extracted from the earth, treated chemically and delivered to homes and businesses within the Ibarra *cantón*.

Prior to traveling to Ibarra, Ecuador, to begin my investigation, I was somewhat uncertain about the types of water companies and treatment methods I would discover upon my arrival. Due to a lack of available literature concerning the specifics of Ibarra's potable-water industry, I was able only to hypothesize about the direction in which my research would travel. The following is a list of subproblems that proved useful throughout my six-week investigation in Ibarra, and which ultimately led to the major findings of my research:

- a) What is the role of privatized companies, the government and non-profit organizations in the distribution of potable water to Ibarra residents?
- b) To what degree is the water available to people living in Ibarra private, public or neither of these?
- c) What types of water treatments are used in Ibarra, and what types of treatment facilities exist in the area?
- d) Where are Ibarra's natural water sources located, and how do they function?
- e) What types of tubing systems are used to transport water throughout Ibarra's urban and rural sectors?
- f) What major sources of water contamination exist in Ibarra, and what efforts, if any, have been taken to promote a cleaner, healthier environment?

## Review of Related Literature

### *Ibarra's Predicament*

Ibarra, situated in Ecuador's *Sierra* or mountainous region, is subject to the same disparities of potable water that affect the rest of the country. Of Ecuador's 13 million

inhabitants, only 67% have access to potable water, and these individuals live predominantly in urban areas.<sup>1</sup> Moreover, the majority of Ecuador's potable water systems exhibit serious flaws, including poor water quality, undependable service and maintenance, inadequately funded installations and unaccounted-for water loss.<sup>2</sup>

In an effort to remedy potable water problems in the highlands, groups such as the Consortium for the Sustainable Development of the Andean Ecoregion (CONDESAN) have initiated projects to protect watersheds<sup>3</sup> in the Andes, as well as to promote local investment in an effort to increase water resource management.<sup>4</sup> During the next five years, CONDESAN's objectives include promoting the integrated management and conservation of water resources, as well as nurturing the development of agricultural systems that value Andean biological and ecological diversity.<sup>5</sup>

In the province of Imbabura where Ibarra is located, the government has begun a project to improve basic services, such as potable-water delivery, and aims to improve the quality of public health in 130 rural communities in the highlands.<sup>6</sup>

#### *Privatization of Water Systems*

Water privatization in Ecuador remains a major source of debate. Promoted strongly by the World Bank as a solution to water management problems, privatization has been protested by many as being harmful to the livelihood of poor farmers in the Andes.<sup>7</sup> A common ground for disagreement is whether water should be treated as a commodity or as a fundamental human right. Dr. Paul Trawick, a renowned environmental anthropologist, sides with the latter of these, asserting that privatization is not practical for people living in the highlands.<sup>8</sup> He proposes

that the ownership of water resources be handed over to local highlands communities, who would then have the choice to create local "markets" — that is, a system in which community-based companies would compete as potable-water providers — or continue to manage them locally, placing financial control in the hands of the government.<sup>9</sup>

Of the major privatized companies currently operating in Latin America, it appears doubtful that the companies themselves have had a positive impact on the distribution of water to poor or rural areas. Vivendi and La Société d'Aménagement Urbain et Rural (SAUR), two French multinational corporations involved in Latin America's water industry, have stated that they cannot provide services to the poor without government subsidies and public sector investment.<sup>10</sup>

A 2002 report cites various problems relating to water privatizations in both Ecuador and Latin America as a whole. The first of these issues is that privatized companies often do not extend their services to areas of lower socioeconomic status, despite contractual obligations.<sup>11</sup> Second, the water these companies provide is often of poor quality.<sup>12</sup> Third, privatized water companies sometimes raise the prices of their service without proper justification.<sup>13</sup> The final problem relates to underinvestment, in which the water companies invest less money into potable water systems than they originally specified.<sup>14</sup>

It remains to be seen what the current status of the water industry looks like in Ibarra, and to what extent privatized companies and public institutions play a role. Publicly owned companies could very well be a dominant force behind supplying potable water to homes and businesses in Ibarra, given the impoverished status of many communities throughout the province of Imbabura.

<sup>1</sup> Consejo Nacional de Recursos Hídricos (CNRH), "Gestión de los Recursos Hídricos del Ecuador — Políticas y Estrategias," [http://www.cnrh.gov.ec/articulos\\_agua.html](http://www.cnrh.gov.ec/articulos_agua.html).

<sup>2</sup> Pablo Lloret, "La Valoración y el Pago por Servicios Ambientales," (paper presented at a conference sponsored by La Corporación de Manejo Forestal Sustentable, Quito, Ecuador, 2002).

<sup>3</sup> A watershed is a region of land where water drains downhill into a large body of water, such as a river. A watershed functions to collect all the water within the drainage area and channel it into a single waterway (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, "What is a Watershed?" <http://www.epa.gov/owow/watershed/whatis.html>).

<sup>4</sup> Consortium for the Sustainable Development of the Andean Ecoregion (CONDESAN), "Watershed Management and Rural Development in the Andes," *Mountain Research and Development* vol. 24, no. 3 (2003): 258-59.

<sup>5</sup> CONDESAN, "Project 7: Consortium for the Sustainable Development of the Andean Ecoregion," [http://cgmap.cgiar.org/documents/MTPProjects/2006-2008/CIP\\_2006-2008\\_7.PDF](http://cgmap.cgiar.org/documents/MTPProjects/2006-2008/CIP_2006-2008_7.PDF).

<sup>6</sup> Gobierno Provincial de Imbabura, "Proyecto De Agua Potable Pesillo Imbabura (2003)," <http://www.imbabura.gov.ec/Proyectos/pesillo.htm>.

<sup>7</sup> Paul Trawick, "Against the Privatization of Water: An Indigenous Model for Improving Existing Laws and Successfully Governing the Commons," *World Development* vol. 31, no. 6 (2004): 977-96.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>10</sup> D. Hall and E. Lobina, "Water Privatisation in Latin America," Public Services International Research Unit (PSIRU), University of Greenwich, <http://www.world-psi.org>.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*

### *Problems Relating to Water Treatment in the Home*

A 2003 study indicates that 98% of selected rural communities in the provinces of Imbabura and Pesillo had severe shortages of potable water, and that the small amount they received, if any, was untreated.<sup>15</sup>

This study considered, it is likely that households located in Ibarra's rural sectors rely on point-of-use (POU) water treatments to purify their drinking water. POU disinfection techniques include the addition of commercial bleaches in liquid or powder form (e.g. sodium hypochlorite and calcium hypochlorite), iodine, filtration through sand or cloth, and copper sulfate.<sup>16</sup> Two other options, using chlorine gas and boiling the water, are considered to be economically unsustainable at the household level.<sup>17</sup>

In areas where potable water is not directly piped to homes, families often collect their drinking water from community water sources (e.g. piped wells) and then store it in household storage vessels. The design of a water storage vessel likely plays a significant role in how well stored water is protected.<sup>18</sup> Inadequate storage vessels put the consumer at higher risk for diarrheal disease.<sup>19</sup> Currently, plastic containers approved by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention/Pan American Health Organization are available and commonly used throughout Latin America.<sup>20</sup>

### *Sources of Water Contamination*

In Ibarra, as throughout the highlands region, a number of factors contribute to the contamination of water supplies. A 2002 article reports that Ecuador's highlands region sees water contamination arising from pollution, indiscriminate use of agrochemicals, overgrazing, erosion, and a general lack of policies and enforcement.<sup>21</sup>

While literature currently available in the U.S. does not disclose Ibarra's major sources of water contamination, it is likely that the agricultural industry is a significant offender. Agrochemicals, such as pesticides and herbicides, have undoubtedly had a negative effect on Ibarra's watersheds as well as on groundwater. It is also likely that if overgrazing by cattle is an issue in Ibarra's rural sector, then potentially

harmful bacteria (e.g. coliforms<sup>22</sup>) from fecal matter are present in untreated water.

### **Research Methodology**

Data for this project was collected through the use of several different methods, the first of which was participant observation. Through my involvement with the *Empresa Municipal de Agua Potable y Alcantarillado de Ibarra* (EMAPA-I), I visited various water-treatment plants, located both in urban and rural sectors of the Ibarra *cantón*. EMAPA-I employees provided me with tours of these facilities, discussing in detail all of the processes involved in converting crude water to potable water.

Additionally, I visited a number of *vertientes*, or natural springs, located at high elevations in the hills surrounding Ibarra. Visiting the *vertientes* entailed a great deal of hiking through natural terrain, which varied between marshes, rolling fields and primary and secondary forests. EMAPA-I employees served as guides while on these outings, pointing out various species of endemic flora and fauna and explaining the overall importance of preserving Ibarra's natural areas.

Two additional sites I visited through EMAPA-I's assistance were the *pozos* ("underground wells") of Yuyucocha and the water-testing laboratory in Ibarra's Caranqui sector. EMAPA-I's Yuyucocha site serves as both a natural water supply and a powerful pumping station, and through my visit I gained information about the distribution of water within Ibarra's central urban sector. My visit to the Caranqui laboratory provided me with firsthand observations of various physical and chemical tests conducted by EMAPA-I analysts to ensure daily the quality of potable water in one of Ibarra's major urban sectors.

The second means of collecting data for this project involved conducting of interviews, both formal and informal, with EMAPA-I employees from various departments. The job titles of those EMAPA-I employees interviewed included: General manager of EMAPA-I, head of potable-water emergencies, forestry engineer and head of the *Unidad de Gestión Ambiental* (Environmental Management Unit), head of the department *Control de*

<sup>15</sup> Gobierno Provincial de Imbabura, "Proyecto De Agua Potable Pesillo Imbabura," <http://www.imbabura.gov.ec/Proyectos/pesillo.htm>.

<sup>16</sup> E. Mintz, F. Reiff, and R. Tauxe, "Water Treatment and Storage in the Home: A Practical New Strategy to Prevent Waterborne Disease," *JAMA* vol. 273 (1995): 948-53.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>21</sup> Patricia Herrmann, "Management Conflicts in the Ambato River Watershed, Tungurahua Province, Ecuador," *Mountain Research and Development* vol. 22, no. 4 (2002): 338-40.

<sup>22</sup> Coliforms are a type of bacteria commonly found in the fecal matter of humans and animals. Coliform bacteria are typically used as indicators of the possible presence of pathogenic organisms. (Natural Resources Conservation Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture, <http://www.mt.nrcs.usda.gov/technical/ecs/watersheds/galsourcebook/gscbkgl.html>).

*Agua No Contabilizada*, assistant laboratory analyst, and several water-treatment engineers. Each of the formal interviews conducted was based on a set of previously composed questions — usually between 20 and 30 — and took place in private settings, such as personal offices. The informally conducted interviews were less structured and more dependent upon those topics that the interviewee took interest in discussing. No electronic recording devices were used during either the formal or informal interviews; rather, I wrote the interviewees' responses on paper, with the intention of referencing them later.

Additionally, I relied on archival data and literature provided to me by EMAPA-I's main office. Using the 2002 archives of *Diario del Norte*, one of Ibarra's major daily newspapers, I found and photocopied articles pertaining to a potable-water contamination incident that affected the health of thousands of Ibarra residents. The literature I obtained from EMAPA-I itself included project proposals, maps showing the distribution of potable water within Ibarra's urban and rural sectors, articles from EMAPA-I's official Web site (<http://www.emapa-i.com>), and a copy of a survey given to EMAPA-I clients on a bi-yearly basis.

As a fourth and final means of data collection for this project, I used photography. During each of my visits to EMAPA-controlled sites, I took digital photographs with the intention of later analyzing and documenting various components of water treatment and distribution within the Ibarra *cantón*.

## Findings and Analysis

### Introducing EMAPA-I

While its name might not be making headlines or receiving much attention in the United States, the *Empresa Municipal de Agua Potable y Alcantarillado de Ibarra* (EMAPA-I) has received its share of press in Ecuador — both positive and negative — since a large-scale water-contamination incident that occurred in the city of Ibarra in 2002.

When an alarming number of Ibarra residents — more than 1,200 within one week — began flooding through the doors of the city's health clinics and hospitals in early November 2002 with severe gastrointestinal problems, health officials first looked to EMAPA-I, the sole supplier of potable water to the city.<sup>23</sup> Over the course of the next few weeks, hundreds more were hospitalized and two infants died from what was later declared an "epidemic of gastroenteritis."<sup>24</sup>

EMAPA-I representatives cited a rupture in its Esperanza tubing system as the cause of Ibarra's widespread illness. While Ibarra's newspapers provided no exact explanation for the water's bacterial contamination, many *ibarreños* speculate that a mixing of potable water and sewage occurred, as these two tubing systems used to run adjacent to one another underground.

What is certain, however, is that the confidence of Ibarra residents in EMAPA-I's potable-water service was severely shaken by the incident. For nearly two years after the problem was resolved, parents across the city forbade their children to drink water directly from the faucet, fearing another contamination could occur on any given day. The majority of *ibarreños* opted to purchase bottled water for drinking and boiled tap water prior to using it for cooking or washing dishes.

Needless to say, EMAPA-I had a sizable amount of work to do in order to restore confidence in its service. Today, nearly six years later, EMAPA-I has nearly achieved that goal. To prevent further disasters relating to faulty water pipes, the company carried out a project that converted over 90% of the city's antiquated concrete/asbestos tubing to safer, more reliable PVC<sup>25</sup> tubing. Additionally, EMAPA-I implemented copious improvements in its water treatment plants and began to focus on creating a healthier, natural environment within the Ibarra *cantón*.

In 2005, EMAPA-I invested a total of \$5,549,876 into improving both its potable water and sewage services.<sup>26</sup> Of this amount, \$518,137 was used to extend coverage of its potable-water service within Ibarra's urban sectors, and \$1,076,208 was used to increase its coverage of Ibarra's rural sectors. Table 1 shows a breakdown of investments EMAPA-I made in its water and sewage services in 2005.

<i>Description</i>	<i>Value (USD)</i>
Potable Water (Urban)	518,137
Potable Water (Rural)	1,076,208
Sewage	3,955,531
<b>Total</b>	<b>5,549,876</b>

Table 1. Investments made by EMAPA-I in its potable-water and sewage services in 2005.

In terms of the number of homes receiving potable water within Ibarra's urban and rural sectors, EMAPA-I says that

<sup>23</sup> *Diario del Norte* (a major newspaper of Ibarra, Ecuador), articles pertaining to "el desastre de agua potable y alcantarillado adentro de Ibarra (the potable-water-and-sewage disaster inside Ibarra)," November 6, 2002, through November 28, 2002.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>25</sup> PVC is a common type of hard plastic, often used in pipelines in the water and sewer industries because of its flexibility and inexpensive cost (3Dchem.com, "What is PVC? About its Science, Chemistry and Structure," <http://www.3Dchem.com>).

<sup>26</sup> EMAPA-I, *Información sobre la empresa, el servicio de agua potable y el medio ambiente*, <http://www.emapa-i.com>.

98% of homes in urban Ibarra currently receive coverage and that 71.85% of homes in rural Ibarra receive coverage.<sup>27</sup> This is a vast improvement from the state of coverage in 1969, the year of EMAPA-I's founding, when only 30% of homes in the Ibarra *cantón* received potable water. Table 2 provides a listing of all potable-water systems within Ibarra's rural sector, and the percentage of homes covered by EMAPA-I's service in each system.

<i>System</i>	<i>Percentage of homes covered (percent)</i>
Ambuqui	72.41
Lita	72.58
San Antonio	76.75
Salinas	83.54
Carpuela	83.49
Yahuarcocha	78.48
Sur Oriental	52.13
La Esperanza	86.36
El Chota	75.00
Juncal	70.65
Zuleta	95.85
La Carolina	80.95
Aloburo	79.31
Priorato	84.55
<b>Total</b>	<b>71.85</b>

Table 2. Coverage of EMAPA-I's potable-water service in Ibarra's rural areas.

The current service of EMAPA-I is sizable and continually growing. According to the company's general manager, the number of EMAPA-I's clients in 2006 totaled 36,500, and increases by approximately 1,500 new clients each year. In addition, EMAPA-I sells 900,000 cubic meters of potable water to its clients each month; the monthly cost for the company's potable-water service is a mere \$6.00 per household. In terms of customer satisfaction, a 2006

EMAPA-I survey shows that 85% of its clients are satisfied with its water service, and that 56% of Ibarra's inhabitants allow their children to drink water directly from the faucet.

#### *Gracias, Japón: Foreign Aid and EMAPA-I*

Maintaining a modern, reliable potable-water service is a pricey undertaking. From the expenses of constructing new water lines to the costs of maintaining effective water-treatment facilities, millions of dollars are required each year. EMAPA-I, perhaps due to its being a publicly-owned and non-profit company, has sought financial backing from foreign governments, the biggest contributor being Japan.

By far, Japan's most philanthropic act for Ecuador's potable-water industry took place on February 21, 2006. On this date, Japanese officials met with Ecuadorian representatives in Tokyo to sign a contract, which gave EMAPA-I a donation of \$10,601,000 to use for improving Ibarra's potable-water systems.<sup>28</sup>

More recently, on March 11, 2008, the same group of Japanese and Ecuadorian officials met again — this time on Ecuadorian soil — to celebrate the completion of a plan made possible by Japan's generous donation: *El Mejoramiento del Sistema de Agua Potable de Ibarra* ("the Improvement of Ibarra's Potable Water System").<sup>29</sup> This extensive plan consisted of constructing and installing a number of useful structures throughout the city, such as: nine water reserve tanks of different capacities, a new PVC-iron tubing system between the Guarazapas and Caranqui treatment plants, new water-treatment plants in the rural communities of Zuleta and Aloburo, and equipment to detect ruptures in the tubing systems.<sup>30</sup> The aforementioned projects were all completed between 2006 and 2007, but the plan itself was five years in the making.<sup>31</sup>

Ibarra's leading officials are thrilled with the progress that EMAPA-I has made as the result of Japan's financial support. Pablo Jurado, Ibarra's mayor, and Alvaro Castillo, EMAPA-I's head engineer, said that they can now guarantee quality, quantity and continuity of potable water to all neighborhoods within Ibarra.<sup>32</sup>

Incidentally, Japan's economic assistance to Ecuador's potable-water industry is nothing new. A visit to EMAPA-I's water-treatment plant at Lita, a small village located in Ibarra's northwestern sector, attests to this. Adorning one

<sup>27</sup> EMAPA-I, *Información sobre la empresa, el servicio de agua potable y el medio ambiente*, <http://www.emapa-i.com>.

<sup>28</sup> EMAPA-I, "Construimos obras para el bienestar de los ibarreños," (supplemental brochure provided by EMAPA-I's main office in Ibarra, Ecuador, July 5, 2006).

<sup>29</sup> EMAPA-I, *Información sobre la empresa, el servicio de agua potable y el medio ambiente*, <http://www.emapa-i.com>.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid.

<sup>32</sup> EMAPA-I, "Información sobre la empresa, el servicio de agua potable y el medio ambiente," <http://www.emapa-i.com>.

side of the plant's disinfection station, in capital red letters, are the words "GRACIAS JAPON." Employees of EMAPA-I are quick to discuss the company's gratitude for Japan's financial assistance, which has been essential to the construction of modern treatment facilities in Ibarra's most remote sectors.

#### *Pump It Up: Los Pozos de Yuyucocha*

Deep underground wells, or *pozos profundos*, constitute an important source of water for the Ibarra cantón. The *pozos* of Yuyucocha, located in Ibarra's southern urban sector, feature a total of three underground wells that provide the city with water at a rate of 230.00 m<sup>3</sup>/s. *Pozo 1* has a depth of 50 meters, *Pozo 2* has a depth of 31 meters and *Pozo 3* is 42 meters deep.<sup>33</sup> Because of the great depth of these wells, powerful mechanical pumps, or *bombas*, must be used to extract the water. EMAPA-I uses the three wells of Yuyucocha 24 hours a day, 365 days a year, and only shuts them down occasionally for short intervals of maintenance work.<sup>34</sup>

Due to Yuyucocha's tubing system being more than 40 years old, the water initially has a high concentration of carbon dioxide. The presence of carbon dioxide in the water gives it an unpleasant odor and taste; consequently, a process called *aeración* must be performed before the water is sent to the Caranqui treatment plant. *Aeración* serves to eliminate excess carbon dioxide from the water and adds oxygen bubbles, thereby improving the water's smell and taste.<sup>35</sup> In 2007, EMAPA-I replaced the Yuyucocha-Caranqui tubing system, thereby ensuring a higher quality of potable water delivered to homes within this network.

#### *Straight from the Source: Vertientes naturales*

Constituting another important source of water for the Ibarra cantón, *vertientes naturales* ("natural springs") are described by EMAPA-I as being "extensions of the earth covered with vegetation," where collecting tanks and PVC tubing serve to transport the water to a treatment plant.<sup>36</sup>

The *vertientes* of Guaraczapas are a major source of water for Ibarra's rural southeastern sector, servicing the communities of Esperanza, Caranqui and 50% of San Antonio's population.<sup>37</sup> Located at a higher elevation than the city of Ibarra, the area surrounding Guaraczapas is lush and green, with copious streams flowing through grassy farmland. Guaraczapas itself consists of 11 different *vertientes*. Entering one of the *vertientes* entails climbing

a ladder downward into a boxlike cement structure and arriving in a rocky cave where water can be seen bubbling upward from underground sources. The water from each of Guaraczapas' *vertientes* is pumped to *Vertiente 11*, the largest of the springs that serves as a collecting tank prior to the water's being pumped to the Guaraczapas treatment plant. *Vertiente 11*, then, is essentially a reservoir of pre-treated water for the community of Guaraczapas, and EMAPA-I reserves access to this site for employees only.

The tubing system in Guaraczapas was constructed between 1968 and 1969, and EMAPA-I considers this to be too old to function properly.<sup>38</sup> For this reason, the company is currently in the process of replacing a 14-kilometer stretch of tubing that runs between Guaraczapas and the community of San Antonio. The replacing of this tubing involves converting a system previously constructed of concrete and asbestos to one of PVC plastic.

Overall, EMAPA-I controls more than 30 *vertientes*, all of which are located in remote areas of Ibarra's rural sectors. The natural makeup of these *vertientes* differs greatly, and ranges from the 20-foot-high waterfall at Santa Martha in Ibarra's southeastern region to the series of three superficial springs of *La Carbonería*, located high above the clouds in Ibarra's *páramo* region. Regardless of type or location, each *vertiente* supplies the cantón with an important source of naturally tapped water.

#### *Keeping It Clean: Water Treatment Plants in the Ibarra cantón*

The majority of water found in nature is unsafe to drink "as is" and, for this reason, must be chemically treated prior to human consumption. Within the Ibarra cantón, EMAPA-I has constructed more than 20 water-treatment facilities, located in both urban and rural areas, all involving essentially the same treatment processes. This section focuses on three of Ibarra's water-treatment plants, two located in urban areas and one in a remote, rural setting.

Located in Ibarra's northern urban sector, EMAPA-I's Azaya treatment plant serves as one of two major water-treatment facilities for the city's residents. Unlike the plant at Caranqui, Ibarra's other major water treatment site, Azaya, has the responsibility of removing iron deposits—a result of the region's past volcanic activity—from the crude water it receives.

<sup>33</sup> EMAPA-I, *Proyecto: Pago por Servicios Ambientales para la protección del recurso hídrico que abastece al cantón Ibarra*, "Primer Informe de Avance: Diagnóstico Ambiental Rápido Microcuena del Río Tahuando." Quito, Ecuador, April 14, 2005.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid.

<sup>35</sup> EMAPA-I, "Información sobre la empresa, el servicio de agua potable y el medio ambiente," <http://www.emapa-i.com>.

<sup>36</sup> EMAPA-I, "Información sobre la empresa, el servicio de agua potable y el medio ambiente," <http://www.emapa-i.com>.

<sup>37</sup> EMAPA-I, *Proyecto: Pago por Servicios Ambientales para la protección del recurso hídrico que abastece al cantón Ibarra*, "Primer Informe de Avance: Diagnóstico Ambiental Rápido Microcuena del Río Tahuando." Quito, Ecuador, April 14, 2005.

<sup>38</sup> Ibid.

To remove this metallic content, the Azaya plant is equipped with a special five-filter system, into which untreated water initially enters via PVC-plastic tubing. These white, cylindrical filters are labeled “F1” through “F5” and serve to eliminate the iron completely from untreated water.

When the iron content has been completely removed, the water passes through a multi-tiered filtration system, constructed mainly of concrete and galvanized iron. This filtration system resembles, interestingly enough, a city parking garage—consisting of two “buildings” with ten “floors” in each—and serves to remove dirt and other large organic particles from the water column. Each floor of this system is lined with a metallic filter. As water travels from the top floor to the bottom floor, the circular openings of each metallic filter become increasingly smaller in diameter, so that by the time water has passed through this system, the smallest organic particles—including those smaller than grains of sand—have been removed completely from the water column.

The water then travels to the disinfection station, where chlorine gas is added to eliminate potentially harmful bacteria, as well as any other microorganisms present. The chlorine gas is added to the water via a cylindrical gas tank, equipped with an electronic gauge and connected to the main water-tubing system via an extension of PVC piping. In this way, concentrated chlorine gas can be added to the water as it flows through the disinfection station; the fact that the water is moving during the addition of chlorine guarantees that a quick, adequate mixing of the chemical occurs.

The now-treated water then travels to Azaya’s sole reserve tank, a large dome-like structure able to hold a maximum liquid volume of 3,500 cubic meters. Each day the treated water stored in this tank will provide a significant fraction of Ibarra’s population with potable water, at a flow rate of 200 L/s. Azaya’s reserve tank is refilled every night with treated water, and the water volume inside the tank is never allowed to drop below 300 cubic meters.

The Caranqui treatment plant, urban Ibarra’s other major water-treatment facility, has essentially the same setup as the Azaya plant, excepting Azaya’s special iron-removing filtration system. The Caranqui site is included in this research for the purpose of demonstrating consistency in water-treatment methodology among EMAPA-I’s urban properties.

Upon entering the Caranqui plant, untreated water flows into a multi-tiered filtration system, similar to the one seen in Azaya. One EMAPA-I employee described the function of the filter’s individual levels: “*Cada piso [del sistema] es como una ducha,*” or, “Each floor [of the system] is like a shower”—that is, a means of ridding the water of its solid

impurities. This particular system consists of two separate but identical structures of five levels each. Each day this system receives 3,000 m<sup>3</sup> of untreated water, which it filters and sends to Caranqui’s disinfection station.

Caranqui’s disinfection station, like Azaya’s, adds concentrated chlorine gas to the untreated water. Two cylindrical gas tanks—one currently in use and one for backup—sit within the walls of the disinfection station and each contain 907 m<sup>3</sup> of chlorine gas. To ensure that the amount of chlorine gas added to the water is below the maximum permissible concentration (0.5 mg Cl<sub>2</sub>/L H<sub>2</sub>O), a chemical indicator called *ortholidina* is used on a daily basis. Upon being added to a water sample, this chemical indicator will change the sample to a yellowish color, the shade of which will be used to determine whether the chlorine concentration is at an acceptable level.

After the water is treated with chlorine, it travels to one of Caranqui’s three reserve tanks. Like the reserve tank seen in Azaya, each of these tanks is dome-shaped and constructed primarily of concrete. The maximum capacity of each tank is 2,500 cubic meters, resulting in a total reserve capacity of 7,500 cubic meters for the entire plant. The tanks provide temporary storage for the potable water that will service homes and businesses within Ibarra’s urban center. Each day, the Caranqui plant pumps a total volume of 8,353,332.5 cubic meters (a flow rate of approximately 300 L/s) to thirsty *ibarraños*.

Lita, located more than 100 miles from the city of Ibarra, is a small, rural village of 220 homes. Sitting in the remote northwestern corner of the *cantón*, Lita—and the EMAPA-I treatment plant that exists there—serves as an ideal model for potable-water treatment within Ibarra’s rural sectors. The climate in this region is hot and humid, and the village itself is surrounded by lush, green jungles and steep, hilly terrain. Located high in the hills surrounding Lita are natural water sources (e.g. superficial springs), and EMAPA-I has installed a system of plastic tubing and collecting tanks—called *captaciones*—that serves to transport untreated water from higher elevations to the treatment plant located just outside the village.

Lita’s treatment plant, while functioning on a smaller scale than the urban plants of Azaya and Caranqui, is similar to those discussed previously. The plant itself, constructed with money donated to EMAPA-I by the Japanese government, has a simple rectangular layout and is surrounded on all four of its sides by barbed-wire fencing. The main components of the plant are a concrete sedimentation station, a disinfection station and an underground reserve tank.

The concrete sedimentation system consists of three levels. Untreated water is initially pumped into the top level, a cement collecting pool lined with stones and gravel. The water enters and remains at this level for several

minutes until the pool fills up completely; the water then overflows into the second level. This process repeats for each level. The purpose behind the sedimentation system is allowing solid particles present in the untreated water (e.g. dirt, metal deposits, mineral residues) to sink to the bottom of the collecting pools and become trapped in the stones-and-gravel mixture. The end result is that the water appears less cloudy and is now ready to enter the disinfection station.

Lita's disinfection station is essentially the size of a shed, large enough to house a plastic sink and a tank of chlorine gas. During the summer months when there is less rainfall in the region, the untreated water is less cloudy and contains less sediment and bacteria. For this reason, a lower dosage of chlorine is used to treat the water; the chlorine is added to the water in its gaseous form, via a cylindrical tank with a gauge that functions automatically. During the winter months, however, it is necessary to add a higher dosage of chlorine to the water, due to increased turbidity and a greater level of microorganisms present in the water. To facilitate a higher dosage of chlorine being added, chlorine powder is stirred manually into the water within the station's plastic sink.

An EMAPA-I employee will visit this station daily during the winter months, each time adding a sizable scoop of chlorine powder to the untreated water, stirring it until the water appears white and cloudy. Regular tests are conducted to ensure that the concentration of chlorine in Lita's potable water falls within the legal limit ( $0.5 \text{ mg Cl}_2/\text{L H}_2\text{O}$ ).

From the disinfection station, the chlorine-treated water is stored temporarily in Lita's underground reserve tank, which has a capacity of 25.0 cubic meters. When compared to the Caranqui plant's maximum reserve capacity of 7,500 cubic meters, the difference in scale between rural and urban potable-water demands becomes apparent. Generally speaking, Ibarra's rural sectors have access to a lesser volume of treated water per month; for this reason, rural community members must work harder to reduce their daily usage of potable water. But does every home in rural Ibarra receive treated water directly? Of the 220 homes found in Lita, 180 receive EMAPA-I's potable water service (as of May 17, 2006). Thus, roughly 82% of the village's inhabitants have safe, treated water delivered to their homes. As of 2006, 40 houses in Lita were excluded from EMAPA-I's water service due to shortages in Lita's tubing system. Since the influx of funding from Japan this year, however, EMAPA-I plans to extend coverage to all homes in Lita within a few months' time.

Each household in Lita pays a flat monthly rate of \$1.00 for 10.0 cubic meters of potable water. Should a residence be in need of more than this quantity of water during a given month, it can pay the local treatment facility to receive the necessary amount of water, at a rate of \$0.10 per cubic meter. This system of restricting the monthly water usage of each household seems likely to cause tensions between community members and the Lita water authority. However, of the numerous Lita residents interviewed, all concur that 10.0 m<sup>3</sup> of potable water per household per month is both reasonable and adequate. Few say they ever need to pay EMAPA-I for an additional volume of water.

#### *Water-testing Laboratory in Caranqui*

EMAPA-I recently constructed a scientific laboratory in Caranqui, where a team of analysts performs daily tests to ensure that the chemical composition of the city's treated water is safe for human consumption. Another purpose of the laboratory is "to determine the causes of the illnesses that affect the city's population"<sup>39</sup>. Various scientific tests are conducted in this facility, and this research will focus on those tests that were emphasized most strongly by EMAPA-I analysts as of May 24, 2006.

To ensure that EMAPA-I's treated water stays within a safe pH range, a device labeled "inoLab pH 720" is used. This device has an electronic dipping rod connected to a portable computer with small display screen. Upon being submerged in a sample of water, the dipping rod sends feedback to the computer and, within seconds, an accurate pH reading is displayed. The pH scale ranges numerically from 0.0 to 14.0, where a value of 7.0 represents a neutral solution. Values less than 7.0 are considered acidic, while values greater than 7.0 are considered alkaline or basic. Generally, EMAPA-I analysts maintain a strict regulation of the water pH, never allowing it to fall outside of the range of 6.5–8.5.

Coliforms represent a broad class of bacteria that are potentially harmful for human consumption. EMAPA-I is most concerned with detecting bacteria from the genera *Escherichia*, *Citrobacter* and *Klebsiella*.<sup>40</sup> To do this, a "total coliform" count is taken. This number indicates the efficacy of the plant's water treatment and how well it has been integrated into Ibarra's distribution systems.<sup>41</sup> To obtain a "total coliform" count, an analyst first takes a small sample of water, which he adds to a clear, plastic Petri dish lined with an absorbent filter. Then, he adds a chemical called "m-CholiBlue-24," which serves as a food source for any bacteria present in the water sample. Sealing the Petri dish, he places it inside a special incubator, set to a temperature

<sup>39</sup> EMAPA-I, "Construimos obras para el bienestar de los ibarreños," (supplemental brochure provided by EMAPA-I's main office in Ibarra, Ecuador, July 5, 2006).

<sup>40</sup> EMAPA-I, "Información sobre la empresa, el servicio de agua potable y el medio ambiente," <http://www.emapa-i.com>.

<sup>41</sup> Ibid.

of 35.2°C, where it will sit for a period of 24 to 48 hours. When enough time has elapsed, the analyst removes the Petri dish and records the number and types of bacterial colonies present. Colonies appearing red in color indicate the “total coliform” count, while blue colonies more specifically indicate the presence of *E. coli* bacteria. Obviously, the presence of coliform bacteria in potable water is a significant health hazard. If EMAPA-I should discover an unusually high coliform count in a water sample, it will see that sanitation inspections begin immediately and investigate possible sources of the contamination.<sup>42</sup>

A third test performed at EMAPA-I’s Caranqui lab is the “calcium test,” which is used to indicate the water’s hardness. To do this, a simple titration<sup>43</sup> is carried out, in which the chemical EDTA (0.15 M) is added gradually via a 50-mL pipette to a water sample containing the indicator Murexid. A magnetic stirring rod is used to mix these chemicals at a constant rate, and the sample changes color gradually, from pink to a shade of purple. When the titration is complete, the final shade of purple is used to determine the water’s calcium concentration.

Using a device called a burette (*bureta*), sulphuric acid (H<sub>2</sub>SO<sub>4</sub>) is added gradually to a water sample in order to test its alkaline or basic properties. The strength of sulphuric acid used for this test is N = 0.021.

The “turbidity test” is used to provide a measure of the water’s cloudiness. Cloudy water typically results from heavy rains that mix in large amounts of sediment, dirt and minerals. In Caranqui’s laboratory, an electronic device called the 2100P Turbidimeter is used to gauge the water’s turbidity. Additionally, EMAPA-I analysts use a device called a *conductimetro* (conductivity meter) to measure the electrical conductivity of the salts and any solid particles present in a sample of treated water.

The aforementioned tests represent a fraction of the procedures that EMAPA-I analysts perform at the Caranqui lab. According to EMAPA-I’s official Web site, the work done at this laboratory is meant to complement the actions carried out daily by its workers in all sectors of the *cantón*—monitoring residual chlorine levels and restricting the presence of microorganisms in Ibarra’s potable water.<sup>44</sup>

### *Environmentally Speaking: EMAPA-I’s Goal for a Greener Future*

The current state of Ibarra’s natural environment is anything but ideal. Copious sources of man-made contamination exist, including unfiltered runoff, consisting of sewage, industrial waste and solid waste, flow directly into the area’s rivers and streams. Ibarra’s main river, the *Ri o Tabuando*, is currently considered “dead” due to the amount of waste floating in its waters.

Additionally, agrochemicals and the burning of trees to clear land for farming and soil erosion have negative impacts on the quality and quantity of water in Ibarra’s *p aramo* region.<sup>45</sup> The *p aramo* region is located high above the city at an elevation of over 3,000 meters above sea level, and includes vast areas of farmland and forests, as well as *vertientes*, the major suppliers of water to the *cant on*. The majority of EMAPA-I’s current environmental projects are geared toward restoring and conserving the *p aramo*.

Farmers and landowners in the *p aramo* have burned large areas of trees in order to expand their agricultural practices. In an effort to restore the water-depleted soil resulting from these actions, EMAPA-I has begun reforestation regions of the *p aramo*, specifically in those areas closest to *vertientes*. EMAPA-I recently created the *Unidad de gesti on Ambiental* (UGA) to deal with the plans and politics of reforestation, as well as carrying out reforestation in areas close to the water sources that supply the city.<sup>46</sup>

To complement its reforestation efforts, the UGA has created a set of guidelines for conserving Ibarra’s *p aramo* region, streams and naturally existing forests:<sup>47</sup>

• Promote the regeneration of natural vegetation.
• Designate specific areas for conservation.
• Avoid the use of any type of chemical contaminant in the area (e.g. agrochemicals).
• Avoid the entrance of livestock into the area.
• Avoid the cutting and burning of trees.

Table 3. Set of conservation guidelines created by EMAPA-I’s *Unidad de gesti on Ambiental*.

<sup>42</sup> EMAPA-I, “Informaci on sobre la empresa, el servicio de agua potable y el medio ambiente,” <http://www.emapa-i.com>.

<sup>43</sup> Titration is a standard laboratory method of chemical analysis used to determine the concentration of a known reactant. A reagent, called the titrant, of known concentration and volume is used to react with a measured quantity of reactant. (Chemical Education Digital Library, <http://www.chemeddl.org/>).

<sup>44</sup> EMAPA-I, “Informaci on sobre la empresa, el servicio de agua potable y el medio ambiente,” <http://www.emapa-i.com>.

<sup>45</sup> EMAPA-I, *Proyecto: Pago por Servicios Ambientales para la protecci on del recurso h idrico que abastece al cant on Ibarra*, “Primer Informe de Avance: Diagnostico Ambiental R apido Microcuenca del Ri o Tatuando,” Quito, Ecuador, April 14, 2005.

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>47</sup> EMAPA-I, *Proyecto: Pago por Servicios Ambientales para la protecci on del recurso h idrico que abastece al cant on Ibarra*, “Segundo Informe de Avance:  reas a conservar en funci on del recurso h idrico aprovechado por EMAPA-I.” Quito, Ecuador, June 1, 2005.

EMAPA-I recently provided a listing of several environmental projects and their costs, which the UGA will carry out over the next few years.<sup>48</sup> Table 4 provides a breakdown of these projects, the total estimated cost of which is \$111,000.

<i>Project name</i>	<i>Estimated cost (USD)</i>
1. Construction of multi-purpose plant nursery ( <i>vivero</i> )	50,000
2. Monitoring of <i>vertientes</i> within Ibarra <i>canton</i>	5,000
3. Payment for environmental services	31,000
4. Payment for environmental education programs	10,000
5. Identification of ways to conserve water resources	15,000

Table 4. Listing of environmental projects recently proposed by EMAPA-I's UGA.

In 2007, EMAPA-I began the enormous task of cleaning up Ibarra's highly polluted river, the *Ri  Tabuando*. The river's contamination is so extensive—including everything from raw sewage to car tires to agricultural pesticides—that the river itself is unable to support life of any kind. EMAPA-I recognizes the extensive costs of revitalizing this defunct ecosystem and has sought financial assistance from the following sources: the Japanese Embassy, *El Banco del Estado*, *El Banco Interamericano* and *El Ministerio de Desarrollo*.

Lastly, to raise awareness among *ibarre os* about issues relating to Ibarra's natural environment, EMAPA-I has begun holding *charlas*, or lectures, in local schools and community centers. The *charlas* are conducted by EMAPA-I employees, many of whom have a strong educational background in environmental studies. The topics addressed by these talks range from potable-water use to the importance of environmental conservation. Through its *charlas*, EMAPA-I hopes to influence Ibarra's young people to strive for a healthier future, with greener hillsides, cleaner rivers—and plenty of water to drink.

## V. Conclusion

As Ibarra's sole provider of potable water, the *Empresa Municipal de Agua Potable y Alcantarillado de Ibarra* (EMAPA-I) has the responsibility of providing quality service to clients in both urban and rural sectors of the *cant n*. Following a large-scale contamination of its potable water in late 2002, EMAPA-I implemented a number of positive changes in its service, including the conversion of antiquated tubing systems to reliable PVC plastic, constructing a laboratory in Caranqui to monitor the quality of water consumed daily by Ibarra residents, and investing money into reforestation and conserving natural areas near the *vertientes* that supply the *cant n* with water.

As a publicly-owned and non-profit company, EMAPA-I has sought financial backing from a number of foreign investors, most notably the Japanese government. With Japan's assistance, EMAPA-I has been able to construct treatment plants in Ibarra's rural sectors (e.g. Lita and Esperanza), and continues to expand the coverage of its service within urban and rural Ibarra.

While many Ibarra residents avoided consuming EMAPA-I's water in the months following its 2002 disaster, today the company's situation appears to be much brighter. A recent survey conducted by EMAPA-I shows that 85% of its clients are satisfied with the potable-water service and that 56% of Ibarra's inhabitants allow their children to drink water directly from the faucet.

This research has outlined the various components of potable-water distribution within the Ibarra *cant n*—from initial collection at the *vertientes*, to filtration and disinfection at water treatment plants, to distribution via PVC-plastic tubing to homes and businesses. Additionally, this research identified the major sources of contamination within the Ibarra *cant n*, which include unfiltered runoff flowing into the *Ri  Tabuando*, and agrochemicals and fertilizers from the farming industry seeping into the region's brooks and streams.

In the coming years, Ibarra will see whether EMAPA-I is capable of bringing about the environmental improvements that it has proposed. In the meantime, the company perseveres to ensure that *ibarre os* drink their potable water in the correct manner: *con confianza* ("with confidence").

<sup>48</sup> EMAPA-I, *Proyecto: Pago por Servicios Ambientales para la protecci n del recurso h drico que abastece al cant n Ibarra*, "Tercer Informe de Avance: Valoraci n de servicios ambientales hidrol gicos." Quito, Ecuador, July 1, 2005.

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## Biographies Of Contributors

Benjamin S. Piven graduated from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in May of 2008 with degrees in Political Science and International Studies. He has studied in Seville and Hong Kong, and completed internships at the US Mission to the UN and the US Consulate for Hong Kong and Macau. He currently works at The Brookings Institution in Washington D.C. This paper was written under the advisory of Prof. Michael C. Davis of the Chinese University of Hong Kong Faculty of Law.



Sarah E. Johnson graduated in May of 2008 from Indiana University with a major in International Studies and an Area Certificate in Latin American and Caribbean Studies. In the fall of 2007, she was an intern at Exodus Refugee and Immigration, Inc. of Indianapolis, IN. She is currently pursuing a Master's Degree as a FLAS fellow at the Center for Latin American and Caribbean Studies at Indiana University. In this and in all things, she owes a debt of gratitude to her daughter, who provides her daily inspiration and motivation.



Annette McFarland graduated in the Spring of 2008 from Oregon State University earning three degrees in English, French, and International Studies. This thesis was written to fulfill University Honors College requirements. While at OSU she studied abroad twice, to Angers, France and Chillan, Chile, where she conducted her research for this thesis. She is excited to teach English in the south of France for the 2008-2009 school year.



Lain Heringman was born in Madrid, Spain and was raised in England. He graduated Phi Beta Kappa from Indiana University in the summer of 2008 with a degree in International Studies. A passionate advocate for human rights, he founded an IU anti-trafficking student organization in 2007 called the Campus Coalition Against Trafficking. Lain is currently in southern Mexico helping to establish a new microfinance non-governmental organization.



Derek Andrew Reighard graduated from the University of Pittsburgh in 2007. While working toward a Bachelor of Science degree in Biology, Derek participated in a number of projects relating to public health issues in Latin America. In June 2006, he traveled to Ibarra, Ecuador, to conduct a six-week investigation about potable-water treatment methods in the Andes Mountains. Several months later, he traveled to the Dominican Republic with the Student Leaders of International Medicine (SLIM), a University of Pittsburgh-based organization, to build artesian well systems in impoverished rural communities and educate children about proper hand-washing techniques. Derek currently works in a balance-disorder research lab, investigating the effects of vestibular inputs on the autonomic nervous system. He will be applying for medical school admission in the fall of 2009, and hopes one day to cater to the health needs of Spanish-speaking communities, both in the United States and abroad.

