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A Case Study of Power Dynamics in the
Cold War*

-Anna Thiergartner

*In Defense of a Lost Cause:
Cooperativism as a Solution to the
Malawian Agricultural Predicament*

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*Mimes, Sunflowers, and Good
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*An Examination of the Political
Philosophy, Pedagogic Policies, and
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Through the Lens of Colombian
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Iraq from 1972-1975: A Case Study of Power Dynamics in the Cold War

Anna Thiergartner

George Washington University

The relationship between the Soviet Union and Iraq in the 1970s represents the perfect case study of the power politics of the period. Iraq's master politician Saddam Hussein ushered in a new era of economic growth in his country using Cold War politics for Iraqi national interest. Economic arms trade data records the minute details of this curious friendship. Looking through the lens of Development Theory and economic interactions, the Iraqi-Soviet bond reveals why the proxy wars of the Cold War ultimately failed. Conventional thinking of this period often led others to believe that the Soviet Union and the United States always held the power. The bilateral world that they created featured their power politics and their control. However, through the study of Iraq, it becomes evident that the balance of control was often held by the supposedly compliant state. This equally exploitative system shows the intensely calculated movements and developments of all alliances. It is important to be thought of both politically and economically as they were completely intertwined. The Iraqi case study also highlights the flaws in the Soviet Union's plan for developing compliant states. Their inability to effectively retain these alliances may have contributed to their downfall.

"Iraq's present pragmatism is a means toward ultimate hegemony in the Persian Gulf and perhaps throughout the Middle East, inevitably at the expense of both superpowers."¹

“As the world now knows, it was a disaster for Saddam, a triumph for American diplomacy and military might, and a centerpiece of George Bush's legacy. Saddam's brutal invasion of Kuwait also provided the unexpected opportunity to write an end to fifty years of Cold War conflict with resounding finality,”² reflected James Baker III, Secretary of State under President George H.W. Bush, on the legacy of the Gulf War. The relationship between the Soviet Union and Iraq began in 1958, solidified in 1972, and dissipated at the beginning of the Iran-Iraq War. This culminated in Saddam Hussein becoming the aggressor to first test the new post-Cold War alliances. The combination of weapons stockpiling, possession of oil riches, and intense egomania fueled the tumultuous history of Iraqi-Soviet relations. This relationship gives tremendous insight into the nature and importance of relations with superpowers during the Cold War. Iraq's ultimate control of the alliance resulted from their

leverage as a successful trading partner and the Soviet Union's disproportionate need for a geo-strategic outpost in the Middle East to counter the United States' allies in the region.

Thousands of studies and books explore the power maneuvering of Cold War relationships between the United States, the Soviet Union and their respective client states. Yet few delve into the day-to-day changes that both evolved and threatened these alliances. The relationship between the Soviet Union and Iraq in the 1970s represents the perfect case study of power politics of the time period. Iraq's master politician, Saddam Hussein, ushered in a new era of economic growth in his country using Cold War politics to benefit Iraqi national interests. Economic arms trade data records the minute and intriguing details of this curious friendship. Looking through the lens of economic theory and utilizing trade data, the Iraqi-Soviet bond reveals why the proxy wars of the Cold War ultimately failed.

The Cold War in the Middle East

Russia had long held an interest in the Arab world. After the conclusion of World War II the Soviet Union sought to have a larger presence in

¹ Michael T. Klare, “Fueling the Fire: How We Armed the Middle East,” *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 47, no. 1 (1991): 19.

² James Addison Baker, *The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War, and Peace 1989-1992* (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1995), 52.

the Middle East and to greatly reduce the strength of the Western powers in the region, particularly the British.³ The Soviet Union's policies in the Middle East reflect the, "total foreign policy which draws no principal distinction between diplomatic, economic, psychological, or military means of operation."⁴ In the period immediately following World War II, the Soviet Union refused to withdraw troops from Iran citing a misinterpreted 1921 treaty, made territorial claims to two Turkish straits to receive access to the Black Sea, and switched from support from Israel to Palestine. All of these moves and decisions can be easily attributed to the Soviet Union's desire for increased strength and sway in the Middle East, as well as areas where they could subtly incite Marxist tendencies in current governments or nationalist movements.⁵

During the 1950's, Cold War rhetoric and ideology in the Middle East rose to a new level. Possibilities for Soviet strategic alliances progressed during this time frame due to the regional security alliance developed in the Baghdad Pact of 1955 and a split between pan-Arabists and nationalists. Contributing to the reorientation towards the Soviet Union was the lack of a Soviet colonial history in the Middle East. Additionally, Soviet anti-imperialist rhetoric appealed to neutral nations and leaders in the Cold War, such as Gamal Nasser of Egypt and Jawaharlal Nehru of India.⁶ The Soviet-Egyptian relationship started with arms trade and continued with similar commercial interests. Nationalization of the Suez Canal was inspired by Western disappointments, not by Soviet influence. To some, the Suez Canal crisis elevated the influence of the Soviet Union in the region, but Egypt remained frustrated that the Soviet Union took credit for the perceived defeat of the West. Serious issues developed between the two allies after the Egyptian-Syrian unification, which formed

the United Arab Republic (UAR), and the perceived repression of Communist parties in the region. The Egyptian case particularly foreshadows the Soviet relationship with Iraq.

The Soviets remained active in the Middle East in all events from the Six Days War of 1967 to the Yom Kippur War years later. The Soviets also attempted to develop strong Communist parties in all Middle Eastern countries, and tried to remove British and American influence in the region. It is not by accident or lack of effort that the Middle East region is the region where the Soviets had the most relative successes and the United States faced the most challenges.⁷ With knowledge of the Soviet stance in the Middle East, and these highlighted examples of proxy wars involving both American and Soviet superpowers, the case study of Iraqi-Soviet relations becomes even more intriguing and clear. Although the Soviet Union remained involved with other countries in the region, few were given the same attention and weight in foreign policy as was given to the Iraqi government.

The Kurdish Question

The first large-scale diplomatic issue between the Soviets and Iraqis involved the Kurdish area of Iraq. The Kurdish region in Northern Iraq holds a Kurdish minority with a separate language that has long sought political autonomy from Baghdad. The Kurdish struggle against the central government for autonomy has continued on and off throughout Iraqi history. Following the 1958 revolution overthrowing the Iraqi monarchy the Soviet Union backed demands for Kurdish autonomy within the Iraqi state.⁸ A document written by Peter Ivashutin to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union divulged in detail the extent that the Soviet Union supported the Kurdish uprisings. He described the Soviet's three-pronged approach, which began with step one: "use the KGB to organize pro-Kurdish and anti-Kassem protests in India, Indonesia, Afghanistan, Guinea,

³ Galia Golan, *The Soviet Policies in the Middle East: From World War II to Gorbachev*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 29.

⁴ Richard Pipes, "Some Operational Principles of Soviet Foreign Policy," in *The USSR and the Middle East*, Edited by Michael Confino and Shimon Shamir, (Jerusalem: Israel Universities Press, 1973), 9.

⁵ Galia Golan, *The Soviet Policies in the Middle East: From World War II to Gorbachev*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 38.

⁶ Galia Golan, *The Soviet Policies in the Middle East: From World War II to Gorbachev*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 45.

⁷ Ivo J. Lederer and Wayne S. Vucinich, *The Soviet Union and the Middle East: The Post-World War II Era*, (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1974), 12.

⁸ Oles M. Smolansky, *The USSR and Iraq: The Soviet Quest for Influence* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1991), 65.

and other countries,”⁹ and continued in stage two to, “have the KGB meet with Barzani to urge him to ‘seize the leadership of the Kurdish movements in his hands and to lead it along the democratic road,”¹⁰ and to advise him to “keep a low profile in the course of this activity so that the West did not have a pretext to blame the USSR in meddling into the internal affairs of Iraq.”¹¹ The Soviets wanted full reign over this small civil based proxy war and did not want the Americans to gain strength in the country. The third phase also involved illicit espionage, “assign the KGB to recruit and train a ‘special armed detachment (500-700 men)’ drawn from Kurds living in the USSR in the event that Moscow might need to send Mustafa Barzani, leader of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), ‘various military experts (Artillerymen, radio operators, demolition squads, etc.)’ to support the Kurdish uprising.”¹² This phase was key because the Soviets were willing to back the Kurds with Soviet-based troops, not merely send support nominally or economically. This willingness demonstrates extreme dedication by the Soviets. The support developed partially because the Soviets had a deep relationship with Barzani, which developed from 1947-1958 while he was exiled from Iraq. Barzani studied political science in Moscow, met Stalin, and had a relationship with the KGB and Soviet military.¹³ The Iraqis suspected the Soviet Union of supporting the Kurds and accused them of such. After this accusation, the Soviet Union and Iraqi Communist Party (ICP) denied the accusations and claimed that the Kurdish uprisings were due to the policies of the central government and not foreign involvement.¹⁴ Despite the Soviets’ continual show of support for the Kurds in the 1960s through diplomatic statements, and the outward desire for compromise between the Kurds and the Iraqi central government, the Soviets inwardly did not want the two parties to come together peacefully.

⁹ Peter Ivashutin to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, September 27, 1961,

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Kamal Said Qadir, “The Kurds and the KGB: The Secret History of the Barzani Family,” August 31, 2006, <http://www.antiwar.com/orig/qadir.php?articleid=9629>.

¹⁴ Oles M. Smolansky, *The USSR and Iraq: The Soviet Quest for Influence* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1991), 66.

Iraq and the Kurdish resistance groups reached a temporary peace in 1970 with the adoption of the March Agreement, which offered the Kurds a measure of autonomy, as inclusion in the cabinet, demarcated borders, and banned the mistreatment of Kurds based on their ethnic status. The slow process of implementing changes led to a return of subtle tensions. The Soviet Union; however, received a commitment from the Kurds that hostilities would not resume, so the Soviets restarted the weapons trade with Iraq. By the end of 1971 some aspects of the March Agreement still remained that had not been affected. As part of the 1972 Iraqi – Soviet Friendship Treaty, the Soviet Union dropped all involvement with Kurdish uprisings. Without Soviet support, the Kurds (and more specifically Barzani, a notorious flip-flopper) turned to the United States for support, which refrained, sensing it was a losing battle. The Iraqis subsequently squelched all uprisings in the Kurdish area with force and returned relations to the previous status quo.

Forming Alliances

Although the relationship between the two countries first developed in the late 1950s, they solidified the bond with the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation signed in April 1972. Iraq approached the idea of a treaty with motivations of nationalizing the oil industry and increased weapons trade. The Soviets desired another Middle Eastern/third world ally and had high hopes for their strategic aims in Iraq. The Ba’th position as a “staunch opponent of ‘imperialism, colonialism, and Zionism,’”¹⁵ was comparable to that of the Soviets. However, other similarities between the two countries appear to be sorely lacking. It has been previously reported that Saddam Hussein (at this point Second in Command in Iraq) very much admired Joseph Stalin and his ability to put down enemies and dissidents.¹⁶ However that is where the ideological similarities end: there is little ideological connection between either Hussein and Stalin or the Soviet Union and Iraq. According to international affairs theorist Francis Fukuyama,

¹⁵ Oles M. Smolansky, *The USSR and Iraq: The Soviet Quest for Influence* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1991), 18.

¹⁶ Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, *The World Was Going Our Way: The KGB and the Battle for the Third World* (New York: Basic Books, 2005) 141.

“Soviet and Iraqi objectives overlap most fully on the issue of anti-imperialism and opposition to Western influence in the Middle East but differ or are irrelevant on the subjects of pan-Arab nationalism, domestic development, and external economic relations,” and he continues, “this somewhat narrow doctrinal basis for Soviet-Iraqi relations has grown even more circumscribed by the coming to power of a Ba’th party faction, led by Saddam Hussein, that has followed a policy of rhetorical toughness coupled with noninvolvement in military confrontations.”¹⁷ Due to these differences, Iraq did not merit the ideological protection and funding that the Soviet Union offered their other communist allies. Those countries did not have the same freedom to receive funding from non-communist countries, specifically the United States.

In the 1972 Treaty, the Soviets requested political autonomy for the Kurds and freedom for the ICP, while the Ba’th party wanted to establish a close working relationship with the Soviet Communist Party not to implement communist ideology, but rather, to learn the Soviet Union’s techniques for imposing party control both in the Kremlin and in the military.¹⁸ The Kremlin also supported Iraq’s goal of nationalizing the oil industry. They recognized the benefits of Iraq having control over their own petroleum and the potentially enormous amounts of oil they could receive as a result. According to Oles M. Smolansky, the Soviet Union anticipated receiving large amounts of oil or hard currency in exchange for their technological and personnel assistance setting up the initial stages of a nationalized oil industry.¹⁹ The treaty appeared to be beneficial for all parties and involved various sectors of economic and political interaction. Hussein and the Ba’th government; however, developed economic success from the nationalization of the oil industry. This very communist decision of nationalization by the Ba’th led to immense oil fortunes and reserves.

Table 1.1 Iraqi Oil Production in Millions of Barrels per Day²⁰

1950	1965	1975	1980
0.136	1.322	2.262	2.514

In Table 1.1 it is clear that efficiency and productivity increased greatly, allowing Iraq to produce many more millions of barrels a day. By 1975, Iraq increased its production of barrels by 2.126 million barrels a day on average.²¹ This made Iraq one of the highest producing oil states in the world. Due to the nationalization, the government retained the revenue and soon became a wealthy state. With the aid from the Soviet Union, Iraq set up a successful state owned company that greatly improved their country’s economic fortunes. It gave them more international political power and made them a more attractive potential ally and/or commercial trader. The nationalization of the oil industry allowed Iraq to become economically independent, and gave access to arguably the biggest bargaining chip in modern politics, petroleum supplies.

Arms Proliferation in the Cold War

Economic development, like the growth in Iraq, underscored an important and unfolding aspect of the Cold War. Both the United States and the Soviet Union attempted to forge relationships of influence through arms sales. According to an unidentified State Department official in a 1983 *US News and World Report* article, “arms sales are the hard currency of foreign affairs, they replace the security pacts of the 1950s.”²² Although at the time they appeared to create “security pacts” in reality they empowered and armed almost every third world country. Political scientist Michael T. Klare described the political game that came with the arms trade by asserting that both the United States and the Soviet Union tried to earn loyalty from each other’s clients using the sale of arms.²³ The United States and the Soviet Union possessed such a strong

¹⁷ USA, The United State Air Force. *The Soviet Union and Iraq since 1968*, By Francis Fukuyama, Rand, 1980, Print.

¹⁸ Oles M. Smolansky, *The USSR and Iraq: The Soviet Quest for Influence* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1991), 18.

¹⁹ Oles M. Smolansky, *The USSR and Iraq: The Soviet Quest for Influence* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1991), 18.

²⁰ Marion Farouk-Sluglett and Peter Sluglett, *Iraq Since 1958: From Revolution to Dictatorship* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2001) 231.

²¹ Marion Farouk-Sluglett and Peter Sluglett, *Iraq Since 1958: From Revolution to Dictatorship* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2001) 231.

²² Michael T. Klare, “Fueling the Fire: How We Armed the Middle East,” *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 47, no. 1 (1991): 23.

²³ *Ibid*, 23.

desire to win over each other's allies and to gain strategic ground that there was no limit to the amount of arms a country could request. Klare asserts that by the 1980s, several countries in the Middle East possessed "arsenals comparable or superior to those found among the front-line states in NATO and the Warsaw Pact."²⁴ The sheer amount of weapons and money generated from the arms trade is astounding.

Table 1.2 World Arms Deliveries 1963-86, Four Year Averages (Millions of 1981 USD)²⁵

Country	1963-6	1967-70	1971-4	1975-8	1979-82	1983-6
United States	3,660	6,504	7,877	8,456	7,968	9,034
Soviet Union	3,238	3,206	6,399	8,275	11,143	14,806
France	364	384	1,116	1,673	3,019	3,596
Great Britain	421	303	824	1,207	1,971	1,045
West Germany	273	249	366	1,047	1,261	1,249
Italy	56	62	231	623	890	763
Other Developed	328	403	744	1,253	1,358	1,143
Other Eastern European	668	655	935	1,701	2,230	2,910
Developing	413	450	868	1,207	2,790	3,680
World	9,421	12,216	19,360	25,442	32,630	38,226

Through the data presented in this chart, it is clear that the United States and Soviet Union had a huge market share of the weapons trades. Furthermore it illustrates the extremely large amount of economic resources devoted to the purchasing of weapons. In a twenty-four year time period, countries earned \$137,295,000,000 (USD 1981) dollars from the sales of arms. For the Soviet Union in particular, arms sales comprised a huge source of currency. Keith Kraus described the Soviet arms economy of the 1970s: "Matters are somewhat different for the Soviet Union because arms sales are a source of hard currency. Between 1970 and 1978, such sales represented an average

²⁴ Ibid, 23.

²⁵ Keith Krause, "The Political Economy of the International Arms Transfer System: The Diffusion of Military Technique via Arms Transfers," *International Journal* 45, no. 3 (1990), 702.

of 8.6 per cent of total hard-currency exports."²⁶ The percentage of arms trade increased greatly in the 1970s, which correlated with the newly rich, and sought after, Middle Eastern countries.²⁷ As Middle Eastern oil revenue increased, so too did their ability to purchase arms. Since these countries held hard currency due to sales of oil, they became popular clients for arms suppliers. This gave them more freedom of choice, and eventually allows them the upper hand in all of their alliances. This dynamic thrived during Cold War bilateralism.

Specifically for the Soviet-Iraqi relationship, the Friendship Treaty encouraged high levels of the trade of arms. Although, Iraq had received their first weapons shipment from the Soviets in 1958, after 1972 they began developing a cache. After the signing, Iraq received SA-3 Surface to Air missiles, TU-22 Medium Range bombers, Scud surface-to-surface missiles armed with conventional warheads; and MIG-23 Fighters.²⁸ This enormous increase in arms purchasing and distributing represents the biggest difference between Soviet-Iraqi relations in the 1950s and Soviet-Iraqi relations in the 1970s. Although, there was some smaller scale arms trade in the 1950's, the massive shift in the 1970's demonstrated the tying bond of economics. In an effort to ensure Iraqi strategic support the Soviets continued to supply them arms, yet the reasoning on the Iraqi side was far different.

Table 1.3 Soviet Arms Supplies to its Chief Arab Clients, 1964-78 (Millions of USD)²⁹

	1964-73	1974-78	Total
Egypt	2,305	430	2,735
Syria	1,153	2,700	3,853
Iraq	742	3,600	4,342
Libya	--	3,400	3,400

²⁶ Keith Krause, "The Political Economy of the International Arms Transfer System: The Diffusion of Military Technique via Arms Transfers," *International Journal* 45, no. 3 (1990), 702.

²⁷ Keith Krause, "The Political Economy of the International Arms Transfer System: The Diffusion of Military Technique via Arms Transfers," *International Journal* 45, no. 3 (1990), 702.

²⁸ Oles M. Smolansky, *The USSR and Iraq: The Soviet Quest for Influence* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1991), 19.

²⁹ Oles M. Smolansky, *The USSR and Iraq: The Soviet Quest for Influence* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1991), 29.

Table 1.3 shows how Iraq became the Soviet Union's best client shortly after the Friendship Treaty came into effect. Iraq quickly became one of the world's largest producers of oil in a short period of time. By 1978, 5.8% of all state employees worked for the Ministry of Oil,³⁰ and Iraq and the Soviet Union traded 1,084,000,000 rubles annually, the most of any of the Soviet Union's allies.³¹

While tracking this particular historical narrative it becomes clear that the Soviet Union traded with Iraq on the whim of the client. Western countries equally craved Iraq's hard currency, and Iraq often reciprocated with its commercial partners. It is important to remember here that Iraq and the Soviet Union lack ideological similarity. Their relationship developed through desire for money and through geo-political strategy. Iraq was the only non-communist country in the Soviet Union's circle of "close" allies. Iraq's lack of commitment to Communism was highly unusual for a Soviet partner and gave them a freedom from dealing solely with the Soviet Union, a possibility the Soviets feared. Neutral states in the Cold War often played all sides against each other; however, none accomplished this with the ease of Saddam Hussein. Iraq's freedom from the Communist sphere gave them the leniency to find new, better deals with non-Communist countries and have states monetarily and politically indebted to them to a certain degree. Klare described Hussein's effortless acquisition of an extensive cache of arms, which revealed the overall danger of the arms trade.³² Published in 1990, Klare reflects from a post-Iran-Iraq War perspective, stating, "Saddam Hussein has collected the most modern arsenal in the Third World – With help from the United States, the Soviet Union, the French, the British, the Germans, the Chinese..."³³ The ability for leaders like Hussein to purchase this many weapons had large and unknown consequences. As just one example, in the twenty years after the signing of the

1972 Friendship Treaty, Iraq went to war with Iran and tried to annex the small country of Kuwait. It is likely that the psychology of the weapons trade influenced those decisions.

Demise of the Alliance

The Soviet-Iraqi relationship was multi-layered and steeped in historical and political drama. Only three years after signing the Friendship Treaty the relationship began to take a downturn for a wide variety of reasons. In 1975 two key turning points took place: the signing of the Algiers Accord between Iraq and Iran, and the crushing of a Kurdish revolt by Baghdad. These two interconnected events forever changed the Soviet-Iraqi alliance and displayed Hussein's pursuit of national interest at all cost.

By 1974, Kurdish leader Barzani had armed a paramilitary Kurdish security force, received enormous amounts of funding from the United States and Iran, and declared the very rich Kirkuk oil fields as the property of Iraqi Kurdistan.³⁴ Kurds remained upset about the complete lack of implementation of the March Agreement by the central government. Hussein's regime and the Kurds held negotiations; however, the negotiations failed to produce results. This deadlock, coupled with violence on the Iran-Iraq border, caused the situation to deteriorate rapidly. Full out warfare began in the spring of 1974, and Barzani's Peshmergas and volunteer forces from throughout the country equaled the number of Iraqi soldiers in the field.³⁵ However, Iraq held superior arms and established successful raids,³⁶ both made possible through arms purchased through the Soviet trade. Through a State Department memo reflecting on a conversation with Soviet Counsellor Avenir Khanov, it is clear to see that this particular show of force with Soviet arms displeased the Soviet Union greatly: "Soviets do not like the fact that their arms are being used against a 'nationalist' movement even if it is a reactionary one, but once the arms are

³⁰ Marion Farouk-Sluglett and Peter Sluglett, *Iraq Since 1958: From Revolution to Dictatorship* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2001) 249.

³¹ Brian Pockney, "Soviet Trade with the Third World," In *The Soviet Union and The Third World*, ed E.J. Feuchtwanger and Peter Nailor (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981) 37.

³² Michael T. Klare, "Fueling the Fire: How We Armed the Middle East," *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 47, no. 1 (1991): 19.

³³ Michael T. Klare, "Fueling the Fire: How We Armed the Middle East," *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 47, no. 1 (1991): 19.

³⁴ Marion Farouk-Sluglett and Peter Sluglett, *Iraq Since 1958: From Revolution to Dictatorship* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2001) 165.

³⁵ Marion Farouk-Sluglett and Peter Sluglett, *Iraq Since 1958: From Revolution to Dictatorship* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2001) 168.

³⁶ Marion Farouk-Sluglett and Peter Sluglett, *Iraq Since 1958: From Revolution to Dictatorship* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2001) 169.

in hands of a country, the donor loses control.”³⁷ Although Iraq used Soviet arms in a less than admirable way for the Soviet Union, Iran and the United States continued to fuel the Kurdish uprising completely. The Soviet Union, however, ostensibly had to support Iraq because of the looming Cold War threat if the United States and Iran gained power with a Kurdish victory. Many had attempted to bring Hussein and the Shah together to negotiate their differences, but no one succeeded until King Hussein of Jordan brought together representatives of both countries in October 1974. The negotiated result of these continuing talks was the Algiers Accord.³⁸

The Algiers Accord directly led to the end of the Kurdish Rebellion, increased tension and distance from Moscow, and, later, led to the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war. The Algiers Accord made two very significant settlements. First, it defined the border of the Shatt al-Arab waterway, which had long been contentious and would later be a major cause of the Iran-Iraq war. Secondly, the Accord closed the Iranian border, which effectively made it impossible for Iran to continue to support the Kurds. While this Treaty temporarily solved several controversial issues, Iraq never consulted on the issues with the Soviet Union. A State Department memo discussed its interpretation of Evgeny Pyrlin, Soviet Deputy Chief Near East Countries department:

“Some of Moscow’s reticence about the Iraqi-Iranian rapprochement can probably be put to the Soviets’ apparent total exclusion from a role as mid-wife. However, we suspect that there may be deeper Soviet concerns about the negative effect an improvement in Iraqi-Iranian bilateral relations can have on Soviet Relations with Iraq. A reduction in Iraqi-Iranian tensions and Baghdad’s apparent success in dealing with the Kurdish Rebellion (in a manner which most report indicate Moscow has opposed) will almost certainly reduce two of Moscow’s major sources of leverage with Baghdad.”³⁹

Moscow’s exclusion from the negotiating process, and complete lack of consultation, shows the independence of the Iraqi government from the Soviet Union. Had Iraq been a Communist state with the Soviet Union omnipresent in all of its activities, this treaty would likely have never been signed or would have been radically different.

Shortly after signing the Algiers Accord, Saddam Hussein made a highly anticipated visit to Moscow. This 1975 visit included several topics of interest between the two countries. Hussein bragged about the Algiers Accord as a “major Iraqi achievement”⁴⁰ and assured the Soviet Union that both Iran and Iraq were “implementing it by joint efforts and cooperation.”⁴¹ The Soviets still worried about the conclusion to the Kurdish uprising. They feared that if changes were not made the Kurds would again attempt to overcome Iraq in a violent manner. Ironically, according to the United States State Department, the Soviets “waxed pedantically eloquent about the Soviets’ ‘rich experience’ in resolving nationality problems. He assured Iraq that a policy directed at a ‘democratic solution’ of the national question will always meet ‘understanding’ from the Soviet people.”⁴² Although the Soviets hoped Iraq would take a more humanitarian and “democratic” stance to the Kurds, Iraq did not oblige. For the Soviets, their lack of involvement and the lack of credence paid to their suggestions demonstrated their miniscule political influence over Iraq. For Iraq, the signing of the Algiers Accord opened up possibilities for a new regional security network. This potential regionalism also loomed negatively over the minds of Soviets.

Although these regional issues weakened the Soviet Union’s presence, the treatment of the ICP upset the Soviet Union to its core. During the Kurdish hostilities, the ICP worked to consolidate power and made major gains in membership and publications throughout Iraq. After the completion of Kurdish hostilities Baghdad began to arrest ICP members, imprison them and then release them. In the spring of 1976, the ICP held their Third Party

³⁷ USA, Department of State, Soviet Disagreement with Gou over Kurdish Policy, Moscow, 1975, Print.

³⁸ Marion Farouk-Sluglett and Peter Sluglett, Iraq Since 1958: From Revolution to Dictatorship (London: I.B. Tauris, 2001) 170.

³⁹ USA, Department of State, Soviet Views on Iraq-Iran Relations, Moscow, 1975, Print.

⁴⁰ USA, Department of State, Saddam Hussein Visit to Moscow, Baghdad, 1975, Print.

⁴¹ USA, Department of State, Saddam Hussein Visit to Moscow, Baghdad, 1975, Print.

⁴² USA, Department of State, Saddam Hussein Visit to Moscow, Baghdad, 1975, Print.

Congress and increasingly complained about government oppression. After this intensification in rhetoric, the two parties' tense relationship began unraveling quickly. Baghdad implemented a "vitriolic propaganda campaign against the Communists."⁴³ By this point the Ba'th Security Apparatus, including the Mukhabarrat (secret police) and Amn al-Amn (general security police), had grown immensely and consolidated their power. The government was purged of non-Ba'thi, no matter the rank of their position, and the government became omnipresent in all spheres of life. Arguably, Hussein and the Ba'th used what they had learned from the Soviets and what they had admired in Stalin to reach this point. Soviet armament and party preservation techniques had completely infiltrated the Ba'th. Their desire for immense power and political control in the shape of the Soviet Union led to the crackdown on the ICP. It became increasingly dangerous to be of another political party in Iraq. In 1978, the Revolutionary Command Council (the leadership of the Ba'th) made non-Ba'thist political activity illegal for any former military men.⁴⁴ Since, Iraq required conscription, this ruling applied to every man over the age of eighteen. To be clear, these purges and consolidations affected more than just the Communist party. However, for a country with such a close relationship with the Soviet Union this treatment of the ICP was particularly antagonistic. The Soviet Union supported all communist parties during the Cold War monetarily and strategically. Arguably, the Ba'th knew that if it went after the ICP, that would be the end of the already much deteriorated Soviet-Iraqi Alliance.

Economic Theory

The Soviet-Iraqi history is full of strategic movements and the desire to develop alliance and economic partnership. The power in their relationship was held by Iraq and is evidenced through a specific economic theory. Although there is no hard evidence to describe the psychological effect of this dangerous political game, this economic theory demonstrates the power struggle in the relationship. To fully appreciate

this, a background in the dependency theory is first necessary. The dependency theory developed toward the end of Imperialism in the 1940s. As colonized countries started becoming independent they met a new set of economic challenges. The development theory attempted to describe their underdevelopment, which, according to the theory, was due to continual reliance on old economic structures. Insinuating that the power and influence still lied with the former colonizing country because of the formally colonized country's remaining dependence.⁴⁵ The dependency theory asserts that the same controller and controlled relationship exists after official independence. This reliance on the controlling country for economic goods, or trade markets, functions as a form of Neo-Colonialism. Fernando Cardoso and Enzo Falleto, dependency relationship experts, describe the attempted independence as "the contradiction between the attempt to cope with the market situation in a politically autonomous way and the de facto situation of dependency characterizes what is the specific ambiguity of nations where political sovereignty is expressed by the new state and where economic subordination is reinforced by the inter-national division of labor and by the economic control exerted by former or new imperialist centers."⁴⁶ Scholars cite this form of nominal independence as the cause for the Third World's twenty-first century underdevelopment.

However, it would be imprudent to consider this status quo as unchanged by the Cold War. The nature of the bilateral world during this period pitted the United States and Soviet Union directly against each other. Ingenious countries used their desired alliance as a bargaining chip to receive the best deal possible for either themselves (as corrupt leaders) or for their countries (what could be considered benevolent leaders). As the Cold War waged, the dependency theory slowly developed into the reverse dependency theory. Desperate powers seeking footholds into strategic regions often bowed to the demands of the "subordinate" party. But these relationships shifted daily and on the whim of the client. After all, strategic alliance and development affected Soviet and American

⁴³ Marion Farouk-Sluglett and Peter Sluglett, *Iraq Since 1958: From Revolution to Dictatorship* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2001) 183.

⁴⁴ Marion Farouk-Sluglett and Peter Sluglett, *Iraq Since 1958: From Revolution to Dictatorship* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2001) 186.

⁴⁵ I. William Zartman, "Europe and Africa: Decolonization or Dependency?" *Foreign Affairs* 54, no. 2 (1976), 325.

⁴⁶ I. William Zartman, "Europe and Africa: Decolonization or Dependency?" *Foreign Affairs* 54, no. 2 (1976), 325.

assets far more than the foothold countries. First and second world countries, particularly the United States and Soviet Union, became relatively dependent on the huge influx of money associated with the arms trade. These underdeveloped countries held all the power because they could simply turn to the other side and find an even better deal. Klare, author of "Fueling the Fire: How We Armed the Middle East," details this paradigm using arms sales. He wrote using the Client-Supplier relationship,

"By agreeing to provide arms to a client, the supplier seeks a local ally for its ongoing struggle against the other superpower. Once the relationship has been forged, however, the recipient comes to expect continuing and even expanded arms deliveries in exchange for its continued loyalty to the supplier – and any reluctance on the part of the supplier will be condemned as evidence of inconstancy and unreliability, the result is 'reverse dependency'. The patron finds itself beholden to the good will of the client, and must satisfy the client's appetite for modern arms."⁴⁷

With all the power effectively in the hands of the client state there would be exponential gains for them. Each side's loss is the other's gain, and therefore the client will always have a supplier. The notion that every movement in the Cold War was strategic and bilateral allowed this reverse dependency to thrive and the clients benefited from the superpowers' tactical interests. This particular case developed in Iraq as the Soviet relationship flourished and then quickly faltered. Yet, Iraq never bemoaned the loss of the alliance because it easily found other suppliers.

Although this relationship turned into a prime example of the reverse dependency theory, the Soviets had their own economic and political ways of developing strategic relationships. The Soviets started formulating this bond by giving a third world country military or economic aide that would in turn develop into a level of import and export dependence that would culminate into political

⁴⁷ Michael T. Klare, "Fueling the Fire: How We Armed the Middle East," *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 47, no. 1 (1991): 21.

compliance with the Soviet Union's policies.⁴⁸ This plan relied on the third world country's trade dependence changing the outlook of its foreign policy. Iraq became an example of the reverse-dependency theory, rather than a Soviet trade-induced dependency, because of the economic freedom afforded to it through its wealth. For example, the NATO report on the Mediterranean Situation in 1975 noted, "According to certain reports the USSR has suspended arms deliveries to Iraq as a sign of its displeasure over certain steps taken by Baghdad."⁴⁹ However, this backfired. When Iraq wanted to assert its independence, or was threatened by the Soviet Union, it often turned to the West, in particular France for trade and the sale of oil. Of non-communist countries in 1976-1979 France led Iraqi exports with \$8,099,000,000 (1980 USD) and also was Iraq's largest non-communist commercial partner with \$10,094,000,000 (1980 USD).⁵⁰ Other Soviet satellites did not possess the same ability to change alliances. They were either smaller, ideologically Communist, or under more constrictive economic auspices with the Soviet Union.

The Soviet-Iraqi relationship provides an interesting and rich case study of strategic armament and proxy wars during the Cold War. Conventional thinking of this period often led others to believe that the Soviet Union and the United States always held the power. The bilateral world that they created featured their power politics and their control. However, through study of Iraq it becomes evident that the balance of control was often held by the supposedly compliant state. This equally exploitative system shows the intensely calculated movements and developments of all alliances. It is important that they be thought of both politically and economically as they were completely intertwined. The Iraqi case study also highlights the flaws in the Soviet Union's plan for developing compliant states. Their inability to effectively retain these alliances may have contributed to their downfall. Most importantly

⁴⁸ Philip G. Roeder, "The Ties that Bind: Aide, Trade, and Political Compliance in Soviet-Third World Relations," *International Studies Quarterly* 29, no. 2 (1985), 192.

⁴⁹ USA, NATO, Draft Report to NATO Ministers on Mediterranean Situation, 21 October 1975, Print.

⁵⁰ Oles M. Smolansky, *The USSR and Iraq: The Soviet Quest for Influence* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1991), 32.

however, Iraq had several abnormalities, including the shrewd politician Saddam Hussein and immense crude oil reserves. Iraq may not be the rule, but it could be a dangerous exception to the norm. If Iraq's circumstances would have been less favorable, or if Hussein had not been in power, there is no guarantee that Iraq would not have complied with the Soviet's requests and turned to Communism. Based on this revealed and analyzed history it is clear that Iraq was the dominant power in this relationship, which caused the Soviet's attempts to develop a compliant state to be completely futile. In reality, the Soviet efforts gave Iraq every tool it needed to flourish on its own and play both sides of the intensely bilateral world of the 1970s.

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In Defense of a Lost Cause: Cooperativism as a Solution to the Malawian Agricultural Predicament

Omar Quinonez

University of Colorado-Denver

Malawi represents the developmental problems of Africa. In the past decades, Malawi has gone through a snapshot of the movement of the world's attitudes towards economic development from protectionism in the 1960's and 1970's, neo-liberalism in the 1980's, post-neo-liberalism in the late 1990's, and a current antagonistic battle between more or less state-intervention in agricultural policies. Malawi's history of economic policies and the overall history of most developed nations provide answers to the problems Malawi currently faces. Government intervention in the agricultural sector can help foster economic activity to create the conditions for private markets to develop. Most importantly, public intervention in the form of the creation of a cooperative system of production can work as in the case of the Israeli Kibbutz, the Mennonites in Canada and Mexico, and the fishing cooperatives of Ensenada Mexico, to push for economic, social, and political development. With the help of the international community and international donors, cooperativism in Malawi can become not a written reality but a concrete and material one that breaks the traps of poverty that haunt Malawi so much.

Introduction

Malawi is a small, landlocked, and underdeveloped country, located in Southeastern Africa. It represents the developmental problems of Africa, and the predicament that continues to haunt the world like a specter, and warns of our ineptness to help the continent. In the last few decades, Malawi began as a nation moving out of the conditions of British colonialism, and out of the material relations derived by almost one hundred years of British colonialism.¹ During the late 1960s and 1970s Malawi experienced a more protectionist form of economic development, being concurrent with the world's preferred economic outlook at the time.²

During the 1980s, it was hit by the neoliberal revolution, transmitted from the developed Western nations through the International Monetary Fund

and the World Bank.³ Later on, Malawi went through yet another stage of economic rearrangement with the introduction of a mixed form of development: neo-liberalism coupled together with a mild version of economic regulations; in other words the "post-Washington consensus."⁴ Finally, during the last decade Malawi has been pressured by international economic organizations to once again lift its economic regulations and finish liberalizing its entire economy, sparking an antagonistic reaction on the part of the Malawian government.⁵

Malawi continues to be one of the poorest nations in Africa with an alarmingly low per capital income of \$800, putting it at a rank of 180th in the world, and a gross domestic product of 12.81 billion, ranking it at 143rd in the world.⁶ Malawi's

¹ Encyclopedia Britannica. "Travel and Geography: Malawi." n.d. Encyclopedia Britannica. 9 July 2010.

² Lele, Uma. "Structural Adjustments, Agricultural Development and the Poor: Some Lessons from the Malawian Experience." World Development, 1990: Vol. 18, No. 9, 1207-1219.

³ Harrigan, Jane. "U-Turns and Full Circles: Two Decades of Agricultural Reform in Malawi 1981-2000." World Development, 2003: Vol. 38, No. 5, 847-863.

⁴ Harrigan, Jane, 850-860.

⁵ Dugger, Celia. Ending Famine, Simply by Ignoring the Experts. 2 December 2007. 23 March 2010 <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/02/world/africa/02malawi.html?_r=2>.

⁶ CIA. "The World Fact Book." 3 August 2010. Central Intelligence Agency. 9 August 2010.

continued lack of growth, I claim, can be solved by reviving an old agricultural form of organization: the cooperative. A look at some of the world's cooperatives reveals that they have occurred in part when market mechanisms and their necessary conditions had not been created. Whether the Kibbutz in Israel, the Mennonites in Canada and Mexico, or the fishermen of Ensenada, Mexico, they have all been successful in places where market conditions have not yet been born. This phenomenon, I claim, can provide an answer and a foundational form of economic organization in Malawi, an economy which has not been able to overcome its socioeconomic difficulties with any of the most popular forms yet of economic development.

The Malawian Predicament: History and Causes

Malawi gained its independence from the United Kingdom in 1964. Its economy was and still is predominantly agricultural, agriculture accounting for a third of its GDP and 90% of its exports.⁷ After independence, the new government decided to pursue an outward-looking economic policy with considerable state intervention. During the 1960s and 1970s the economy was dominated by the colonial legacy of agricultural estates, which grew at an annual rate of 17% at the cost of the small landowners who were prohibited from growing export-crops (primarily tobacco) and who were marginalized to produce crops (primarily corn) for Malawi's self-consumption.⁸

The government intervened in the economy in the form of the state-corporation ADMARC, whose main role was to stabilize internal markets by buying at a fixed rate from small farmers and then re-selling the products in auctions. Further, with the profits made in the resale of crops, ADMARC was required by the government to subsidize producers and consumers.⁹ A clear bias, however, could be observed in the division of the agricultural economy in the sense that smallholders were pushed to the level of only providing enough food for internal consumption and estates were allowed to farm highly valuable export crops. This bias against small farmers during the 1960s and 1970s

could be easily observed in ADMARC's operations, since its profits and the reinvestment of them benefited estates the most.¹⁰

Even though the economic arrangements of the 1960s and 1970s were dominated by the colonial legacy of agricultural estates, the Malawian economy managed to grow at a healthy 5.5% annual rate until the late 1970s. It provided a functioning export agricultural economy, managed and stabilized by strong state intervention, whose bias nevertheless provided the poor and smallholders with a stable fixed price and a clear market for their harvest.¹¹ Further, the 1970s economic order provided small landholders with subsidized fertilizer, grain reserves, and other government help through the National Rural Development Program to stimulate their production.¹² However, poor farmers with very limited land to harvest had to look for wage-labor jobs at large estates in order to provide enough for their families.

The strong economic performance of the 1960s and 1970s came to an end by 1979 when a second oil shock was followed by a decline in tobacco prices, Malawi's main export crop. Simultaneously, a civil war in Mozambique created an exodus of refugees to Malawi that increased Malawi's export costs (since it is a landlocked country) by 50 million.¹³ The crisis sent most large estates into bankruptcy and threatened the sustainability of Malawi's agriculturally-based economic system. Because of this, the Malawian government was forced to ask the World Bank for help in dealing with the crisis. The results were a series of neoliberal structural adjustment loans destined to reform the economic system and end the crisis. The loans came with strong conditions "to improve the balance of payments, cut the budget deficit, and give market mechanisms greater influence in determining prices, wages, resource allocation, and structure of production."¹⁴

⁷ Harrigan, Jane, 848-849.

⁸ Harrigan, Jane, 848.

⁹ Lele, Uma, 1208.

¹⁰ Shan, David, E. "The Stagnation of Smallholder Agriculture in Malawi: A Decade of Agricultural Adjustment." *Food policy*, 1991: Vol. 16, No. 3, 223.

¹¹ Harrigan, Jane, 848.

¹² Lele, Uma, 1211

¹³ Lele, Uma, 1209.

¹⁴ Lele, Uma, 1211.

A positive impact of the structural loans was the reduction of the budget deficit; however, this was done by the traditional neoliberal mechanism of cutting public expenditure. Furthermore, the structural loans had the goal of dismantling of the strong bias against small-scale farmers by allowing them to grow export-crops such as tobacco. In order to stimulate their production, the reforms also allowed for ADMARC's increase in producer prices and decrease in consumer prices for crops sold domestically.¹⁵ However, these positive impacts came at great costs for the Malawian economy, in the sense that per capita income declined from 1985 to 1987, and production did not recover even with the attempted stimulus. Furthermore, the stimulus of production actually backfired; the rise of producer prices to stimulate production resulted in inflation at a 15% average throughout the 1980s, resulting in an increase in consumer prices as well.¹⁶ With a decline in income per capita, no increment in total production, and a rise in prices, Malawi was faced with a serious food crisis throughout 1986-87.¹⁷ The horrible effects of the food crisis caused a decline in Malawi's balance of payments to its international creditors since the government had less income due to the crisis, and overall made matters worse for the nation.¹⁸

The source of these problems has been identified as a combination of factors including the switch to full export orientation, which requires the import of basic crops for subsistence, and presents difficulties during declines in international markets.¹⁹ Other failures of the structural adjustment loans were: the negative impact of non-price factors such as smallholders' dislike for hybrid (disease resistant and fast growing) corn crops, the inability of market mechanisms to penetrate smallholders' areas, the high prices of unsubsidized fertilizers, and the lack of good lending credit due to the bank's distrust of poor smallholders.²⁰ For example, the lack of government infrastructure such as roads and airports made it more expensive, and perhaps even

unprofitable, for private businesses to operate, especially those dedicated to exports since transportation is vital to them. The cost of transportation in Malawi throughout the 1980s averaged \$0.65 to \$0.75, which was much higher than Zimbabwe and South Africa (averaging \$0.2 on trunk roads and \$0.35 on rural roads).²¹ If the cost of transportation is too high, especially for Malawi since it is a landlocked nation, then it is more difficult for a neoliberal private system to operate in the way dictated by structural adjustment reforms.

Since independence and throughout the 1970s, Malawi had only two main commercial banks, The National Bank of Malawi and the Commercial bank of Malawi.²² Malawi did possess a whole range of other smaller banks such as the Post Office Savings Bank, but these had little effect on lending for commercial purposes.²³ Lack of a solvent financial system becomes problematic especially when a country such as Malawi engages in neo-liberalization practices. Lack of access to credit limits, or not prevents, the expansion and creation of private enterprises, which is of course the center of economic neoliberal thinking. Malawi was forced to nationalize what were the Barclays D.C.O and Standard banks after independence, transforming them into the national banks so as to generate savings to lend in commercial fashion. Nonetheless, at their peak in 1986, their total lending did not exceed 374,878 dollars:²⁴

“Smallholder farmers were characterized as consisting of three groups. The 20 to 25 percent . . . hired labor and had significant off farm income. Their land holding was above average and were credit recipients. The bottom 25 to 30 percent was usually female-headed households. These were ‘severely constrained by lack of labor’ and ‘unable or unwilling to accept institutional credit.’”²⁵

¹⁵ Lele, Uma, 1211-1212.

¹⁶ Sindima, Harvey J. *Malawi's First Republic: An Economic and Political Analysis*. Boston: University Press of America, 2002, 116.

¹⁷ Harrigan, Jane, 849-850.

¹⁸ Sindima, Harvey J., 116

¹⁹ Lele, Uma, 1212-1213

²⁰ Lele, Uma, 1212.

²¹ Ndlulu, Benno, and et al. *The Political Economy of Economic Growth in Africa 1960-2000*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008, 159.

²² Sindima, Harvey J., 104.

²³ Sindima, Harvey J., 104.

²⁴ Sindima, Harvey J., 104.

²⁵ Spring, Anita. *Agricultural Development and Gender Issues in Malawi*. Lanham: University Press of America, 1995, 60.

In this sense the banking system in Malawi was not robust enough to incentivize the generation of rapid economic activity, especially with regard to poor farmers who represent a high default risk for banks. As such, the credit system, the engine of private entrepreneurship, stalled the success of neoliberalization since the country was never ready for it.

The case of fertilizer subsidies during the neoliberal restructuring is also crucial. Fertilizer in Malawi plays a very important role as the country's economy was and still is overwhelmingly agricultural. By 1996, Malawi was the fourth highest country in terms of fertilizer use.²⁶ However, during the 1980s Malawi, as well as Tanzania and Cameroon, were in the process of phasing out most of their fertilizer subsidies.²⁷ The idea of phasing out subsidies was part of the neoliberal paradigm required by the structural adjustment loans. The goal was to open the door for private fertilizer companies to take over the market. However, with the transportation costs and lack of credit already noted above, the project did not go well for Malawi. The prices for two of the three most prominent types of fertilizer for maize rose 63% and 27%, respectively, from the 1980s through 1995.²⁸ In addition, there was a ten percent drop in the demand for fertilizer throughout the same period, reflecting the inability of small farmers to purchase the product.

The government then took the initiative of reinstalling the fertilizers, even when this was against neoliberal policies, because bad raining seasons and transportation problems with its neighbor Mozambique could put the economy on the brink of another agricultural crisis.²⁹ What this highlights, is that the market approach was not successful in allocating fertilizer at an affordable cost for smallholders. That is to say, bad raining reasons and a rise in transportation costs could make the fragile fertilizer private market collapse and produce another food crisis. The government had to intervene to secure smallholder access to fertilizer.

One additional aspect to note in regards to the failure of the neoliberal policies is the lack of investment in education during the reform years and prior to them. After independence, the government decided to channel most of its funding to infrastructure projects but neglected healthcare and education.³⁰ Basic education received low funding and many schools were organized on the basis of "self-help," with little funding from the government or international organizations, and lacking basic equipment and teachers.³¹ In addition, the situation worsened due to the budget cuts generated by the economic crisis of 1979 and the austerity measures imposed by the reforms. "A 1986 World Bank Report on education in Africa states that Malawi government funding of primary schools declined from US\$26 in 1970 to US\$14 in 1980 and that the teacher-student ratio went from 1:50 to 1:64 in ten years."³² Budget cuts also impacted the university level. "Up to 1984, students in the institutions of higher learning received full scholarship and allowance. That changed and students had to come up with a K200 fee per year."³³ What this highlights, is that by the time of economic liberalization, the education system had only become worse, and the ability of an educated population to open private businesses, manage them, and invest in key areas, was very limited.

The failures of the neoliberal economic policies in ending Malawi's agricultural problems resulted in a new set of reforms called "post-neoliberal" or "post-Washington consensus." These reforms maintained the idea of agricultural liberalization but acknowledged the importance of fertilizer subsidies, input subsidies, rural investment, and credit extension to the poor.³⁴ The reforms implemented in 1994 onward provided alleviation to the agricultural sector, and this reflected in the economy. The smallholder sector grew 43.6% in 1995, and the economy grew at an accelerated rate of 14% in 1995, and 10% in 1996. Although this was caused in part due to good raining seasons, good growth nevertheless pushed by the

²⁶ Kherallah, Mylene, et al. *Reforming Agricultural Markets in Africa*. London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002, 30.

²⁷ Kherallah, Mylene, et al., 44.

²⁸ Kherallah, Mylene, et al., 53.

²⁹ Kherallah, Mylene, et al., 46.

³⁰ Sindima, Harvey J., 123.

³¹ Sindima, Harvey J., 123.

³² Sindima, Harvey J., 125.

³³ Sindima, Harvey J., 125.

³⁴ Harrigan, Jane, 851.

smallholder sector continued until the end of the decade.³⁵

By the end of the 1990's, however, the World Bank and international donors began pressuring Malawi to cut its agricultural subsidies, to sell its grain reserves, and privatize ADMARC. Eventually Malawi followed most of these recommendations with the exception of privatizing ADMARC. It sold its grain reserves and dismantled the fertilizer program, but these actions eventually backfired, and produced a long food crisis mainly caused by the inability of farmers to buy seeds and fertilizers, which triggering a decline in corn production and subsequently a decline in farmer's income.³⁶ The current president, Bingu wa Mutharika, has responded by rejecting previous advice from the international community and restoring the fertilizer subsidy in order to stimulate crop production. The results have been successes. By 2007, Malawi was exporting more corn to the United Nation Food Program than any other nation in Africa, in addition to sending hundreds of tons of corn to Zimbabwe, and child hunger has "sharply fallen" (Dugger 2007). The New York Times stated that, "corn production leapt to 2.7 million metric tons in 2006 and 3.4 million in 2007 from 1.2 million in 2005."³⁷

Even with the agricultural improvements in the last half-decade, Malawi still has an alarming low per capita income and a low GDP. The light of hope at the end of the tunnel arises from its healthy GDP growth in the last few of years: 7.9% in 2007, 9.7% in 2008, and 5.9% in 2009. Given the historical economic policies of Malawi, its crises, and its current success, a new economic arrangement must be drawn, one that tackles the old and alarming social problems the nation still faces.

Cooperativism: A World Phenomenon

The controversial topic of state intervention in agriculture is actually uncontroversial in the development of most rich nations today. Germany, France, Norway, Japan, Sweden, and even the U.S. created publically owned banks to stimulate lending to small and poor farmers, due to the absence and

unwillingness of private lenders to lend to them.³⁸ Irrigation infrastructure, along with subsidies in machinery and farmer equipment, has been part of the rich nations' developmental path. France, Sweden, Japan, and the U.S., all created public initiatives to generate irrigation systems. In the U.S.:

"The increasing scale of irrigation projects prompted the federal government not only to subsidise irrigation projects but to take them up itself, following the 1902 Reclamation Act (Fuhrihan 1949, 966; also see Gras 1925, 392, and Selby 1949, 964). Canada reformed the irrigation system in 1894, consciously imitating the American model (with a bit of Australian elements thrown in), especially the centralisation and the nationalisation of water resources."³⁹

Malawi's critical question of fertilizer subsidies is a topic that was also present in the development of today's rich nations. The World Bank has only recently recognized the importance of this phenomenon for the Malawian economy. However, government intervention on this subject is not new:

"In many of today's rich countries in the past, governments subsidized fertilizers and/or promoted their uses through extension services. In the long run, fertilizers are likely to be even more successful if they are combined with the supply of fertilizer responsive crop varieties, as seen in the cases of Japan, Korea, and India."⁴⁰

The U.S. did something slightly different by "impos[ing] quality standards on fertilizers in the late nineteenth century."⁴¹ Two of the most controversial policies by neoliberals were also part of the development of rich nations today: trade control and price controls. Trade restrictions in agriculture help maintain stability in the market, particularly for vulnerable small farmers. "It is for this reason that many European countries re-

³⁵ Harrigan, Jane, 852.

³⁶ BBC. Malawi Famine Blamed on Aids. 26 November 2002. 23 March 2010 <<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/health/2512315.stm>>.

³⁷ Dugger, Celia

³⁸ Chang, Ha-joon. "Rethinking Public Policy in Agriculture: lessons from history, distant and recent." *Journal of Peasant Studies*, 2009: Vol. 33, No.3, 36.

³⁹ Chang, Ha-joon, 498.

⁴⁰ Chang, Ha-joon, 501.

⁴¹ Chang, Ha-joon, 501.

introduced agricultural tariffs and quotas in the late nineteenth century, when New World (and to a lesser extent Russian and Ukrainian) imports dramatically increased thanks to the development of steamships, refrigeration, and railway."⁴² The Dutch government, the U.S., Japan, and Chile, among others, have all participated in price controls, all of which has been proven to be successful in maintaining stability in farmer's income.⁴³

The most relevant aspect of public intervention by developed nations for this paper is the utilization of cooperatives. Cooperatives provided a way for poor farmers to unite and use their collective capital to buy machinery, more easily obtain credit, distribute services, democratize economic policies, and support each other during bad economic times:

"In today's rich countries, with the exception of Japan, the agricultural co-operative movement emerged spontaneously in the late nineteenth century. There were many different types of co-ops, providing activities like joint marketing, joint production, joint input purchase, irrigation/drainage, product quality control, timeshare for machine, and credit. Denmark was a pioneer in marketing and production co-ops, while Germany led the way in the development of credit co-ops. Co-operative banks first emerged in Germany in 1864 in response to the tendency of the Hypothekenbanken to lend only to large farms (Tracy 1989, 103). The idea quickly spread to other countries, upon which their governments started supporting them."⁴⁴

In order to make a case for the use of cooperatives in Malawi's agricultural sector, I would like to discuss three specific cases of cooperatives around the world: the Kibbutz in Israel, the Mennonites in Canada and Mexico, and the fishing cooperatives of Ensenada, Mexico. I will also address the difference between the system proposed for Malawi and the failures of collectivization in the Soviet Union and China.

⁴² Chang, Ha-joon, 504.

⁴³ Chang, Ha-joon, 504.

⁴⁴ Chang, Ha-joon, 496.

The Kibbutz System

The first Kibbutz was founded in 1910, long before the creation of the State of Israel.⁴⁵ The Kibbutz communities are technically much more than a form of cooperativism. They began as forms of Anarcho-syndicalist or Anarcho-socialist communities in which private property was non-existent and where direct democracy was in control of even economic matters. Nonetheless, Kibuzzism represents a very similar form of economic organization as farm cooperatives. Their fundamental principles are based on communal ways of creating economic prosperity, rather than atomized individuals competing on their own. The Kibbutz communities were set up in Israel by European Jewish immigrants who were adherent to socialist principles and who wanted to make Zionism the socialism of the Middle East.⁴⁶

The advantages of the Kibbutz mode of production for the Israeli settlers were based on the ability to struggle together in the midst of growing tensions between Arab governments and Israeli colonizers. The basic elements necessary for market mechanisms to take place were inexistent at that time. First, security was not guaranteed at all due to the growing discontent regarding Arab neighbors and especially because the State of Israel, the institution that was supposed to guarantee security for capitalism to flourish, was not yet born. Second, a reliable justice system was also absent due to the lack of a recognized nation-state. Third, laws that protect and guarantee private property and open a space for the possibility to take risks in investment and lending were also absent. Fourth, the lack of a concrete and materialized nation-state prevented the large-scale building of basic infrastructure such as roads, ports, and electricity generation, all crucial for a market to begin operations. Fifth, the harsh climate conditions made it extremely risky for any individual farmer to take on the task of erecting a productive and profitable farm.⁴⁷

⁴⁵ Bowes, Alison, M. "The Experiment That Did Not Fail." *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 1990: Vol.,22, No.1, 85-103.

⁴⁶ Bowes, Alison, M., 88.

⁴⁷ Barking, David, and John, W. Bennett. "Kibbutz and Colony: Collective Economies and the Outside World." *Comperative Studies in Society and History*, 1972: Vol. 14, No. 4, 456-483.

It was under these unfavorable conditions for capitalism that the Kibbutz began to flourish:

“Kibbutz origins are traced to practical experiments in agriculture in desert Palestine in the early years of the twentieth century, when the Zionist movement commenced its program of colonization. The high costs and needs for labor in creating irrigation and other techniques required to farm in this forbidding environment encouraged collective, risk-spreading solutions.⁴⁸

The Kibbutz communal mode of production was able to flourish where market mechanisms could not. The astronomical investment risk of a single farmer attempting to turn land in the middle of the desert into a prosperous business was tackled by a collective take on investment risks. The problem of the lack of a coherent justice system was solved by setting up a direct democracy in which members of the Kibbutz had a say in all aspects of their society, whether political or economic. The issue of private property laws was irrelevant since all property was held communally, and not by the state, since the state was the people itself. The issues with regard to infrastructure and investment in machinery were tackled by collective capital investment in those areas, moving the burden from one individual to the whole community. Finally, the problem of security in the midst of the absence of a concrete nation-state was solved with the rise of militias within the administrative structure of the Kibbutz:

“In the last years of the Mandate, the kibbutzim provided important bases and sources of recruitment for the Jewish underground, particularly the Palmach and the Haganah (Drabkin, 1962). Kibbutz defensive abilities were further proven in the War of Independence, when many communities successfully held out against the advancing Arab armies.⁴⁹

If a Kibbutz could thrive in conditions in which market mechanism could not, the question becomes

whether a Kibbutz was in fact an economically profitable enterprise and whether a collective organization such as this could provide enough for its inhabitants to live and develop further. The answer is yes. Kibbutzism provided with a very efficient way of farming the land and to incubate new technological breakthroughs.

“Kibbutz agriculture advanced rapidly in the late Mandate period and quickly became the most efficient organization in the country (Cohen, 1966, p. 8). Kibbutzim chose the crops that were best suited to the communal social organization they were evolving and that would enable them to raise their standards of living quickly. They could develop to suit themselves, virtually without competition, thereby laying firm foundations for their success after 1948.”⁵⁰

The collective nature of the Kibbutz provided an environment optimal for technological advancement. Contrary to the traditional view which holds that technology can only be successfully driven by competition, the early years of the Kibbutzism showed that, at least before market requirements existed (stable judiciary systems, private property laws, capital existence) cooperation, stability, and collective risk taking proved more successful than the ruthless competition, astronomical risks, and the atomization of the early development of markets.

Even today, the remaining Kibbutz citizens consider themselves “Israeli super-citizens.”⁵¹ Kibbutz communities guarantee twelve years of education, four more than the Israeli government does, and often pay for the university education of its members.⁵² With the help of subsidies and lower interest rates by the Israeli central government, the economy of the kibbutz has also been diversified, moving into industrial production and services in part to provide jobs for the elder population that cannot work in agriculture.⁵³ Healthcare and pensions are guaranteed by the community, and Kibbutz emigrants often find jobs easier than regular Israeli citizens because of their intense

⁴⁸ Barking, David and John, W. Bennett, 460

⁴⁹ Bowes, Alison, M., 89.

⁵⁰ Bowes, Alison, M., 90.

⁵¹ Barking, David and John, W. Bennett, 464.

⁵² Barking, David and John, W. Bennett, 466.

⁵³ Barking, David and John, W. Bennett, 469-470.

education and training.⁵⁴ Kibbutzian citizens also compare themselves not to the lower peasant population, or the middle urban workers, but rather to the “upper strata of the society.”⁵⁵ Although their levels of consumption are lower than what the upper strata consumes, the public benefits offered by the commune make up for the lower level of individual consumption.⁵⁶

The communal and cooperative mode of production developed by the Kibbutzian movement thus provides a glance into what form of organization can be successful when the material conditions such as war-risks and a barely created, unstable nation do not allow for market to flourish successfully, an organization that can be efficient enough as to produce a population that compares itself to the highest strata of a market society.

The Mennonites

The Mennonites are part of a denomination of Protestant Christianity called Anabaptists. Because of their belief in peace resistance to military service, they were persecuted in their home country, Germany, forcing them to immigrate to Russia beginning in 1788.⁵⁷ Soon after, in the 1870s, they were forced to emigrate once again, this time to Canada. At the time they moved to Manitoba, Canada, they were among the first to create agricultural settlements in the area.⁵⁸ This means that there was no infrastructure or private resources with regards to agriculture for them to access after establishing their villages. However, the Mennonite community was able to flourish because of their particular communal mode of production. The members of the community decided collectively to take up a parcel of land and work together to erect a village, thus dividing the risks of starting a dangerous enterprise.⁵⁹ They also organized and divided the lands among the members of the community in a way that would allow all farmers to gain access to water and timber. They would “utilize the individually deeded

land for the common good, so that everyone would benefit equally from the wooded land, the arable land, and the meadows.”⁶⁰

The Mennonites succeeded so much as professional agriculturalists in Canada that in 1922, fifty years after their arrival to Manitoba, Mexican President Alvaro Obregon offered the Mennonites freedom of religion, their autonomous education system, military protection, and plenty of land to colonize and prosper in the Mexican territory. The paradox of the Mexican actions, namely that the representative of the winning party of a ten-year-long revolution would ask a foreign community to settle the lands that Mexican peasants fought to obtain rights for, can only be answered one way. “The Mennonites brought an estimated four million dollars in capital into the country...By 1933 its environs were home to almost 14,000 Mexicans and 9,000 Mennonites. What had been a dusty rancho within a decade became a thriving center of agricultural and commercial activity, and acted as a magnet for surrounding areas.”⁶¹ This means that the Mennonites had accumulated great amounts of capital back in Canada, enough to take the risks of investing in a foreign nation, through their cooperativist and communal practices.

But an even more subtle idea is important to recognize to understand the relevance of cooperativism. The Mennonites were called to colonize Mexico as a group, as a cohesive organism that together developed the necessary technology, professional farming, and surplus-profit. Without an initial mode of production based on cooperativism, the Mennonites would not be viewed as a successful organic structure, since only those with large amounts of capital would be asked to migrate and not those farmers who for whatever reason were not as wealthy. “Thus the Mennonites, by settling in Chihuahua and putting into production the land which had lain fallow, fulfilled specific regional needs after the plunder of the Revolution, and exemplified the government’s program of reconstruction.”⁶²

⁵⁴ Barking, David and John, W. Bennett, 466-469.

⁵⁵ Barking, David and John, W. Bennett, 468.

⁵⁶ Barking, David and John, W. Bennett, 468-469.

⁵⁷ Warkentin, John. "Mennonite Agricultural Settlements in Southern Manitoba." *Geographical Review*, 1959: Vol. 49, No.3, 342-368.

⁵⁸ Barking, David and John, W. Bennett, 343.

⁵⁹ Warkentin, John, 343-344.

⁶⁰ Warkentin, John, 343.

⁶¹ Will, Martina, E. "Mennonite Colonization of Chihuahua." *The Americas*, 1997: Vol. 53, No. 3, 353-378.

⁶² Will, Martina, E., 372.

Another reason for Obregon to call the Mennonites to immigrate to Mexico was their advanced level of agricultural development. "The farming methods of the Mennonites, which included the use of tractors and power machinery, were superior to those of the Mexican *campesino*, who 20 years later still used oxen and draw a hand plow."⁶³ Of course, their particular historical experiences might not allow for drawing a comparison between them and the poor Mexican farmer. Nevertheless, the fact that no individual or small group of individuals was able to monopolize the technology and capital through buying farms, making profits, and hiring poor farmers with no land, points to the advantages of cooperativism in advancing the standards of living of the whole population.

The experience of the Mennonites demonstrates that cooperativism can be successful enough to produce capital, technology, and development in farming techniques in an egalitarian fashion, which develops the whole of the population as an organic unit.

Mexican Fishermen of Ensenada

Beginning in the 1960s, Mexican fishermen began to feel a sense of economic deprivation due to the fact that the fishing industry was becoming a large-scale and high-investment sector.⁶⁴ The small scale, capital scarce Mexican fishermen could not compete with large U.S. enterprises on market reach, fleet numbers, technology, people, or political and economic muscle. Facing this, they came up with one answer: cooperativism.⁶⁵ Their solution proved to be economically, politically, and socially successful.

By working together as one organic whole, the Mexican fishermen were able to gather the necessary capital and credit to purchase more advanced and numerous fishing boats.⁶⁶ Furthermore, they were able to expand their market reach, moving out of Ensenada into the U.S. and

Mexican markets.⁶⁷ Also, "[b]y separating the functions of management from production, thus providing permanent occupational categories to those in responsible positions, they have generated expertise in marketing, accounting and in organization and have been able to utilize this in their interaction with both government and private enterprise."⁶⁸ Out of the five fishing cooperatives, only one has not been economically successful but has still experienced moderate results.⁶⁹ In the social realm, working together has allowed the fishermen to provide benefits to cooperative members in the form of health benefits, life and disability insurance, and scholarships for the children of cooperative members.⁷⁰ Politically, fishermen before the 1970s could influence little in the dynamics of the Mexican political system; however,

"In October, 1976, the cooperative fishermen of Guaymas, Mexico, physically ousted the government-appointed director of the Federation of Fishing Cooperatives of Guaymas. This action set in motion a series of events which have culminated in the achievement of significant political power for Mexican fishing cooperatives. In the months to follow, the cooperative fishermen of Cabo San Lucas and Ensenada were also to replace their government-controlled directors with democratically elected representatives."⁷¹

The cooperatives of Ensenada bring to light an additional advantage of the cooperative form. It is not only functional in the absence of market-mechanisms or the necessary conditions for them to occur, but also when the free market system has become too monopolistic or too complex for small scale fishermen, that cooperativism can bring a mode of production that increases political power, economic development, and social alleviation. Although the fishermen of Ensenada are not farmers, their example points out the diversity of economic application that cooperatives can bring.

⁶³ Will, Martina, E., 373-374.

⁶⁴ Peterson, John, S. "Fishing Cooperatives and Political Power: A Mexican Example." *Anthropological Quarterly*, 1980: Vol. 53, No. 1, 64-74.

⁶⁵ Peterson, John, S., 66.

⁶⁶ Peterson, John, S., 69.

⁶⁷ Peterson, John, S., 66-69.

⁶⁸ Peterson, John, S., 68.

⁶⁹ Peterson, John, S., 65.

⁷⁰ Peterson, John, S., 70.

⁷¹ Peterson, John, S., 69.

The Malawian System of Farmer Production

Beneath the above analysis of cooperativism at work lay four relevant conclusions. First, cooperativism can be functional where market mechanisms cannot because of high risks or the inability of enough individual capital. It can thrive in dangerous zones, with no concrete nation-state, private property laws, or efficient judicial systems. Second, cooperatives work to prevent the monopolistic-like inequalities that free markets often take. This point is relevant especially for poor nations that base their economies in agriculture. Accumulation of economic power through the accumulation of land is the basis of inequalities in agrarian societies. The accumulation of land in the hands of a specific group is problematic because it forces others to work in those lands, since they do not have land or cannot compete with the landed class. This, in turn, makes it hard for the wealth of the nation to be distributed equally. This is why land reform is critical, and was for today's developed nations, in achieving a more egalitarian form of economic development.⁷² Third, cooperatives provide a framework for human development in the full sense of the term, as political, economic, and social development. And fourth, cooperatives can alleviate some of the pressure on poor farmers created by the rise of private power in full liberal market societies.

Malawi's low per capita income, GDP, and human development, in a virtually completely agrarian society, constitutes a perfect environment for the formation of cooperatives. These cooperatives can work better, I claim, when they are accompanied by a parallel structure from the government to enhance productivity, resource-allocation, and a political check on government power. The formation of the cooperative system, then, should be a hybrid system. From one side, the organic structures that produce and administer their internal affairs, similar to the administration and departments that control the internal affairs of a corporation, and from the other, an umbrella from the Malawian government that represents the interests of the economy as a whole in the sense of coordination between cooperatives, market demand of products, and export demands.

⁷² Chang, Ha-joon, 479-480.

These institutions should be created to account for the absence of private institutions and markets in Malawi's economy. One of the roles of the cooperatives within the overall Malawian economy can be similar to that of ADMARC, as a secure source for farmers to turn in their harvest every season. The government side of structure should deal with the selling and marketing of the harvest every season. The profits generated by the selling of the crops should be divided between the government and the farmers. This way, farm cooperatives will receive payments from the sale of their crops and eventually from the profits generated by their resale by the government in the national markets. This will create a large and fast increase of income, which can generate demand for private economic activity and set the foundation for the emergence of free market mechanisms.

These cooperative institutions can be created in key areas where there is critical need for market generation. For example, ADMARC can be reinstated to be the secure buyer and price stabilizer of corn, and for internal food sustainability, with part of its profits given back to the farmers. Another institution can be created to generate diversity of crop farming, and another (possibly by buying the dying large estates) can be focused solely on export crops. Large estates can either be left intact or can be broken up into small export cooperatives. Special attention should be paid to the singularity of export cooperatives. Export-orientated cooperatives would bring most of the foreign currency, and as such, would be extremely important. In order to prevent the creation of a powerful economic class, export cooperatives should be given a set price for their harvest within a range relative to other domestic crops and should receive an extra share equivalent to the profit share received by other non-export farmers. The rest of the income should be taken by the state and used for imports or other needs.

The institutional framework of the cooperatives can also prove to be a strong foundation for the credit sector to begin rolling. The risks associated with lending to collective institutions are much lower than the risks associated with lending to isolated individuals. The lower risk of lending to established cooperative organizations, with a much lower possibility of default, makes banks lower interest rates, which in turn makes the financial

system more attractive to their clients and raises the social usefulness of the financial system.

The relationship between the government and the cooperatives can be very specific. Cooperatives provide a better form of organization in maintaining grain reserves locally at each cooperative to guard against bad economic years and booms and busts of international markets for export-orientated cooperatives. Cooperatives should also be in charge of maintaining capital stock reserves to be used in years of strong droughts, natural disasters, or a decline in international market prices for export cooperatives. Price stabilization can also be incorporated into this economic framework. The Malawian government can guarantee a minimum price when buying the harvest of the cooperative, ensuring stable income for farmers. Fertilizer subsidies can also be distributed not to individuals but rather to cooperatives to be used collectively. Finally, the cooperative mode of organization can serve to increase demand for technology, since the collectivization of capital can be more powerful in buying new technology and machinery than the capital of individual farmers, the purchasing of efficient irrigation systems being one example.

The government on its end should make use of the profits generated by the sale of the cooperative's harvest as an easy and efficient form of taxation. It is a form of taxation because in a traditional free market society, a corporation would take the profits of the products it sells and then later on pay taxes to the government. In the Malawian system, the government would take part of the profits, the difference earned between the price it paid to the farmers and what the product is finally sold for, and this would be considered a form of taxation on the cooperative. This taxation can be used to fund reserves for subsidies in fertilizer, price-stabilization, and public insurance. Also, for the profits to be used optimally, they should be re-invested in roads, electricity, irrigation systems, and drought-resistant seeds, generating jobs and income for other sectors of the population. It is recommended that the government reserves part of the profits or accesses funds from other areas to set up public-run banks that provide cooperatives with low-interest loans, at least until the Malawian financial sector becomes more dynamic.

The Malawian government, by making the first investment and generating economic dynamism through these cooperative institutions, will generate private demand of services as they increase people's income by providing secure employment, stable incomes, and stable sources to sell their harvest. Furthermore, as the principle of economic agglomeration states, once the first institution is created and once it generates the necessary infrastructure, other private institutions will follow since it will have become more profitable. For example, one of the reasons the liberalization stage failed is because fertilizer prices were too high for farmers due to transportation and other infrastructural-related issues. Investment in infrastructure will lower those costs and allow private companies to sell at a price accessible to farmers. Moreover, once economic dynamism begins to take place, citizens can decide whether they wish to continue with the hybrid cooperatives or whether they wish to privatize them, becoming shareholders. For example, in the case of the Mennonites in southern Manitoba, some members decided to switch from communal farming to individual farming after a period of time because infrastructure and the individual risk-taking in running a successful agricultural enterprise was now low enough after the cooperative had created a more vibrant community.

The cooperative framework not only works well in organizing the agrarian economy of a country like Malawi, it can also serve as a framework in which other activities with social goals can take place. The United Nations Millennium Village Program is a system developed to bring the social and economic objectives of the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) into existence.⁷³ The village program tries to promote agricultural education and services, health education and services, and general education for children from village to village.⁷⁴ The cooperative framework can function as Malawi's means for the Millennium Village Program to expand since it could utilize and work through the already existent structure of the cooperatives. Agricultural education and green revolution practices can spread

⁷³ Sachas, Jeffrey, D. *Common Wealth: Economics for a Crowded Planet*. New York: Penguin Group, 2008, 238-241.

⁷⁴ Sachas, Jeffrey, 238-241.

easier through the institutions and communal organization of the cooperatives. Also, just as in the case of the Mexican fishermen of Ensenada, the cooperative mode of organization can work collectively to provide services such as health, pension, insurance, and scholarship benefits that the poor Malawian central government cannot provide. In other words, the cooperative system can be the structure for a whole array of services and activities orientated toward social goals.

Politically, the cooperatives have a lot to offer. First of all, like the Israeli Kibbutz system, direct democracy must be the foundation of their political essence. Decisions with regards to farming, allocation of internal resources such as fertilizer, management of reserve funds and seeds, election of administrative positions, capital management, and internal policies with regards to benefits should all be decided through direct participation. This has several advantages in a country like Malawi. First of all, it ensures real democracy is operating in the political and economic spheres most crucial for farmers, that is, in topics that directly affect agricultural practices. Second, it forces Malawian citizens to build a sense of political consciousness, civic participation, and politicization of every aspect of social life. It reverses the common trend of poor societies being atomized and de-politicized. Third, by introducing direct participation through an institution in which the central government is also involved, the Malawian government is forced to work hand in hand with and engage its own citizens. It will make the government accountable and make the population much stronger since it will be organized in social groups and will not be perceived as a passive mob any longer. Just like the fishermen of Ensenada, who before becoming organic wholes had little say in local politics, but eventually grew powerful enough to remove politicians from their posts, the Malawian cooperatives can become vehicles for democratization and checks on political and private power.

Because the cooperatives work in a hybrid system with parallel administration from the central government, some political roles fall beyond the government's authority. The central government should limit itself to policies that go beyond the cooperatives themselves. It should administer a national justice system that resolves conflicts

between cooperatives and where individual members can appeal. It should also administer the national police and army that keep security outside and inside the cooperatives if this is approved by cooperative members. The government should also maintain a legislative and executive power that channels power in a similar form as a federal system does, by keeping some power in the federal hands but delegating some to the states, which in this case would be the cooperatives. Just as important, the central government should maintain a constant dialogue with cooperative administrators with regards to what is being produced, in what quantities, how it is being produced, as well as any other administrative necessities.

After discussing the economic, social, and political roles and benefits of a cooperative system in Malawi, there remains the question how to both fund and jump-start the project. This is precisely where the international community can play a very crucial role. Donors should focus their aid in funding the project and the international community should agree to provide the necessary loans, with no agenda of their own, when aid is not sufficient. Furthermore, the international community should provide the necessary technical assistance to create such institutions and to train community members in understanding the new system; it requires a big push on aid. The New York Times reported that \$74 million of fertilizer subsidies can create up to \$140 million in economic activity. It also states that the U.S. gave \$174 million in emergency food to Malawi because of the food crisis at the beginning of the decade.⁷⁵ If such aid is concentrated in creating the hybrid cooperatives, the wealth generated could be dramatic and perpetual.

To guard against possible mismanagement, the government of Malawi should accept that an organ of the international community be allowed to scrutinize and audit how the money is being spent as well as monitor progress on economic and political goals. This will not undermine the sovereignty of the country since the country will still be completely free to use the money according to its own judgment. It will however, discourage the government from corruption practices by mean

⁷⁵ Dugger, Celia.

of the risk of cutting aid (when the government is perceived as corrupt) and by issuing citizens transparency reports of their own government activities, thus applying anti-corruption pressure from the Malawian civil society as well.

Finally, how is this different from the catastrophic failure of the collectivization efforts in the Soviet Union and China? The answer lies in the fact that this agricultural system combines the best of both collectivism and small-scale farming. One of the central criticisms of the Soviet and Chinese collective initiatives has been the lack of incentives given to individual farmers to harvest the required quota. Under the Malawian cooperative system, individual cooperative farmers would be paid a set price for the harvest they produce; the more they grow the more they would be paid. This way, farmers are incentivized to boost productivity. On the other hand, farmers could be prohibited from buying up land and hiring poor landless peasants so as to avoid the accumulation of land on a few hands. Also, there can be limits to the amount of harvest any individual farmer can turn in, thus disincentivizing them from flooding the market with too much harvest and creating a domestic economic crisis. In this form, then, the agricultural system combines the incentives of individual farming with a collective structure to prevent the growth of inequalities and provide the benefits described above.

Politically, the cooperative system can also avoid the mistakes of both Soviet-style collectivism and neo-liberalism. In reference to the former, the two-tiered Malawian system automatically gives cooperatives a share of power and authority over a whole range of decisions and automatically integrates every member of the cooperative in the decision-making process. In this way, politics as well as economics are democratized. The agricultural system ensures the state does not monopolize power by giving it directly to every cooperative. The possibility of Soviet and Chinese-style coercion and violence can thus be completely eliminated. Further, the cooperative system also prevents the growth of private power by giving every individual member equal access to resources and political decision-making in every cooperative. Thus, no land, resource, or political accumulation of power can take place either by private or state players.

The strongest criticism against cooperativism, although valid with reference to the Soviet Union and China, can clearly be avoided under the Malawian system. No new Comrade Stalin or Chairman Mao, and no new famines or coercion, but the democratization of the economy, egalitarianism, and economic development.

... First as Tragedy Then as Farce ...

Malawi's history of economic policies and the overall history of most western nations provide answers to the problems Malawi currently faces. Government intervention in agriculture can help foster economic activity to create the conditions for private markets to develop. Most importantly, public intervention in the form of the erection of a cooperative system of agricultural production can work as in the case of the Israeli Kibbutz, the Mennonites in Canada and Mexico, and the fishing cooperatives of Ensenada, Mexico, pushing human development in the economic, social, and political realms. With the help of the international community and international donors, cooperativism in Malawi can become not a written reality but a concrete and material one that breaks the traps of poverty that haunt Malawi.

Karl Marx once remarked that great historical facts not only tend to repeat themselves as Hegel remarked, but that they repeat first as tragedy and then as farce.⁷⁶ Cooperativism as a mode of production in Malawi in the midst of today's advanced capitalism is precisely that. The tragedy is none other than the virtual historical death of communalism, the proclamation of the complete death of communal thinking by the victors in the revolution of individualism and private property. The repetition as farce occurs when communalism must come back to save the possibility of free-market capitalism developing in Malawi, when communalism must come back from its grave to save the system that ridicules it so.

⁷⁶ Marx, Karl. "The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte." 1999. Marx/Engels Internet Archive (marxists.org). 13 August 2010.

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El Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional: The Use of Identity in the Path to Legitimization and Non-Violence

Andrea Delmar Sentías
Syracuse University

This article attempts to describe the Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional's trend towards nonviolence. There has been a simultaneous shift away from armed conflict due to various external influences, as well as a conscious internal push for a nonviolent image. This piece looks at the evolution of the organization and explains what internal and external effects impacted the EZLN to be the movement it is today.

Since the mid-1990's, throughout Mexico and much of the world, the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN) has captured headlines due to their continuing fight for indigenous rights, and because of the methods they have used to try to achieve their demands. Their methods, especially the use of violence, have been a source of extreme controversy in Mexico and, increasingly, among Mexico's indigenous populations, other oppressed Latin American groups, NGOs, and anti-neo-liberalists. As can be seen in these groups and others, the controversy has become more globalized since the Zapatistas have become a globally recognized movement due to their use of identity. In the past sixteen years, the EZLN has successfully used identity to legitimize its struggle and to become a more peaceful movement. As a result, Subcomandante Marcos's image has transformed from that of a modern Che Guevara to a modern Martin Luther King, Jr.

Although the Zapatistas had been organized far before the 1990s, they went public with their struggle during this decade, and eventually, the rebellion became violent. On January 1st, 1994, thousands of indigenous—and a few non-indigenous—people rose up in arms in Chiapas, capturing several towns and setting fire to police buildings and military barracks. Chanting, “*Ya basta!*” to the rhythm of a several hundred-year-

long repression, Southern Mexico's indigenous people had finally had enough. Shortly thereafter, the Mexican army retaliated in an attempt to quell the rebellion. The federal retaliation was successful in silencing the January uprising and driving the Zapatistas back into the jungle; however, it was not successful in stamping out the movement, its ideology, and its goals. Both sides acted violently in 1994, and both sides inflicted casualties. The events that took place during this uprising captured the attention of the world. The Zapatistas knew that all eyes were on them, but the attention itself did not help their cause.¹ What they needed was support. In an effort to gain support, the Zapatistas would become visibly political in the following years, and would eventually set in motion a change in their methods. This included the aspects of their movement that they themselves emphasized, including representation and identity.

In 1995, the EZLN moved away from guerrilla tactics and started becoming more political. In August of this year, they held their first *consulta*, which was nonviolent, and in which they called specifically for public opinion on how to handle the problems they were facing. This was a drastic step toward peaceful conflict resolution. In 1996, they took another step in that direction by participating

¹ Bob, Clifford. *The Marketing of Rebellion*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005, 4.

in the San Andrés Accords and holding the First International *Encuentro* for Humanity and Against Neo-liberalism, which demonstrated a willingness to speak diplomatically and make concessions with the federal government- a stark contrast to just two years before, when the EZLN and the Mexican government were opening fire on each other in civilian territory. The International *Encuentro* for Humanity and Against Neo-liberalism displayed an undeniable politicization of the Zapatista movement. Neo-liberalism is a political ideology, and their claim that it was “for humanity” implies a political humanitarian purpose as a result of the government not looking out for its own people. Through the events and the steps they took in 1995 and 1996, the Zapatistas were conveying a clear message that they demanded to be taken as a political force—as more than an armed group of individuals with a list of qualms. Thus, by 1996, the EZLN was more than a guerrilla force.²

The initially violent nature of the EZLN in 1994 is attributed to the combination of the people’s unrest and anger towards the government, as well as to certain national and international conditions that helped to radicalize the Zapatistas. The economic crisis during this time, though not as bad as that of the 1980s, was enough to cause widespread discontent and unrest, and was exacerbated once again by the drop in oil prices. Due to Mexico’s debt and its history of defaulting on payments, the international community urged Mexico to cut wages, devalue the peso, and remove urban and rural subsidies.³ The economic state that Mexico found itself in during this time did not benefit the country’s poor community. The indigenous people thought that Mexico’s weak economy indicated that the government would welcome more foreign investment. This might entail selling land that was supposed to be protected under *ejido* contracts, upon which indigenous people lived, as had happened in the past, during the *Porfiriato*.⁴ The weak economy also meant less social spending on health, welfare, or education programs for the poor. The international pressure

on Mexico to cut wages meant a reduction in the quality of life for poor agriculture workers who could already barely make ends meet, and the removal of subsidies meant their increased vulnerability to agricultural workers in other countries who were supported through subsidies. This was exacerbated by the introduction of NAFTA. The flow of American imports included United States crops produced by subsidized American farmers with whom the Mexican farmers were unable to compete, thereby suffering large losses. The externally imposed devaluation of the peso perpetuated a cycle of Mexican economic inferiority. Producers were not well compensated for their exports, and it would be more difficult for Mexico to pay off its debt. These conditions further inflamed tensions with rebel groups in Chiapas. They began to see their time as running out and violence as their means of gaining the government’s attention. Violence was initially used at the beginning of the rebellion in order to achieve a reaction, not in an effort to take over state power. This is one reason why after 1994, the Zapatistas began to decrease their use of violence.⁵ After the initial rebellion, the Zapatistas’ ideology began to take a different shape and with that, so did their methods.

The violence at the start of the revolution can also be attributed to the influence of violence in surrounding Latin American countries. For several years, Guatemala had been experiencing its own conflict. During this time, many Guatemalans migrated to Mexico, bringing Marxist rhetoric and guerrilla tactics. Early on in the movement, many Zapatista revolutionaries were identified as having Guatemalan accents, indicating that they had a part in creating the rebellion in Chiapas.⁶ As the EZLN aged, two things happened: the Soviet Union finished disintegrating and the Sandinista government fell. The international community was experiencing a shift towards democracy, so the Zapatistas’ decrease in violence can be interpreted as a reflection of the change in the international mindset, and an “opportunistic reaction” to the changing trend.⁷

² Hayden, Tom. *The Zapatista Reader*. New York: Thunder’s Mouth Press, 2002, 12.

³ Collier, George. *Basta!: Land and the Zapatista Rebellion In Chiapas*. 3rd ed. Oakland: Food First Books, 1994, 83, 84.

⁴ Gibler, John. *Mexico Unconquered: Chronicles of Power and Revolt*. San Francisco: City Lights Books, 2009, 70.

⁵ Harvey, Neil. *The Chiapas Rebellion: The Struggle for Land and Democracy*. Duke

⁶ Hayden, 81.

⁷ Harvey, 9.

However, the decrease in violence in the EZLN is mostly due to their need for economic support. The Zapatista movement, like most institutions or political entities, has an agenda and needs funds in order to pursue that agenda. As the 20th Century came to a close, the phenomenon of the NGO was becoming increasingly popular and the Zapatistas saw opportunities that might open up for them if they acquired the economic backing of such organizations. The support of the NGOs could help to pay for meetings, transportation, fundraisers, and living expenses; which would allow the Zapatistas to focus on achieving their political goals. Without economic support, they would be less able to invest time, money, or effort into the EZLN's political agenda. In some ways, economic power was more important than the contents of the message of a social movement, and the success of a movement may be determined solely by its access to cash.⁸ The NGOs provided the “political purchase of democracy,”—or their access or ability to having legislation passed, etc.—so their support was vital to the existence of Zapatista movement.⁹

Furthermore, without the approval and backing of the non-governmental organizations, the EZLN could possibly lose the worldwide attention that it had garnered. . With the innumerable coalitions, unions, rebellions, and others that seem to appear in new places around the world every day, there is an enormous amount of competition between them to receive political and financial NGO support.¹⁰ This NGO support has the power to determine the relative success of a given movement. In the mid-1990s, the Soviet bloc was crumbling, there was a turn in democratization, and guerrilla warfare seemed increasingly outdated—NGOs were on the lookout for a new kind of movement.¹¹ In order to be a successful rebellion, the Zapatistas began emphasizing their desire for nonviolence since this is a concept that NGOs consistently promote. However, they also began to emphasize the issue of identity to use as a catalyst to achieving support.¹²

⁸ Harvey, 87.

⁹ Harvey, 9.

¹⁰ Bob, 4.

¹¹ Harvey, 15.

¹² Bob, 5.

At this time, scholars were fiercely debating what “identity” was, and ordinary people were challenging the labels they had been branded with by the elites, by their peers, and by their friends and family. Auto-identification was a novelty for some, and was increasingly more important to the individual in maintaining a level of power over his or her life since it gave the individual a sense of self-awareness about his or her past, present, and future. A common identity also brings groups of people together with a uniting bond, and especially in the case of the Zapatistas, a strong sense of self-identity may even prevent further colonization or repression because, “*el pueblo unido jamás será vencido*.” The common identity represented by the Zapatistas has ties to Chiapas. Of the three million people living in Chiapas, where the EZLN is based, over one quarter of those people identify as belonging to an indigenous group.¹³ As the majority of the Zapatista army is composed of Mayan people, the Zapatistas represent the conflict that has been present in Chiapas for hundreds of years. Many of the claims of the rebels rest on appeals to indigenous rights and autonomy, indigenous individuals and groups in the state and country therefore identify closely with the movement and feel represented by Subcomandante Marcos and the rest of the EZLN.¹⁴ However, the EZLN came to represent increasingly larger groups.

Much of their fight against the federal government is based on a history that people throughout Latin America have experienced, as well on problems that take root in that history and still ravage the indigenous populations today. The repression that the indigenous currently experience is a result of the Spanish conquest and the history of violence that the Europeans imposed on them, including using them as pawns in political battles between liberals and conservatives in the 19th Century, and establishing the *patron* system.¹⁵ For example, the Zapatistas have demands that apply to other repressed sects of Mexican society—or capitalist society, in general. They are calling for a new constitution to replace that of 1917, since they claim the current constitution was never implemented the way it should have been, and

¹³ Harvey, 70.

¹⁴ Collier, 23.

¹⁵ Collier, 26, 27.

never protected its citizens the way a constitution should.¹⁶

This claim represents Mexico's poor, repressed, and any citizen who agrees that the government must replace the constitution and abide by it. The Zapatistas are also calling for a struggle against neo-liberalism and the hardships it brings upon agricultural workers and other poor classes. These claims are not particular to the indigenous of Southern Mexico. They can—and do—apply to people all over the world and the struggles that they face. This way, the EZLN represents other minorities that also face repression throughout Mexico, such as the Jewish population, as well as to other minority groups outside of Mexico. As a result, the Zapatistas identify with other groups and populations that exist under similarly repressive historical circumstances in Central American, South American and the Caribbean.

Their broader and greater use of identity has meant more people supporting their struggle. The use of identity during this stage in the Zapatista movement coincided with a particular moment in history: after the American civil rights movement; the toppling of torturous repressive governments in Latin America and Eurasia; the five hundredth year anniversary of Christopher Columbus's arrival to the Western Hemisphere; the change in the education system; and the rise of NGOs. These have all led to an increasing awareness of our common human identity and this, in turn, has led to a decrease in racism. The decrease in racism—specifically in this case towards indigenous people—has meant more sympathy for the Zapatistas' struggle and more people rallying behind their cause. This is beneficial to the EZLN and because as its following grows, so does its potential for power. Its increasing size helps persuade civilians of surrounding towns that the Zapatistas have the necessary force to fight for their rights and against the repression that they, too, wish would cease. The growing numbers also demand the attention of the Mexican government, demonstrating to federal officials that, despite the government's attempts to quell the insurrection years before, the movement is still strong, and that the people and their demands are to be taken

¹⁶ Collier, 28.

seriously. The Zapatistas took an active role in increasing the size of the EZLN. Subcomandante Marcos illustrated the open door policy of the EZLN, its acceptance, and its efforts to grow when he welcomed “‘zedillo-phobics, all global-phobics, even all phobic-phobics’ to join the struggle against neo-liberalism.”¹⁷ In this way of opening the movement to people who identified as being social or political minorities or misfits, the EZLN used the concept of identity and wider acceptance to attract more people to their movement, thus gaining more power.

Not only has the Zapatista movement become a mode of identification for entire social sects, such as the indigenous or other poor communities, the EZLN also seeks to represent the individual and his or her struggle. The way in which this is most commonly experienced is through the image of Subcomandante Marcos. His mask has been described as a mirror because people feel as though they see themselves, their ideals, and their personal struggles reflected in him.¹⁸ To demonstrate to the government and to the nation the impact that Marcos and the movement has had on not only the indigenous population, the country, and the world, but also on the individual, hundreds of people marched through Mexico City's Zócalo, declaring, “*Todos somos Marcos.*”¹⁹ Clearly, the cultural and social identity that people felt in relation to the Zapatistas and the representation they believed they achieved through the EZLN was immense. However, the Zapatistas also represent people with a particular political identity.

On one hand, the world is becoming increasingly globalized, capitalistic, and neoliberal. On the other hand, there has been a tremendous backlash to this type of politics, consisting of a demand for nonviolent conflict resolution, and the concern for, and preservation of, culture. There is an undeniable rise in a new way of thinking about power and resistance, and many of these new thinkers are identifying and siding with the Zapatistas.²⁰

¹⁷ Hayden, 95, 96.

¹⁸ Klein, Naomi. *The Zapatista Reader*. “The Unknown Icon.” New York: Thunder's Mouth Press, 2002. (2001) 116.

¹⁹ Harvey, 10.

²⁰ Klein, 118.

This tension has caused the rise of a new kind of cosmopolitanism, which reinforces the similarities all human being share. New cosmopolitanism breaks down racial identities, and builds up a humanitarian identity and a mindset based on solidarity and our common humanity. It is precisely this type of identity that differentiates the current and future EZLN from that of the past. Initially, the Zapatistas' foundation was based on issues mainly affecting the indigenous, but today, their struggle is much more encompassing and has a global resonance, global following, and most importantly, global identity.

The Zapatista identity has had much to do with their movement towards nonviolence because of the movement's history and the Mayan traditional culture. There has been land conflict in Chiapas for decades between the *ladinos* and indigenous populations. For generations, these conflicts have been resolved using citizenship and identity, so the indigenous populations of Chiapas have traditionally used identity as a central concept to conflict resolution.²¹ Throughout this history, the indigenous people were—and still are—wary of guerrilla tactics.²² It was Rafael Sebastián Guillén Vicente, a former college professor from northern Mexico of predominantly European ancestry—now known as Subcomandante Marcos—who first introduced Marxist rhetoric, guerrilla mentality and, most importantly, stockpiles of technologically advanced weaponry to the indigenous people of Chiapas. As the movement moved forward, Subcomandante Marcos and his fellow revolutionaries with whom he had arrived in jungle adapted themselves to more peaceful Mayan ways of life and conflict resolution. This adaptation on behalf of Subcomandante Marcos and other strategists also helped propel the movement forward in a modern way. Marcos was adapting to the indigenous' way of life, which could have been his predecessors' downfall. Those who came before him, such as Che Guevara, may have been partially unsuccessful particularly because they failed to adapt to the lifestyles led by the people they were leading through revolution.²³ Marcos's adoption of the Mayans' ways of life meant a decrease in

violence and guerrilla tactics. Consequently, this led to legitimacy on a global scale, more economic support, and therefore, the opportunity to rebel in nonviolent ways.

There were motivations for the Zapatistas to make an initial shift towards nonviolence, but there were also many self-perpetuating results of decreasing violence that further continued this trend. As the EZLN began to take on the role of a political force by participating in meetings and *consultas*—and this gained increased domestic and international support—the Zapatistas, as a reformed guerilla force, were on a more level playing field with the federal government as a result of organized meetings and discussions, the people's believed power and legitimacy of the EZLN, and its increasing economic support. The belief that the Zapatistas were an almost equal combatant to the corrupt Mexican government gave more people hope in the final success of the Zapatistas. Its increasing size and power led people to believe that the EZLN was capable of making a real change, thus causing it to grow even more. This increase in size and power opened up new possibilities for negotiation between the EZLN and the federal government. As the movement grew, attention from the government increased, and so did possibilities for nonviolent conflict resolution through contracts, and talks. Even if the government did follow through with the agreements reached through these negotiations—such as in the San Andrés Accords—violence on behalf of the Zapatistas was no longer justified since it seemed to the people that the EZLN had increasing chances of solving their issues nonviolently.²⁴ As a result, the initial emphasis on identity, expansion in their representation, and shift towards nonviolence caused an increase in support for the movement, the growth of the movement gave it more power and status, and this new power and status made the use of violence unjustified.

Another self-perpetuating result of the decrease of violence was the Zapatistas' credibility. As one source recounts, “[In 1994], Zapatista-mania looked suspiciously like just another cause for guilty lefties...another Marxist rebel army, another macho

²¹ Harvey, 37.

²² Hayden, 97.

²³ Hayden, 98.

²⁴ Harvey, 9.

leader.”²⁵ However, by 1996, it was clear that the EZLN was more than this. Their emphasis on identity, their global resonance, their shift towards nonviolence, their support from NGOs, and their abnormally high amount of leverage for a rebel army against the Mexican government were also gathering more of a domestic and international audience, as well as more support. Not many people, including the Zapatistas themselves, had anticipated the success of the Zapatistas.²⁶ However, their successes gained them more popularity from the people and, as NGOs, leaders, and institutions witnessed the increasing status and credibility, it also gained them more economic support.

Throughout the development of the Zapatista movement, Subcomandante Marcos’s individual identity and image also changed in multiple ways. His changing identity affected the movement itself, such as his realization of the paradox of the military man in which he states that, “the military man is an absurdity because he must always rely on weapons to be able to convince them.”²⁷ This paradox provides insight into another possible cause for the demilitarization of the EZLN. The realization could be due to his changed state of mind after the initial uprising. Marcos had expected to die that day, so his survival, along with the attention of the federal, domestic, and international community motivated him to rethink the EZLN’s violent methods.²⁸ However, the EZLN also changed Marcos’s image. At inception, the Zapatistas were violent and armed with weapons and Marxist ideals. Their issues were particular to Latin America, and especially the poor and agriculturalist groups. This earned him the image of a modern Che Guevara since it followed the same trend as Che and his rebel groups approximately half a century before. However, the EZLN’s increasing emphasis on the issue of identity, its increased representation of people and social groups, and its shift towards nonviolence places Subcomandante Marcos in the position of

transition into a Martin Luther King, Jr. paradigm²⁹ While it is not accurate to compare the two figures directly, since Subcomandante Marcos is still a military man, Marcos’s aim for nonviolent conflict resolution, his heavy political involvement—as opposed to merely waging guerrilla warfare—and the global resonance of the issues for which the Zapatistas fight, make his current image resemble a modern Martin Luther King, as opposed to a modern Che.

The Zapatistas and their movement have come a long way from the armed uprising of 1994. Their following, setting, audience, and issues have all become global. In a world that increasingly places emphasis on capitalism, open markets, and individualism, it is imperative to preserve the cultures and rights of those whose lifestyles do not emphasize the importance of power and material wealth. Lust for money is never as apparent as when it conflicts with basic human rights. The Zapatistas and their demands are a struggle against a history of repression and the repercussions of imperialism and of the *conquista*. It is time to leave indigenous discrimination in the museums and move forward through the 21st Century together as a collective human race.

²⁵ Klein, 115.

²⁶ Hayden, 96.

²⁷ Hayden, Tom. Subcomandante Marcos. Interview by Gabriel García Márquez. *Marcos Speaks: An Interview With Subcomandante Marcos*. New York: Thunder’s Mouth Press, 2002, 180.

²⁸ McCaughan, Michael. *The Zapatista Reader*. New York: Thunder’s Mouth Press, 2002. (1999) 73.

²⁹ Klein, 122.

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The Valuation System of the Quechua in Peru

Elise Boruvka

Indiana University Bloomington

The Quechua language in Peru continues to decrease in prevalence and importance at the risk of Quechua cultural and ancestral values. This occurs because of the economic and social benefits perceived from speaking Spanish. This paper analyzes the role and influence of families, communities, the economy, the government and nongovernmental organizations in perpetuating the prevalence and preference of Spanish over the Quechua language. Factors such as language formalization, cultural values and social power affect the teaching and understanding of Quechua, thereby influencing the preservation of values embedded within the language itself. One must understand these factors in order to address not only the educational deficiencies that exist but also the valuation and preservation of the Quechua language and culture itself.

There are over ten million speakers of Quechua, an indigenous language commonly spoken in the mountainous Andes of South America. Despite this, the language and its speakers have been experiencing social, political, and economic difficulties for years. The conflicts that arise encompass not only the indigenous communities themselves, but also the nation states within which they reside. As such, national policies, non-governmental organizations, and the Quechua populations have attempted to alleviate some of the pressures of language acquisition, both of Spanish and Quechua, through educational programs and amendments. Unfortunately, these actions have not only had some benefits, such as bringing attention to the indigenous communities, but have also created cultural questions and conflicts that continue to arise regarding cultural preservation through language educational programs, the needs of the people in relation to the government's educational policies, and the formalization of a language that had always been an informal part of life.

When looking at the topic of language acquisition in Quechua communities, it is important to understand why the preservation of the language and culture is worth studying. A culture's language

does more than simply provide a mode of communication. It also provides a way in which the values of and perspectives on life can be passed from one generation to the next. As global linguist Greg Anderson reported, "Languages are rich in the history and taxonomy of a place ... reflecting subtleties that can be lost in translation. When the last keepers of a language die off, so does the fluent understanding of that particular environment."¹ Within Quechua populations, Spanish is replacing Quechua as the dominant language in the younger generations, leaving the elders to feel as though their progeny are losing their culture's values and ancestral understanding. Meanwhile, Spanish is replacing the language that once worked as a *lingua franca* before and after the Incan empire. *Lingua franca*, as defined by UNESCO, is a "language which is used habitually by people whose mother tongues are different in order to facilitate communication between them."² Spanish is rapidly gaining prominence and importance within Quechua populations as Quechua individuals and communities choose to communicate in Spanish rather than practicing the fading language of Quechua.

¹ "Saving Dying Languages in 'the Linguists'", 2009

² King and Hornberger, 1996, p. 177

As language preservation and education has become a more prominent issue in most countries, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have attempted to assist with lessening the distance and the differences between Quechua and Spanish speakers. One such way these organizations have sought to do this is by offering bilingual educational systems that teach young Quechua children Spanish. These systems, however, have encountered difficulties translating and passing on the cultural norms that would otherwise be an inherent part of language education from one's parents and daily activities. In addition, the resources available to provide educated teachers, suitable locations, and economic benefits to go to school only increase the difficulty of the situation. In effect, the goals of some NGOs to help improve the economic situation of Quechua communities through language acquisition have come in conflict with the preservation of the culture. Due to the lack of understanding the NGOs have of the values transmitted within the languages they teach, they can oftentimes add to the potential and continual loss of a language.

While this paper will focus predominantly on Quechua speakers, the difficulty of language loss is not isolated to Quechua-speaking communities. It is a conflict that exists around the world as indigenous communities must find ways in which to preserve their heritage while also remaining economically successful and productive in the ever-changing world. The language they speak can be essential to the political weight of their words and their work. The tongue or tongues they choose to teach and learn can affect their social standing or the perceptions of their social and economic classes. The solutions to these issues are neither simple nor quickly implementable. Solutions to assist in such situations must be malleable enough to allow the advancement and growth of each culture and people without forgetting the values and history of the culture's past. Generally, it is not the goal to freeze a culture or a people in the time and traditions of their ancestors but rather to preserve and to understand the importance of the past to the present and future. In this, the power of language becomes ever more apparent and necessary, revealing the capacity each language has to communicate across generations the values and norms of one's ancestry and cultural perspectives.

Education, therefore, is not simply a formulation of systematic principles to be executed by any who wish to learn the system, but instead becomes a responsibility to inculcate the norms and values of both current and past societies. The curriculum that may seem explicit and straightforward in education and educational systems is then flooded with implicit ideals and goals that must be recognized explicitly by educators and community members for the power and affect they have on youth and societal development.

In order to further study and analyze the current situation of Quechua preservation, revitalization, and education in Peru, this paper will analyze the societal, economic, and political values within the languages and perceptions of Peruvian society. Understanding and identifying the values and the social factors alive within the society and the people of Peru will then allow for a better understanding of the variables at work in preserving or dictating a language in order to save a culture. As stated previously, this situation is neither simple nor easily resolved. It involves many social stigmas and has been developing for years; these processes must first be reversed in order to see an improvement in the valuation of Quechua within Peru, both by non-Quechua residents and Quechua descendants alike. In order to continue searching for solutions, then, this paper seeks to provide a baseline of understanding of the current situation and the social factors influencing the lives and tongues of today's Peruvian society.

Historical Analysis

In order to understand the present situation of the Quechua language, Quechua education and Quechua's presence within Peruvian society today, it is essential that one knows the history behind the treatment of Quechua over the course of the country's development. Although Quechua was considered to be the official language of the whole of the Incan Empire, it has become devalued and has rapidly decreased in use within Peruvian society today. As such, many consider the language at the risk of extinction. How did the official language of the Incas become a language filled with social tensions and on the verge of linguistic destruction?

To begin, it is important to see that Quechua has always been a language of diverse groups of

people. During the time and expansion of the Incan Empire, the land under the rule of the Incan government spread from Bolivia to Argentina, including the Andean regions of Ecuador, Peru, Chile and Colombia, and centered around the Incan capital, the Cusco area in Peru. Within this large expanse of land, language and communities varied greatly making it difficult for the Incan government officials and traders to communicate and conduct business amidst such a multitude of languages and cultures. Thus, it would have been nearly impossible for one to learn all of the tongues of the Incan Empire.³

In order to standardize a multilingual empire, Cuzco Quechua became the official language of the land under a period of reorganization between 1430 and 1532, which spurred the region's first official decree for bilingual education. This is not to say, though, that schools were erected in mass to educate everyone in the empire to learn Quechua. Instead, a less explicit form of education took place in the courts of the Incan government. Young lords would live at the courts, taking in the Quechua language by simply living among it in their youth. As Cerrón-Palomino points out, "After more than five centuries of expansion and divergence into different dialects, [Quechua] was to achieve true interregional status through one of its dialectal forms transmitted by the Lords of Chinchay" ⁴⁵ The policy was stated that "under threat of serious punishment, any native of the empire should understand and know the language of Cuzco, both males and females, and so that even babies might begin to learn the language they ought to speak, even before leaving their mothers' breasts."^{6,7} Although this policy threatened punishment for not learning Quechua, the reality of the situation was much different. Rather than taking on the impossible goal of having every person of the empire learn and speak Quechua, the language became one of governmental officials and

tradesmen, who simply learned informally in the courts and through daily work. In fact, Hornberger and King explain that the spread of the language was most likely due to the "forced relocation of conquered peoples."⁸ This meant that as the empire conquered new land, subjects loyal to the empire would go forth to teach and use the language in the newly acquired community, thereby effectively extending the use of Quechua beyond the strict reaches of the capital.

Although the conquest of new lands by the Incan rulers remained relatively peaceful, the volatility of the situation once the official language was in place could be very high because tensions might arise over the possible devaluation, or extinction of, other languages upon the institution of Cuzco Quechua. Instead, Quechua became a unifying force among the multiple communities within the Incan Empire, permitting communication and trade to succeed between cultures with different languages. This plurilinguistic acceptance of the variety of people, cultures, and languages within the Incan lands meant that the majority of people were affected very little by the official governmental policy, since most of them did not have access to government positions or interact on a level of trade that required learning Quechua. This is not to say that the status of Quechua, specifically Cuzco Quechua, did not change because of the policies. In fact, Quechua became the operating language of the empire, even recognized by the Spanish when they first arrived as a language that had the ability to transcend linguistic and cultural barriers within the Incan Empire.

Upon the arrival of the Spanish and throughout the colonization process, Quechua became the language used to cross the boundaries between the Spanish and native cultures. However, rather than allowing for and encouraging the maintenance of Quechua and other native languages such as Aymara, Puchina or Moquica, the Spanish generally refused to learn Quechua themselves, instead depending on interpreters to communicate with the indigenous communities. This immediately created a distance and hierarchy between the Spanish and the Quechua-speaking

³ Demarest and Conrad, 1984, p. 58

⁴ Cerrón-Palomino, 1989, p. 15

⁵ When Incan power was consolidated by victory over the Chancas, the Chinchay variety of Quechua was so widely distributed that the sovereigns of Cuzco themselves adopted it as the official language of the empire, in a manner reminiscent of the way in which Latin was adopted by Frankish conquerors" (15).

⁶ Cerrón-Palomino, 1989, p. 16

⁷ Citing Cieza, 1967

⁸ King and Hornberger, 2006, p. 180

natives as well as among the Quechua speakers themselves. By rejecting the need to learn Quechua and often expressing a disdain for communicating with the locals, the Spanish implemented a system of linguistic hierarchy, associating Spanish-speakers with the powerful minority. Further, as Cerrón-Palomino states, “the subdued majorities reemphasized their language differences when they realized that the linguistic unity achieved through Quechua was no longer valid,” thereby causing a fragmentation to the once united communities.⁹ Further cultural alteration occurred as religious leaders attempted to convert the natives to Christianity. Even this struggle was not without linguistic barriers as the question arose regarding what language one should preach to the people. Only the Jesuits pushed for learning Quechua to communicate with the people, which eventually led to the expulsion of the Jesuits in 1767.¹⁰ All other religious groups with missionary goals chose to distance themselves from the people they were sent to lead and convert.

When looking at the linguistic shift in values among the indigenous communities in the post-colonization period, the natives now saw that Spanish had become the official language of the land. However, unlike when the Inca made Quechua the official language of the empire, Spanish worked to distance the indigenous groups from one another. In fact, one theory is that if Quechua was seen as stifling the other American languages present in the time of the Incas, then Spanish could symbolically act as an agent to free these languages from the dominance of Quechua.^{11,12} In general, Spanish became the language of power—economically, socially and politically—which became expressed in the educational systems and laws that were to pass.

The formal education that took place during colonization taught Quechua speakers Spanish so that they could better serve the Spanish in interpretation. This education, given to a privileged few, caused further distance among the natives, reflecting a hierarchy among the people with access

to education and those without. Accordingly, “indigenous language speakers frequently opt[ed] not to use their language in many situations in order to avoid the stigma attached to speaking it.”¹³ Thus began the sentiment that Quechua was inferior to Spanish, causing further striation among language groups and weakening of local languages and cultures.

As the colonization period gave way to the republican period, Quechua continued to suffer. This time, however, it was not simply from the political and social preference given to the Spanish language. The economic, technological and territorial developments of the Spanish and indigenous populations began to threaten the language as well. Since a language is dependent on the health of the culture that uses it, the health of the indigenous communities is important to understand the struggle the Quechua language underwent. As the government and Spanish profiteers exploited the riches of the Peruvian land, they did so with little regard for the native inhabitants and their uses of the land. Due to the pressure exuded on the land by mining and exploitation of its resources, many inhabitants were forced to move to more urban areas, separating them from their communities. In addition, the burgeoning technological advancements in transportation and communication worked to further dissipate the cultural connection within the communities. With the development of the railways came the expansion of exposure rural communities had with larger cities and other cultures. Youth began to speak Spanish rather than Quechua in order to avoid the embarrassment and discomfort of the social differences they felt due to their communities and languages of origin. This expansion of technology and transportation played a large role in increasing the linguistic shame young people felt towards their ancestors’ language. Furthermore, because of the expansion of industry and technology, Peru experienced an urban shift. Hornberger and Coronel-Molina calculate that “in 1940, 35 percent of the population resided in urban areas, 65 percent in rural sectors; by 1982 these numbers were reversed, with 65 percent of the country counting as urban and 35

⁹ Cerrón-Palomino, 1989, pp. 18-19

¹⁰ Cerrón-Palomino, 1989, p. 19

¹¹ King and Hornberger, 2006, p. 182

¹² Citing Urban (1991)

¹³ Hornberger and Coronel-Molina, 2004, p. 14

percent as rural.”¹⁴ This shift in location inadvertently led youth to deemphasize Quechua and their indigenous heritage in preference for the Spanish language and heritage. Not only social, but economic success became associated with the Spanish language.

Case Study

After tracing the foundations and historical movements of the Quechua language and the evolution of linguistic hierarchy between Quechua and Spanish, one must look to the present to further comprehend the complex relationship between an indigenous language and a dominant language within a country like Peru. As previously asserted, the language of a people is often affected by the politics of those in power. Once a social meaning becomes inherently imputed into a language, issues of formalization, education, value transmission, and power echo repeatedly within the struggle for a language’s maintenance and/or revitalization. In looking at Quechua in Peru, it is illuminating to look at which interest groups have become involved, the missions, goals and motives of each group, goals the groups seem to collaborate on regarding Quechua, and the conflicts that arise between the multiple parties, motivations, and dynamics in this charged atmosphere of language protection and analysis.

Current Situation

Although Quechua has been spoken within indigenous communities of the Andes for hundreds of years, the use of this spoken language has been rapidly disappearing for years from the communities that once spoke little else. Hornberger and King call it an “endangered” language, despite the existence of some ten million speakers: “although Quechua speakers outnumber users of all other indigenous languages in South America combined, data from a range of sources indicate that a contraction of Quechua domains and a gradual cessation of intergenerational transmission of the language are well underway.”¹⁵ With each new generation, the distance from the traditionally spoken dialect and daily usage of Quechua dissipates, leading individuals, families, and

communities farther away from their ancestors’ language and system of values. Elderly generations no longer understand what their progeny say because while they may still speak Quechua, their children and grandchildren choose to speak Spanish. What little Quechua they may speak is reserved for formal traditions or in attempts to communicate with their elders.

This shift in the daily language use within Quechua communities has made Quechua, once shared among all members of the community, a point of division and differentiating status. To only speak Quechua today can lead to situations of social exclusion rather than inclusion, leading to deeper chasms between elders and youth in families and communities.¹⁶ Falling within the chasms are the values and modes of thinking that were traditionally passed from generation to generation through the Quechua language. There is an unconscious absorption of culture and knowledge that comes through growing up around certain stories, hearing a peer or an elder phrase something in their native tongue, and listening to the wisdom of those with more experience and knowledge regarding the paths and directions of the world.¹⁷ These are important elements that can only be learned when constantly surrounded by the sounds, thinking, and wisdom of family. However, this process of cultural cultivation that once was the responsibility of older generations has become interrupted by the desire of youth to learn Spanish and to possibly only save Quechua for traditional occasions.

As the younger generations choose to speak more Spanish than Quechua, they are demonstrating a general understanding of diglossia, where the value of one of two languages is considered greater than the value of the other, whether from a social, political, economic, or personal perspective. In this case, due to the Spanish colonization process that took place in Peru, Spanish became incorporated as the language of the colonizer and the conquistador, the language of power over the ancestral mother language of Quechua.¹⁸ As more and more individuals and

¹⁴ Hornberger and Coronel-Molina, 2004, p. 25

¹⁵ King and Hornberger, 2004, p. 1

¹⁶ Godenzzi, 1992, p. 63

¹⁷ Flórez, 1992, p. 103

¹⁸ Aguirre, 1989, p. 39

families move to urban areas, they find themselves being ascribed a socioeconomic status based on the language they speak. Quechua signifies a lower class. Spanish does not. Because Spanish is the more powerful language in Peru, they choose to speak Spanish more often than Quechua, thereby causing a gap in their knowledge of the language of their ancestors. The pride the younger generations feel for the language they speak is one of demonstrating their linguistic similarities to others rather than maintaining the ancestral language and identifying with their differences.

Given the power dynamics among Quechua and Spanish speakers in Peru, education becomes an important tool to either encourage or counterbalance the role of linguistic power. In identifying the power of education, Hornberger and Coronel-Molina explain, that, “whereas education is an important avenue for social mobility and advancement, educational policies have long served to repress Quechua and Quechua speakers. Spanish has typically been the official language of schooling, and Quechua-speaking children face great disadvantages for speaking Quechua in school, a circumstance seemingly contributing to linguistic shame and language shift.”¹⁹ In years past, Quechua has been used in schools in order to teach Quechua-speaking children how to understand Spanish, the language in which the majority of their schooling would later be conducted. It has only been recently that bilingual education has sought to equalize this distance between languages in education. This language preference is played out in everyday life. For example, if someone is looking to move to the city or even to leave the country, he or she will choose to learn the language that will be most beneficial, so oftentimes Spanish or English are more readily sought after by parents for their children to learn.²⁰

Given these issues of language preference and diglossia, linguistic shame and language education currently in Peru, certain organizations or parties have contributed to the development or destruction of Quechua as a commonly spoken and appreciated language. Therefore, the government, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and the

Quechua people themselves are all important and influential parties to the past, current, and future status of Quechua in Peru.

Interest Groups Involved

Many organizations work towards a change in the general view of indigenous languages such as Quechua in Peru; however, these groups have differing abilities, responsibilities, and objectives that they each strongly desire to fulfill. This section will briefly look at the role of the government, the participation of non-governmental organizations, and the interaction of the Quechua communities within the context of the Quechua-Spanish debate.

To begin, the Peruvian government has long been aware of the plight of indigenous languages within its borders, especially the decline of Quechua. However, what has the government done in the past to help? After all, up until 1979 Peruvian citizens could not vote unless they were literate in Spanish.²¹ “The three countries with the largest indigenous populations (Ecuador, Guatemala and Peru) rank among the lowest in terms of social spending, while the most sweeping changes seem to have occurred in countries with smaller indigenous populations, such as Colombia.”²² This signifies that the majority of indigenous populations have remained underrepresented and underserved in the past, thereby giving room for Spanish to continue to grow in political, economic, and social power. These dynamics at play have only recently begun to develop within legal and national policies.

The 1993 constitution of Peru identifies certain stipulations that relate directly to education and the importance of language education: “Bilingual intercultural education is guaranteed, ‘according to the characteristics of each zone,’ in the last paragraph of Article 17. Article 48 establishes Spanish as the national official language, with indigenous languages as official in the areas where they are numerically dominant.”²³ While the official stance of the Peruvian government appears to be in favor of the preservation and promotion of

¹⁹ Hornberger and Coronel-Molina, 2004, p. 28

²⁰ Aguirre, 1989, 49

²¹ Coronel-Molina, 2007, p. 155

²² Hall and Patrinos, 2006, p. 33

²³ Hornberger and Coronel-Molina, 2004, p. 32

language education and possibly indigenous language preservation, it does not initially state or imply ways in which it will do this. Therefore, as money and other resources are scarce, fewer educated and qualified teachers and fewer academic resources are available for students to enhance their learning.

Despite what the official documentation says, resource availability remains a problem for implementation. "It has only been within the last decade or so that the Andean governments have begun to provide greater economic and technological support as well as the full legal recognition needed to implement bilingual education at a national level."²⁴ Therefore, it has been up to many non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to help with the education of Quechua-speaking communities, particularly with the provision of bilingual education in their school systems. These organizations range from religiously affiliated to international groups, each with their own objectives and ideas of what indigenous communities need. One such NGO is Fe y Alegría (FYA) that offers "education in Latin America with the principle of equity, quality and lower cost."²⁵ Due to the sheer number of indigenous communities in Peru suffering from similar situations of limited resources, education, and the disappearance of ancestral languages, a coalition of Peruvian NGOs has come together since 1992 to provide bilingual education to students. Since 1992, Montoya states that they have "implemented a literacy program in 42 monolingual communities in the department of Cuzco, Cajamarca and Apurimac ... students are taught civic education and to read and write in Quechua and then Spanish."²⁶ This unique coalition also works to provide community figures as teachers for these schools, thereby building literacy within the communities and guaranteeing that the community's own form of Quechua and values will be more likely transmitted to the students. While many other such organizations exist to help in resource provision to the indigenous communities of Peru, the fact remains that once funding leaves the organization, the organization

leaves the people. This leaves the communities with a hole in their educational systems as they might no longer find the support or have the ability to sustain quality education for their youth.

Although it is easy to simply look at the governmental and non-governmental organizations involved in the education and promotion of the Quechua language and education within Peru, one cannot forget to look at the Quechua-speaking communities themselves as important factors in this process of growth and potential revitalization of the Quechua language. As late as 1916 with the Rumi Maqui Rebellion, indigenous communities rebelled against the treatment, rights (or lack thereof), and education of their communities, culture, and language.²⁷ Following these rebellions were indigenous movements and creations such as the World Council of Indigenous Peoples to help promote and bring into political and social discourse the status of Quechua as a language and as a people.²⁸

In other initiatives exercised by the communities, a common problem exists when NGOs leave the communities and do not give the community members the opportunity and instruction to continue the work previously done by the non-governmental organization. The communities cannot sustain the initiatives. However, despite these tendencies, many communities have come together to seek outside help, so that their children can be economically competitive, socially involved, and politically capable. What is most difficult, though, when looking at the communities themselves, is the range of variance that exists within, between, and among them. Because of migration to the cities, what it means to be a community or to be Quechua has changed, thereby altering the values sought after and the ideas taught within the local schools.

Goals

With the work of governmental, nongovernmental and community organizations to enhance education and Quechua language acquisition in indigenous communities and for Quechua-speaking Peruvians, it is necessary to

²⁴ Hornberger and Coronel-Molina, 2004, p. 44

²⁵ Montoya, 2004, p. 8

²⁶ Montoya, 2004, p. 8

²⁷ Coronel-Molina, 2007, p. 140

²⁸ Coronel-Molina, 2007, p.146

identify the various initiatives, values, and goals present in today's discourses on Quechua's existence and presence in Peru. One of the largest obstacles in valuation and preservation of the Quechua language is the process of standardization it must undergo in order to become a set written language. While the Quechua have a phrase of "*Kastillanu liyinapaq, ghichwa parlanaypaq*" ("Castilian (Spanish) for me to read and Quechua is in order for me to speak"), this process of standardization must take place to create a more consistent system of teaching Quechua and to provide more literary materials to Quechua readers.²⁹

Nowadays, for a language to achieve legitimacy, it must be standardized, unified and written in such a way that it can be taught and transmitted comprehensively. In working with a historically oral language, linguists, scholars and other language enthusiasts seek to standardize Quechua (or Quichua as it is called in Ecuador) into a form of writing that can work to translate and to unify the language. One of the most prominent debates in this process of standardization is identifying the alphabet. Given the multiple dialects of Quechua, scholars have identified between three and five vowels alive within the language. The First World Congress on the Quechua Language, 'Inka Faustina Espinoza Navarro,' convened in 2000 to discuss the alphabetical debate of standardization of Quechua. The Quechua Language Academy and the National University of San Antonio Abad attended this conference, seeking to encourage the maintenance of Quechua. However, "many members took a Cuzco-centric position, and hence failed to take into account dialectal variations in their orthographic suggestions."³⁰ The biggest reason for this debate between whether the written Quechua language should have three or five vowels is because of the influence of the Spanish system of writing on the Quechua language. To have five vowels (a, e, i, o, u) as in the Spanish alphabet would be to demonstrate the influence of Spanish and other modern languages on the historical language of Quechua. Supporters of the three-vowel system (a, i, u) proclaim three vowels to be

much truer to the sound and form of the spoken language, thereby being more true to Quechua's history.³¹

A problem that continues to persist is that the majority of those involved with deciding the process of standardization are academics and linguists rather than the community members and natives. However, the process of choosing a standard form of a language has much deeper issues and questions that significantly impact the community members. Who is considered and what does it mean to be Quechua? In seeking to standardize the language, linguists and standardization efforts effectively have come to a halt over these questions when deciding which dialect or dialects to include in the making of an "official" language. The danger that enters is the hierarchy perceived within the multiple dialects of Quechua. If one of the purposes of standardization is to preserve a culture through its language, should the chosen language not also appreciate and pay respects to all dialects that make up the Quechua language and culture? While it might appear to be physically impossible to incorporate all Quechua dialects in one standard Quechua language, it is worth considering why it is that one dialect should be more highly desired than another, even within the same language system.

The active parties within the Quechua debate essentially seek to eliminate the inferior social status of the language and seek equality between Spanish and Quechua. In order to do this, though, they must combat the issue of linguistic power both within the Quechua-speaking communities as well as within the society of non-Quechua communities due to, as Hornberger and Coronel-Molina state:

"The marked tendency to view other dialects of the language – even geographically contiguous and linguistically similar ones – as being alien, amusing, incomprehensible, ugly and so on. This local dialectical chauvinism is distinct from the concept of a supralocal hierarchy which may set one dialect as superior to all the others, as in the case of the so-called Quechua 'purists' who insist that the Cuzco dialect is the only 'real' Quechua since they believe it to

²⁹ Godenzzi, 1992, p. 70

³⁰ Hornberger and Coronel-Molina, 2004, p. 40

³¹ Itier, 1992, p. 26

have been the dialect spoken by the Incas.”(16)

This idea that the Cuzco Quechua is the only true dialect or that there is actually one dialect that is superior to all others is working to create a break in the unity of the Quechua-speaking community as a whole because one small group is setting itself above its neighbors. In fact, as King and Hornberger point out, there is a factor that further divides the generations and their transmission of values. The dialectical difference between “the nationally standardized variety [of Quechua] (*Quichua Unificado*) and the local community variety (*Quichua auténtico*), spoken by elderly and more rural dwellers” causes for the diminishing number of Quechua speakers to have increasing difficulties communicating in their own language, both in Ecuador and other Quechua-speaking areas such as in Peru.³² However, if the communities were to overcome this idea that one dialect is better than another, they have the potential to be a very strong force in the effort to spread Quechua in Peru.

Simply improving the image of Quechua within the indigenous communities however, is not enough. Indigenous communities must gain support and respect from non-Quechua inhabitants as well. According to Hornberger and Coronel-Molina:

“It would be a significant 'vote of confidence' if mainstream officials were to accept the use of Quechua (or any indigenous language) within the halls of government. Such an action would signal that Quechua is a legitimate language and could, over time, influence the attitudes of the mass of the population, both Spanish speaking and Quechua-speaking.” (33)

By doing this, a circular and reciprocating relationship might be formed to permit an appreciation, respect, and usage of Quechua on an equal level with Spanish in Peru. Although this process could not happen immediately, the shift toward seeing Quechua as a language sufficient and even encouraged for use in daily communication would greatly help in spreading the acceptance of Quechua within Peruvian society.

³² King and Hornberger, 2006, p. 187

Another goal of governmental, non-governmental and indigenous organizations is to maintain the transmission of values and the preservation of the Quechua culture without freezing the culture in the past and preventing it from moving forward. “Traditionally, informal socialization received at the hands of family and community members is the means by which an older generation passes on its linguistic and cultural wisdom and practices to the younger generation.”³³ The transmission of values and culture has been interrupted as Spanish has become more prominent and popular among younger generations and because families and individuals are now moving away from their ancestors’ communities in order to seek better economic opportunities in urban areas. Language must be recognized as a method of cultural transmission:

“Language is a key marker of ethnicity: for many, being Quechua means speaking Quechua. Indeed, Quechua-speaking people often self-identify as Quechua speakers, rather than as 'Quechuas' per se. Quechua speakers are also likely to self-identify according to their geographical region and local cultural traditions, such as otavaleño, saragureño, paceño, santiagueño, cochabambino, cusqueño or ayacuchano.”³⁴

All of these different ways of self-identification with the Quechua culture and language make it difficult to have a clear estimate of the real size of Quechua populations in Peru and other countries. Past censuses show strong fluctuations in those who identify themselves as Quechua in different decades. This again relates to the social status associated with the language’s value in society. Other reasons for variance include, as Hall and Patrinos reveal, that “indigenous areas are often undersurveyed due to civil conflict and/or geographic isolation, and therefore the size of indigenous populations is underestimated.”³⁵ They posit that such underestimation is especially problematic when it comes to policy decisions.

³³ King and Hornberger, 2006, p. 187

³⁴ King and Hornberger, 2006, p. 187

³⁵ Hall and Patrinos, 2006, p. 59

Looking at the factors affecting the current situation and status of Quechua in Peru and understanding the various roles different parties have played within the Quechua language debates gives partial insight to the position of Quechua in Peru. Looking at how this situation is echoed internationally adds another critical dimension.

An International Perspective

Although the Quechua-Spanish debate outlined above in present-day Peru may appear to be important only to indigenous citizens of the country or to enthusiasts who seek to preserve the Quechua cultures and traditions, the issue of language loss and destruction is a global concern. Language loss occurs when a language gains prominence over a traditional language, whether in a political, social or economic context, leading individuals to learn, prefer and utilize that language to the point of extinction of the other. This is not to say that one must only speak traditional or ancestral languages; however, it is important to see the power and value that rests in choosing a language to use.

According to statistics, there are over 7,000 languages in the world today. However, every two weeks, another language becomes extinct, “and each time a language disappears, a part of history – a subtle way of thinking – vanishes too.”³⁶ Each language represents a piece of culture, a perspective on the world that is unique. Language is imparted with the ideas of the world as perceived by the people who use, develop, and pass on the language. However, these ideas can only be passed from one generation to the next if each generation works to teach and practice the language. Unfortunately, given the pressures and tendencies to value some languages over others, the world will continue to lose 26 languages a year unless individuals, communities, and governments take action to preserve the languages and cultures at risk of extinction.

Conclusion

The Quechua-Spanish debate is on-going in Peru today. It is not simply a matter of preserving a language through political recognition and declaration of its presence in the country’s heritage.

Instead, the debate involves varied parties, diverse interests, and multiple goals, all with various social factors and contexts in which they work. Standardization remains an issue of contestation among scholars and native speakers, slowing the process by which education and literature can be disseminated to students and communities. Educational systems suffer from a lack of funding and training. Meanwhile, social, political, and economic limitations discourage the learning and speaking of Quechua among individuals and groups. All of these factors, therefore, hinge on the crucial process of valuation, giving and demonstrating a social appreciation for the Quechua language in Peruvian society.

When looking at this conflict of languages and the social and cultural values embedded in the use of a language, one can see that the situation of Quechua and Spanish in Peru is not dissimilar to many other societies’ struggles to preserve and encourage the use of a native or indigenous language despite the presence of a more dominant and seemingly more popular language. The decision to communicate in a native language oftentimes becomes stigmatized and fraught with negative social and economic implications. In order to overcome this, individuals must first come to place value on the teaching, learning, and practice of the language. By using a language of the majority, one does not face social ostracization. To make indigenous languages more acceptable, education can be very influential. If kids are taught from an early age the power and value of a language, they are more likely to appreciate, respect and continue to value the benefits of the language in the future.

Once one understands the values embedded in a chosen language, one can then see several barriers that are necessary to overcome in order to improve a language’s status. First, in today’s society, it is important to have a standardized system of writing and recording a language. As seen with the Quechua language in Peru, this process is filled with conflicts of how to determine which dialects should be seen as the most “pure,” how to write the language in a way that makes sense given other modern languages, and how to maintain the values that are usually transmitted orally by generations within a style of writing that remains true to the people and the culture from which the language

³⁶ “Saving Dying Languages in ‘the Linguists,’” 2009

comes. Another multi-layered challenge lies in not only having people of the indigenous language and society value and utilize their language but for those outside of the indigenous culture to value and respect the language and culture enough to discourage linguistic prejudice. Governmental and social programs can help in these cases to bring about linguistic legitimacy, but a language's legitimacy must also be proven through the daily use and appreciation of the culture from which it comes.

By looking at the situation of Quechua in Peru and its struggle for a footing equivalent to Spanish's linguistic role in the country, one can see that individuals within and outside of Quechua communities must place value on the language itself and its use. However, one must understand that language and the language one uses works as a form of identification and inclusion for an individual and a group. The power of identity brought about by language can be very strong, especially where social and economic statuses are affected. When looking at identity and the power of a language, one must ask: should all languages be valued equally? Is it possible for equality between languages to occur? In the case of Quechua in Peru, will the changing of educational and societal perceptions of the language bring about a greater sense of appreciation and equality?

The value of a language is embedded in the society in which it lives. The factors affecting the valuation of Quechua in Peru not only reflect the present social and economic situation but also find their basis of origin within historical political and communal movements of power. Ranging from the time of the Incan Empire to the Spanish colonizers to those in power today, Quechua's status and the values within it are in constant flux. Linguists and cultural preservationists are seeking to preserve the Quechua culture, trying to standardize the Quechua language so that it has greater status, usage, and importance. Within the standardization process, though, dialectal preferences and status struggles come to the forefront as well. Throughout all of this, though, Quechua descendents and non-Quechua residents must be aware of the linguistic power struggle that is reflected in every decision they make to speak Spanish over Quechua. A language is never neutral, nor is it ever separate from the culture within which it is spoken. The

Quechua-Spanish situation in Peru is linguistically one that remains a debate in standardization and codification; culturally, it risks the extinction of ancestral and community values; and politically and economically, it remains charged with socioeconomic implications and consequences, affecting the lives of over three million people.

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Mimes, Sunflowers, and Good Governance: An Examination of the Political Philosophy, Pedagogic Policies, and Campaign Strategy of Antanas Mockus Through the Lens of Colombian Electoral Politics

Cory Siskind
Tufts University

The initial success and subsequent failure of Green Party candidate and former Bogotá mayor Antanas Mockus in the Colombian presidential elections of 2010 exemplifies the duality of Colombia's modernizing political culture and taste for tradition. This paper will provide a brief overview of electoral politics in Colombia, including a discussion of clientelism, political violence, the 1991 Constitution, expansion of political parties, and placing Antanas Mockus and the Green Party in historical context. Next, it will outline the specifics of Mockus's Bogotá-tailored philosophy of governing. The paper will advance into an analysis of Mockus's policies in Bogotá, including disarmament, battling corruption, reforming drivers, expansion of public space, transportation, and infrastructure, water conservation, and voluntary taxes. This paper will then argue that the qualities that made Antanas Mockus initially appealing to the Colombian people, such as his honesty, academic nature, and break with politics as usual, ultimately proved his downfall in the 2010 election. This paper will conclude by looking to the future of the Colombian party.

I. INTRODUCTION: WHO IS ANTANAS MOCKUS AND WHY DID HE LOSE?

Many people have heard of Antanas Mockus. Inside of Colombia, he is either a superstar or a menace, depending on whom you ask. Outside of Colombia, he is the subject of curiosity, admiration, and shock. Antanas Mockus served as mayor of Bogotá from 1995 to 1997 and again from 2001 to 2003, and is widely known for stunts like picking up litter in a spandex superhero costume, taking a shower in a commercial to promote water conservation, and sending mimes into the streets to direct traffic. However, beyond the theatrics and social experiments, he reduced crime rates, corruption, and resource consumption. He increased public space, transportation, and citizens' rights and, most notably, heightened respect for the rule of law. In the run up to the 2010 presidential election, he shocked Colombia and the world when his poll numbers briefly surpassed those of Juan Manuel Santos, the chosen successor of Alvaro Uribe, the most popular president in Colombia's history. The revolutionary campaign strategy of his Partido Verde (Green Party), featuring email, social networks, and flashmobs,

was met with great success.¹ Yet despite his overwhelming popularity as mayor and internationally successful campaign strategy, Mockus lost the presidential race to Juan Manuel Santos by a margin of 40%.

This research paper will examine Colombia's 2010 presidential election in depth. First, I will discuss traditional electoral politics in Colombia and the placement of Antanas Mockus and the Green Party within that framework. Second, I will explain Mockus's political philosophy as established in his numerous publications and through academic interpretations. Third, I will discuss his accomplishments as mayor of Bogotá, and the changes that took place in the city. Fourth, I will analyze the 2010 presidential campaign, highlighting how Mockus's strong points were also his pitfalls. Specifically, I will argue that his honesty, academic background, and break with politics as usual all led him to high poll numbers initially, but as the race wore on, ultimately worked directly against him. I will conclude by discussing the future of the Green Party in Colombia.

¹ Flashmobs are defined as a large group of people who assemble suddenly in a public place, perform an unusual act for a brief time, and then disperse.

Throughout this paper, I will reference the canon of texts written on Colombian electoral politics, the papers and presentations of Antanas Mockus and relevant intellectuals, and academic articles. I will rely on contributions from interviews, specifically with Michael Shifter, the President of the Inter-American Dialogue and Adjunct Professor at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service; Ricardo Plata, a businessman and Mockus campaign organizer in Baranquilla; Mónica Pachón, a Professor of Politics at the Universidad de los Andes and Director of Congreso Visible; Juan Camilo Chavez, campaign consultant with Aguayo Publicidad and strategic planner for Mockus; and Darío Restrepo, a fellow-academician and contemporary of Antanas Mockus.

II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF ELECTORAL POLITICS IN COLOMBIA

In order to understand the phenomenon of Antanas Mockus and place the Green Party in historical context, it is important to briefly discuss the political history of Colombia. An oligarchic regime for most of its early history, Colombia transitioned into an oligarchic democracy over time. Its main periods of transition can be classified as pseudo-democracy with indirect elections and limited suffrage from 1819 to 1953, a military dictatorship under Gustavo Rojas Pinilla from 1953-1957, and a mix of electoral and liberal democracy challenged by political violence from 1958 to the present.² Throughout the later part of the country's history, two characteristics have defined Colombia's political landscape: clientelism and democracy limited by political violence.

Clientelism

As was the case with many Latin American countries, clientelism played an important role in governing Colombia from the time of Spanish rule. Formerly called *caudillismo*, it has evolved into a subtle form of modern political patronage. Although definitions of clientelism vary, Robert Clark defines it as a system in which members of lesser socio-economic status are "under the jurisdiction or control of local patrons who defend the interests of their clients and receive deference and respect (as well as more material rewards) from

² Steven L. Taylor, *Voting Amid Violence: Electoral Democracy in Colombia* (Northeastern University Press: Boston, 2009), 19.

them in return."³ Scott Mainwaring defines clientelistic relationships by four main characteristics: their unequal character, their uneven reciprocity, their non-institutionalized nature, and their face-to-face character.⁴ Clientelism served as a way for the Colombian elite to maintain a hold on power. John D. Martz's explains, "the patrimonial state in Colombia evolved as a highly malleable system committed to the maintenance of a responsive but ultimately personalistic public order, one dedicated most fundamentally to its own preservation and the unity of the state."⁵ With the onset of modernization, industrialization, and the expansion of the state, clientelism was reformed into a system of corporate clientelism, or the replacement of traditional individual patrons with groups or corporate entities.⁶ Modern clientelism often manifests itself through bribes, handouts, and political favors. The dynamic, asymmetrical quid-pro-quo of clientelism has continued to play an important role in Colombian politics.

Political Violence and the Degradation of Democracy

Periods of civil war, antagonist political dialogue, and violent elections greatly hindered Colombia's democracy. It underwent eight civil wars during the nineteenth century alone. Although it has some of the hemisphere's longest-standing democratic institutions and a tradition of resistance to authoritarian rule, it also has perhaps the most violent history in the hemisphere.⁷ The murder of Liberal Jorge Eliécer Gaitán incited the riots known as *El Bogotazo*, launching *La Violencia* ("the Violence") from 1948 to 1958 between the Liberal and Conservative parties.

The dictatorship of Gustavo Rojas Pinilla from 1953-1957 was followed by a pacted transition, in which power was transferred from the governing

³ Robert P. Clark, *Power and Policy in the Third World*, 3d ed. (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1986), 102.

⁴ Bruce Michael Bagley, "Colombia: National Front and Economic Development," in Robert Wesson, ed., *Politics, Policies, and Economic Development in Latin America* (Sanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1984), 125.

⁵ John D. Martz, *The Politics of Clientelism: Democracy & the State of Colombia* (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1997), 40.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 19.

⁷ Taylor, *Voting Amid Violence: Electoral Democracy in Colombia*, 14.

elite through a series of agreements.⁸ Through the 1956 Pacto de Benidorm and the 1957 Pacto de Sitges, power shifted from the dictator to a new government. The dyadic power-sharing agreement known as the *Frente Nacional* (“National Front”) was exclusionary in nature, banning political parties other than the Liberal and Conservative from competing for power. During *La Violencia* and the *Frente Nacional*, Colombians were overwhelmingly political and polarized. However, throughout the last quarter of the twentieth century, the violence among the Colombian government, leftist guerillas, and paramilitary forces ensured that Colombia featured some of the highest rates of voter abstention in the hemisphere. In recent years, rarely have more than 45% of voters participated in an election.⁹

According to Steven Taylor’s interpretation of Larry Diamond’s ten criteria for liberal democracy, Colombia today is defined as a democracy. However, only two of the criteria are fully present: control of the state by elected officials and constrained executive power. Although severely limited by violence, Colombia still features uncertain electoral outcomes, unrepressed minority groups, free association and group formation, freedom of information, basic democratic liberties, equal rights under the law, and an independent judiciary. Nonetheless, the ability of the state to protect citizens from violence is absent in large portions of the country.¹⁰

The Adoption of a New Constitution and the Expansion of Political Parties

Colombia also has a long history of pursuing institutional change in the face of political problems. Previous to its adoption of a new Constitution in 1991, Colombia had the second longest-standing Constitution in the hemisphere (since 1886) after the United States. Nonetheless,

⁸ According to Guillermo O’Donnell and Phillippe C. Shmitter, a pact in this context, is defined as “an explicit, but not always publicly explicated or justified, agreement among a select set of actors which seeks to define (or, better, to redefine) rules governing the exercise of power on the basis of mutual guarantees for the ‘vital interests’ of those entering into it.”

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⁹ Taylor, *Voting Amid Violence: Electoral Democracy in Colombia*, 27.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 20-35.

the Constitution faced many reforms and modifications. Directly after the *Desmonte*, or dismantling, of the *Frente Nacional*, the two-party political system remained largely intact.

After the advent of the 1991 Constitution and the decline of *bipardismo*, or rule by two parties though not necessarily featuring cooperation, the number and power of alternative political parties grew. The transition of Colombia’s political parties looked something like the following: a strong two-party system (1974-1990), increasing atomization (1991-2002), and seeming consolidation in a multiparty system (2006-present)¹¹ The Liberal Party retained much of its support, while the Conservative party gained minority status as many independent movements splintered off. After its emergence in 1990, the Alianza Democrática Movimiento del 19 de Abril garnered substantial support, which it quickly lost because of its fragmentation. Many other strong third party candidates entered the political landscape. Álvaro Uribe, a liberal who defected from his party, ran as an independent in 2002. Uribe became wildly popular, and the Partido Social de Unidad Nacional, or el Partido de la U, formed around him. In 2010 President Uribe endorsed Juan Manuel Santos. Several parties rose to challenge Santos, such as the traditional Liberal and Conservative parties, as well as the Polo Democrático Alternativo, Cambio Radical, and of course, Antanas Mockus’s Partido Verde.

How to Place Antanas Mockus and el Partido Verde in Historical Context

In many ways Antanas Mockus represents a major parting with political tradition in Colombia. Although he was not the first to do so, Mockus made a dramatic statement with his refusal to engage in patronage and clientelism. Mockus did not establish pre-election alliances, as is the common practice. The campaign’s use of social media to interact with voters also distinguished Mockus’s from traditional campaigns. His Green Party is an example of the new structure of party politics in Colombia. Leaving the traditional dyadic system behind, the runoff to the 2010 presidential election featured two candidates, neither of whom belonged to the Liberal nor Conservative party.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 110

Mockus's candidacy also inspired an unprecedented number of youth voters to participate in the election, turning back the tide of Colombia's voter apathy.

III. THE MOCKUS PHILOSOPHY OF GOVERNING

A mathematician and philosopher, Antanas Mockus is first and foremost an educator, and he approached his time as mayor of Bogotá as such. He entered office during a troubled time, and understood that Bogotá's situation was unique, requiring carefully crafted policies that reflected the history, tradition, and personality of the city. According to Professor Darío Restrepo Mockus believed, "laws are very personal to a people. The same law you impose in the United States will have a completely different effect in Russia, China, or Haiti, because every group of people has its own code of morals and individual values."¹² Mockus thus moved forward with a strategy to target Bogotá's unique ills.

Mockus also recognized that there was a problem with societal norms. "The Colombian people are entrepreneurial and resourceful. They are very creative and adaptable. If the people are not morally in the right place, these positives can be misused."¹³ The misuse of these qualities caused what Restrepo explains as a short-cut culture:

"Mockus said, 'we have a problem. We have a shortcut culture. We use shortcuts to bypass morality, culture and society.' Many of the people of Bogotá believed the end justified the means. They looked at each other's actions and thereby justified their own...the result of this culture was uncertainty, violence, distrust in the system, and corruption. This misalignment of culture and morality presented huge policy obstacles."¹⁴

Mockus sought out to reform Bogotá with strategic, pedagogic policies that would teach Bogotanos how to behave like good citizens.

Personal Responsibility and Compliance with Laws

A fundamental cornerstone of Mockus's belief system is that individuals must make the choice to improve their surroundings. Restrepo explains, "Mockus believed that every person can distinguish between good and bad. It is possible for individuals to have different interpretations of what each one means, but every person knows when they are doing good or bad."¹⁵ The idea of personal responsibility and accountability runs throughout Mockus's canon of essays and is reflected in policies. Mockus conducted extensive research on the factors behind compliance and noncompliance with laws. He explained the contextual factors surrounding laws that encourage compliance can be broken down into five categories: 1) the law itself and how easy it is to understand and comply; 2) anomie, or the presence or lack thereof of social norms; 3) aversion or acceptance of norms; 4) tolerance and pluralism in society and; 5) acceptance of negligence.¹⁶ He also argued that humans have both positive and negative legal, auto-regulatory, and mutual-regulatory influences that drive behavior. Positively, citizens may follow laws because of respect for the law, moral obligation, or concern for their reputation in society. Negatively, citizens' behavior may be guided by a fear of legal sanctions, guilt, or social rejection.¹⁷ Mockus approached crafting policy not just from a political standpoint but also with an in-depth understanding of sociology and human psychology.

Divorce of Law, Morality, and Culture

The root of Bogotá's problems, Mockus argued repeatedly, was a divorce of law, morality and culture among the city's inhabitants. He explained the dangers of the "lack of congruency between cultural behavior, and moral and judicial regulators. This incongruence expresses itself as violence, delinquency, corruption, illegitimizing institutions,

¹² Darío Restrepo, interview by author, Bogotá, Colombia, August 10, 2010.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Antanas Mockus and Jimmy Corzo, *Cumplir para convivir: Factores de convivencia y tipos de jóvenes por su relación con normas y acuerdos*. (Bogotá: Universidad Nacional de Colombia, 2003), 25-72.

¹⁷ Antanas Mockus, "¿Bogotá: cohesión social vía innovación? Cultura ciudadana y espacio público: motivaciones y regulaciones." Presentation for Sub-National Governments of the European Union and Latin America, Rosario, Argentina, June 3-5, 2007.

and a crisis or weakening of individuals' morals."¹⁸ The idea is that there can be exaggerated cleavages between what the law tells its citizens, what the citizens believe is morally correct, and what is culturally acceptable. For example, the law tells a citizen in Bogotá to wait at a red light until it turns green. However, that person sees other drivers continuing through the red light, and realizes it is culturally acceptable to do so. The citizen begins to see this basic traffic violation as morally acceptable because he or she does not connect the rule to its purpose and just sees the end result. This divorce of different channels of directing citizens' behavior creates havoc in a city. Mockus approached crafting policy from the belief that if citizens merely look to the actions of others and do not consider the intended purpose of a law, they would not respect it nor comply with it.

Coexistence and Citizen Culture

Although he did not originally coin the term, Mockus became widely known for promoting *convivencia* ("coexistence") as mayor. He defined the idea of *convivencia* in a city as, "striving to live together amongst different peoples without the risk or violence and with the expectation of viewing differences as necessary for growth."¹⁹ Mockus believed that a human being that does not form relations with others is not a human being, and therefore *convivencia* is intrinsically desirable.²⁰ "*Convivencia* is more than just simple, tranquil, and pacifistic existence. It is conjoined construction, strong relations, mutual support, reciprocal utilization of skills, and mutual enrichment. In sum, it is the fertility of diversity."²¹ Mockus believed that sense of community and mutual destiny was entirely absent in Bogotá, and he worked to foster it.

Another important aspect of Mockus' ideological platform was encouraging *cultura ciudadana* ("citizen culture"). Mockus believed in enforcing policies that mandate citizen behaviors (regulation), but he also strongly believed that when citizens understand and respect the law, they

enforce their own good behavior (auto-regulation). There is also an interpersonal aspect to *cultura ciudadana*. Mockus desired that citizens help support the rule of law. Beyond creating rules, he wanted to create a culture that encouraged all citizens to be watchdogs of each other's behavior. This would not only create a more lawful city, but a city in which citizens believed they were actively contributing to the betterment of their surroundings.

The Role of Government and the Individual in Changing Behavior

What was the role of government institutions in stopping short-cut culture and disrespect for others? Were the citizens responsible for promoting the harmony of law, morality, and culture, as well as *convivencia* and *cultura ciudadana*? Mockus believed the responsibility for a better Bogotá did not fall entirely on the shoulders of the city government. Even though his ideological platform was ambitious, Mockus did not believe the state was the answer. According to Darío Restrepo, "Mockus wasn't a 'statist.' The state was not the solution. When he spoke of 'the collective' he was not speaking of the state. He distrusted the syndicates and bureaucracies and was therefore not in favor of validating or concentrating them."²² Mockus believed the shared duty among the citizens of Bogotá was to act: "for Mockus, it was absolutely necessary that the leaders and the people take responsibility. The state was a problem but it was not just the state that was guilty."²³ Therefore, Mockus implemented series of pedagogic policies, discussed in the following section, which sought to challenge the citizens of Bogotá to reflect upon their own actions and how their role in city life was impacting the wellbeing of others.

The Legacy of Mockus's Ideas

Mockus's philosophy spurred a number of intellectuals and politicians to expound upon his ideas after his time in office. Several authors, such as Efraín Sánchez and Víctor Manuel Rodríguez, wrote about the power of collective action regarding citizen culture. Thinkers like Luis Fernando Martínez discussed the influence of fear on citizens' wellbeing in Bogotá, and others explored how to advocate "love" for Bogotá. Rocio

¹⁸ Antanas Mockus, "Convivencia como armonización de ley, moral y cultura," *Perspectivas*, vol. XXXII, no. 1 (2002), 23.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 20.

²⁰ Antanas Mockus, interview by Guillermo Solarte Lindo, Bogotá, Colombia, 1997.

²¹ *Ibid.*

²² Darío Restrepo.

²³ *Ibid.*

Londoño, Otty Patiño, Paul Bromberg, and Tatiana Gomezcásseres all engaged in a discussion of the nature of the *cultura ciudadana* movement and its future in Colombia. Many educators and institutions looked closely at his pedagogic approach to governing, and thus restructured their teaching format.

Mockus's philosophies had a major impact on intellectuals inside and outside of Colombia. His ideas were practical and accessible, yet somehow stunning in their uniqueness. They resonated with the citizens of Bogotá who were tired of crime, corruption, violence, disrespect, and politics as usual. The following section will discuss how a zealous and determined Mockus put these ideas into action during his time as mayor of Bogotá.

IV. MOCKUS AS MAYOR: SUCCESS IN BOGOTÁ

The city of Bogotá saw hard-fought developments from 1995 to 2003. When Antanas Mockus left his post as President of the National University of Colombia and ran for mayor of Bogotá in 1995, he had no political experience. As a creative eccentric, he saw an opportunity to turn the city into a classroom. His policies were not just directed at reforming the city, but at changing the mentality of its citizens. Professor Jane Mansbidge summarized his general approach: "The most effective campaigns combine material incentives with normative change and participatory stakeholding."²⁴ In addition to individual incentives and communal rewards, the effectiveness of his policies was rooted in their shock value, symbolism, and pedagogy.

Mockus was not the only person responsible for changing Bogotá. Other leaders in Bogotá before, during, and after his mayoral tenure also contributed to the positive development of the city. Restrepo argues that, although he may have dressed up as a superhero, "Mockus is no superman. The mayor before him [Jaime Castro] was also a reformist who set the stage. He made the government more concentrated and efficient."²⁵ Paul Bromberg and Enrique Peñalosa served as

mayors of Bogotá between Mockus's two terms, from 1996 to 2000, and Luis Eduardo "Lucho" Garzón held the office from 2004 to 2007. Bromberg, Peñalosa, and Garzón all developed their own distinctive policies that incorporated Mockus's philosophy and expounded upon it. Additionally, politicians outside of Bogotá implemented citywide reforms in their own right. Another mayor, Sergio Fajardo dramatically improved Medellín, catching national attention and causing Mockus to select Fajardo as his running mate and vice presidential candidate. Nonetheless, "everything Mockus did in office was entirely Mockus."²⁶

Recognizing the Importance of Life

Throughout his career, Mockus repeated, *la vida es sagrada* ("life is sacred"). Therefore, one of Mockus's first priorities in office was tackling the soaring crime rates and poor citizen safety. In response to a question regarding which of Mockus's policies had the greatest impact, Michael Shifter of the Inter-American Dialogue states, "some of Mockus's innovative and resourceful efforts to reduce street crime in Bogotá were quite effective. He identified key risk factors and methodically went about changing these to increase citizen security."²⁷ One such policy was the *ley zanahoria* or the "Carrot Law." A Colombian colloquialism, a "*zanahoria*" is a person who does not party or get into trouble. The law mandated that bars and clubs in Bogotá close at one o'clock in the morning. Although faced with vigorous protests from the youth of the city, the law got people off the streets at night when most of the crime was occurring and reduced the number of drunk driving accidents. In the face of protestors, Mockus said, "a thousand nights of partying, do not justify the death of a single human being."²⁸ Before the *ley zanahoria*, an average of 38 people died in Bogotá during the weekend (with 16 from traffic accidents), but afterward the number was lowered to 14 (with traffic accidents lowered to just four).²⁹

Disarmament

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Michael Shifter, interview by author, Washington DC, July 14, 2010.

²⁸ Antanas Mockus, "¿Bogotá: cohesión social vía innovación?"

²⁹ Ibid.

²⁴ María Cristina Caballero, "Academic turns city into a social experiment: Mayor Mockus of Bogotá and his spectacularly applied theory," *Harvard Gazette*, March 11, 2004.

²⁵ Darío Restrepo.

Another important initiative in reducing the crime rate in Bogotá was the disarmament of the city. Caballero explains:

“Voluntary disarmament days were held in December 1996 and again in 2003. Though less than 1% of the firearms in the city were given up, homicides fell by 26%, thanks in part to the attention given to the program by the media. The percentage of people who think that it is better to have firearms in order to protect themselves fell from 24.8% in 2001 to 10.4% in 2003.”³⁰

Following his mantra of “*la vida es sagrada*”, Mockus, and the mayors who followed his lead between and after his two terms, obtained results. In the eight-year period from 1995 to 2003, homicides in Bogotá dropped from 80 people per every 100,000 to just 22, a 73% decrease.³¹

Battling Corruption

Mockus also tackled the culture of political corruption. Upon entering office, he faced an elaborate political network that dictated favors and alliances as a means of operation. However, Mockus was elected the first independent mayor in Bogotá’s history, and he shocked the established political elite by stating, “the only alliance I can possibly have is with the people.”³² Regarding business as usual, he continued, “I stopped that, and some called me an anti-patronage fundamentalist.” Apparently, when he presented one council member with a text explaining his goals, the man at first smiled, but soon after resigned.³³ Despite the entrenched system, his independence allowed him to fill his administration with the brightest academics the country had to offer.

He battled corruption outside higher political office as well, disbanding the notoriously corrupt traffic police and firing 3,200 officers. He offered to hire them back if they underwent retraining, and several hundred took him up on his offer. His

overhaul of the police force, according to Mónica Pachón, a political science professor at the Universidad de los Andes, was instrumental in setting the stage for all of his other reforms: “Mockus’s pedagogic policies only worked as a complement to his focus on security and investing so much in revitalizing the police force and removing the corruption.”³⁴ Mockus’s no-nonsense attitude toward political favors, alliances, and corruption was a wake up call to the governing elite, as well as the police force. His transparency and honesty, combined with his focus on security, paved the way for his future effectiveness in other endeavors.

Reforming Drivers

Mockus sought to completely change the way drivers behaved in Bogotá. Drivers are required to make sacrifices, such as waiting for a pedestrian to cross the street or yielding to another driver. Restrepo explains, “we didn’t have a culture that allowed us to have collective rules that required some sacrifice from the individual.”³⁵ Therefore, traffic laws were taken as suggestions, and driving in the city was tantamount to chaos. Beyond the *ley zanáhoría* that helped get drunk drivers off the street, Mockus moved to draw citizens’ attention to their own actions. He trained hundreds of mimes to go into the streets and silently act out good driving behavior and publicly ridicule bad drivers. The press and many in the general public were dumbfounded by the absurdity of the mimes, but it got their attention. Mockus also distributed 350,000 “thumbs-up” and “thumbs-down” cards to drivers to rate each other’s behavior on the road. He formed the *Caballeros de la Cebra*, or Knights of Crosswalk, composed of a group taxi drivers who the public nominated based on their kindness and honesty. Mockus consulted with the *Caballeros* to better the taxi culture in Bogotá. Another powerful policy Mockus implemented was painting black stars on the street where pedestrians had been killed from a traffic accident. This drew the citizens’ attention to just how many lives were lost because of failure to follow rules. All of these policies

³⁰ María Cristina Caballero, “Academic turns city into a social experiment,” Harvard Gazette.

³¹ Antanas Mockus, “¿Bogotá: cohesión social vía innovación?”

³² Bogotá Change, documentary, directed by Andreas Dalsgaard (Copenhagen, Denmark: Up Front Video, 2009).

³³ María Cristina Caballero, “Academic turns city into a social experiment,” Harvard Gazette.

³⁴ Mónica Pachón, interview by author, Bogotá, Colombia, August 10, 2010.

³⁵ Darío Restrepo.

contributed to a reduction of traffic fatalities from 1,300 per year to 600.³⁶

Public Space, Transportation, and Infrastructure

The Mockus administration's effort to improve public space and infrastructure had a major impact on the city. The network of libraries, parks, and plazas within the city's limits grew rapidly. Restrepo describes public transportation pre-Mockus: "the companies that owned bus lines were very big and powerful in Bogotá, and the bus drivers were paid for every person they picked up. Therefore, bus drivers would race each other to the bus stops to pick up more people, thus causing traffic accidents and difficult driving conditions."³⁷ An efficient, streamlined, subway-like system of buses, known as the Transmilenio, cleaned the streets of hundreds of dueling, privately owned buses. Although it was implemented under Mayor Peñalosa, Mockus's successor and predecessor to his second term, Mockus was instrumental in its conceptualization and continued the system's implementation during his second term. More bike lanes and the closing of streets on certain days increased the number of bikers and decreased the number of cars on the road. A system called *pico y placa*, in which cars with license plates that ended in even or odd were restricted to driving on certain days, decreased the congestion of the city's streets.

The transition to increase public space and transportation under Mockus and Peñalosa was controversial and did not go smoothly. Both Mockus and Peñalosa focused on clearing out the slums to make way for public space that would change the face of Bogotá. Possibly the hardest task was Peñalosa's renovation of El Cartucho. One of Bogotá's worst neighborhoods and located just next to the city center, El Cartucho was home to thousands of the city's poorest residents, all of whom had to be relocated. Protestors took to the streets with fireworks and bombs. Peñalosa also turned Bogotá's most exclusive country club into a public park, a difficult struggle against the city's elites. Battling the powerful private bus companies with the Transmilenio led to debilitating strikes. However, the rapid and thorough developments

modernized Bogotá, improving urban life for millions of residents.

Water Conservation

Water conservation was also high up on Mockus's agenda. "In 2003, the Mockus administration provided 1,235,000 homes with sewage service and 1,316,500 with water services. The city's provision of drinking water rose from 78.7% of homes in 1993 to 100% in 2003. The sewage service rose from 70.8% of homes in 1993 to 94.9% in 2003."³⁸ Landlocked Bogotá faced extreme water shortages. Mockus set out to reduce water consumption through a highly visible campaign of conservation. Mockus famously showered on national television in a commercial to promote shorter showers. He removed limitations on water use, hoping that people would regulate their own consumption through collective action. On the contrary, water usage rose sharply as the citizens of Bogotá hoarded water in their homes. Mockus took action with the support of a television crew. Restrepo recalls,

"He actually went around to different house in Bogotá and knocked on doors saying, 'Señora, this month you used 10% more water than last. Don't you know that there is a grave problem with people not conserving water? If everyone escalates their water consumption as you have done, there will be even less water.' And that woman would be full of embarrassment and shame. Guilt over one's negative actions. A sense of personal responsibility. That is what Mockus did."³⁹

After the initial spike and retaliation campaign, numbers dropped down far below the original consumption levels.

Voluntary Taxes

Perhaps the most surprising success of the Mockus era was the implementation of voluntary taxes. Many Bogotanos evaded paying taxes. "Colombians pay taxes in the United States, throughout the rest of world, but not here, because they know they can get away with it. It's a simple

³⁶ Antanas Mockus, "¿Bogotá: cohesión social vía innovación?"

³⁷ Darío Restrepo.

³⁸ María Cristina Caballero, "Academic turns city into a social experiment." Harvard Gazette.

³⁹ Darío Restrepo.

cost benefit analysis,”⁴⁰ says Pachón. However, Mockus asked the people directly to pay an extra 10% in voluntary taxes, and astonishingly 63,000 people complied.⁴¹ Compliance with voluntary taxes marked the success of the Mockus model of citizen culture. Despite the potentially staggering cost of implementing infrastructure, public transportation, public space, increased security, education programs, social experiments, and expanded access to water, Mockus spent dramatically less than previous administrations. In 2002, with the tax dollars saved from the administration not paying handouts, the city collected more than three times the revenues it gathered in 1990.⁴²

Mockus's Policies in Conjunction

Mockus oversaw a revolution in Bogotá. He is now known for lowering the homicide rate, setting up disarmament initiatives, battling a tradition of political corruption, reforming driving culture, decongesting the roads, rejuvenating the police force, promoting public space and transportation, lowering water consumption, and implementing a system of voluntary taxes. He had many other successes in office, such as combating domestic violence, promoting education, and community-monitored security. He also faced many failures and disappointments. However, with all the successful policies that focused on changing the way Bogotanos see each other and their city during his years in office, Bogotá changed so fundamentally that to many, it became an entirely different city.

Looking towards the 2010 presidential election, the next section will briefly discuss the electoral political structure of Colombia and conclude by examining Mockus's position therein.

V. THE 2010 ELECTION: HOW MOCKUS'S SELLING POINTS BECAME HIS PITFALLS

In April 2010, with the presidential election looming in May, *Semana* published a poll conducted by Ipsos Napoleon Franco for a coalition of the country's largest news sources that shocked Colombia and the world. In just two weeks,

⁴⁰ Mónica Pachón.

⁴¹ Antanas Mockus, “¿Bogotá: cohesión social vía innovación?”

⁴² María Cristina Caballero, “Academic turns city into a social experiment,” *Harvard Gazette*.

Mockus's poll numbers had shot up from 20% to 38% support, propelling him nine points ahead of the next closest competitor (Juan Manuel Santos, the current President of Colombia).⁴³ The poll also reported that Mockus had 58% support in the capital city over Santos's 37%. The results sent a shock wave through the country and Colombians began to ask themselves, “Could we really elect Antanas Mockus to be President of Colombia?”

After reviewing the appealing philosophy of Antanas Mockus, the overwhelming success of his policies and his popularity as mayor, and the norms of traditional electoral politics in Bogotá, the question remains, “Why did Antanas Mockus lose the presidential election to Juan Manuel Santos at a stunning 40% margin (28% to 69%)?” According to Ricardo Plata, a businessman and campaign organizer for Mockus, he lost the election because,

“He was an iconoclast. He was so completely original that he could not be in-tune with the people. His stance was visionary and personal. He ran for president three times, and he believed in his cause. He managed to change the culture of an 8 million-person town on the verge of collapse. But his stance was so different he couldn't sell it. He didn't have what other politicians have: the ability to sell.”⁴⁴

Juan Camilio Chavez, a campaign consultant and strategic planner for Mockus, saw the end of the campaign as a series of gaffs: “With all that momentum, Antanas could have won. At the end of his campaign, he made many mistakes while Santos was being very deliberate.”⁴⁵ Many have theorized on why Mockus lost so dramatically. Perhaps the answer is that the Colombian people spooked and realized that the qualities that made Mockus an appealing idea worked directly against him in his bid for the presidency. Specifically, Mockus's honesty, reputation as an academic, and break with

⁴³ Mockus 38% - Santos 29%, según encuesta de Ipsos - Napoleon Franco,” *Semana*, April 26, 2010, <http://www.semana.com/noticias-actividad-politica/mockus-38-santos-29-segun-encuesta-ipsos-napoleon-franco/138145.aspx>

⁴⁴ Ricardo Plata, interview by author, Bogotá, Colombia, August 9, 2010.

⁴⁵ Juan Camilo Chávez, interview by author, Bogotá, Colombia, August 13, 2010.

politics as usual all caused the dramatic jump in his poll numbers, but ultimately cost him the election.

Honesty

Mockus's honesty and frank style brought him to the spotlight in the 1990s. The anti-politician, he spoke to people directly and gained the trust of his constituents. As his presidential campaign progressed, his popularity and appeal on a personal level was widespread. "He is the kind of person that people fall for politically when they meet him. He is so obviously a good person, and transparent in his intentions."⁴⁶ Initially, voters were attracted to his honesty, "Antanas does not tell lies. Traditional politicians tell lies, and promise things they can't accomplish. Antanas is not accustomed to lying. When we would try to prep him for debates, we would say 'Antanas, your opponent will say this. You have to respond with that.' He had a hard time with that. He would just say whatever occurred to him in the moment."⁴⁷ Antanas basked in the glow of his success as mayor of Bogotá. According to Chávez, "the success of the campaign in the first stage was that many of the things we marketed were not political. They were the nonpolitical aspects of his mayoral tenure. We emphasized the increase in the security, visual improvements, and infrastructure." Mockus's honesty got him elected twice as mayor of Bogotá, national and international attention, and poll numbers that increased from virtually irrelevant to a real threat to his opposition.

Eventually Mockus paid the price for speaking without a filter. The voters began to see him as unpredictable and a loose cannon. Mockus wanted to talk about the future and thus did not market his past. By May, Santos had Mockus on the defensive, and his honesty started to work against him: "The two biggest problems with Antanas's campaign were, first, that he did not sell his successes as mayor enough and, second, that he never censored his own speech. He would say things in a debate, and his campaign staff would immediately groan and say, 'what did he just say?'"⁴⁸ According to Chávez, first, Mockus did not stick to his selling points, "there weren't extensive criticisms of his

time as mayor. Almost everyone recognizes his mayoral tenure as a success... but his campaign couldn't capitalize on it. With a more aggressive campaign leadership, things would have been closer."⁴⁹ Second, Mockus floundered in debates. He fumbled over his words, offending people and frightening voters.

Mockus's gravest gaffe was stating that he "admired" Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez, who is hugely unpopular in Colombia. He later replaced "admired" with "respected", but the damage had been done. He also said that he would extradite a Colombian president to face justice in another country. That statement horrified voters at the thought of extraditing President Uribe, who boasted 70% support, to Ecuador to face charges brought against him. Juan Camilo Chávez explains, "he couldn't defend his ideas strongly, and accordingly in many people's point of view, he wouldn't be able to defend Colombia." Political analyst Camilo Rojas argues, "projecting only the image of honesty did not reflect the real preferences of the Colombian constituency," which Rojas said was "seeking the image of a leader, a manager, a commander in chief, not just an honest candidate."⁵⁰ Initially, voters were attracted to Mockus's honesty, frankness and integrity. However, as the election neared and the reality of Mockus as president set in, the Colombian people realized they were not ready to elect the unpredictable politician.

Academic Nature

Another distinctive quality of Antanas Mockus is his academic nature. His rational, thought-out approach to the city's problems was entirely unique. "Mockus was a completely different mayor because he behaved like a professor. He was very authentic."⁵¹ Throughout his time as mayor and during his campaign, Mockus thought, talked, and acted like a professor. Mockus called for rationality and challenged the people of Bogotá to consider their actions and why they behaved the way they did. He pushed for libraries and better schools. Mockus also managed to navigate away from the

⁴⁶ Ibid

⁴⁷ Ibid

⁴⁸ Ibid

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ "Where Did Mockus Go Wrong?" Colombia Reports June 21, 2010, <http://colombiareports.com/colombia-news/2010-elections/10382-where-did-mockus-go-wrong.html>

⁵¹ Juan Camilo Chávez.

negative stereotypes often associated with academics in order to be seen as one of the people, “even though his parents are foreign-born, he studied in France, and speaks four languages, the people never viewed him as an elitist. To them, he was just completely academic.”⁵² With his pedagogic policies and social experiments, Mockus treated Bogotá like a classroom. “Mockus said we ‘need an educator.’ He approached his governing position like he approaches education. He is not messianic or orthodox or the good father who sacrifices for his family. No, he assumed the role of an educator, and he said that if we cooperate we will all win.”⁵³ The educator of Bogotá continued his academic approach into his campaign for president.

The world of academics and that of politics are very different. While the educator image appealed widely when Mockus was mayor of Bogotá and at the start of his presidential run, it ended up making Mockus appear to be an overly individualistic, lofty intellectual. Mónica Pachón echoed the thoughts of many, “when you’re a politician, you can’t only talk about ideas.”⁵⁴ On the national stage, Mockus’s calls for rationality and pedagogy made him look weak in the face of candidates who boasted more practical priorities like security and economic growth. While direct communication with citizens may have worked in the city of Bogotá, nationally it seemed like a much more unrealistic goal. Pachón explains,

“He said we will go to the people directly and then to Congress. Here you do not go to the people first. You go right to Congress.” His continued calls for communication and dialogue also seemed impractical to the Colombian people, “Mockus said ‘we are going to argue and counter argue’. Where does he think he is? This is politics. Saying that idea to people is just irresponsible because it will only lead to disappointment. The senate is going to sit and counter argue? Give me a break.”

Voters were initially taken by the professor, but when the image failed to adapt to the national stage, it left them doubtful.

Professors rarely teach in groups, and accordingly, Mockus lacked the organizational skills to bring together an effective party machine. As the first independent mayor in Bogotá’s history, “much of Antanas’s team was academics, and very few were traditional politicians. There is a huge difference between the two sectors.”⁵⁵ This difference caused great difficulties in building a coalition that was more than merely a collection of individuals. “One of the biggest problems with the Green Party is that Mockus had never been a member of a party. He was completely an individual. Organizing was very difficult for him, and therefore the Green Party lacked structure.”⁵⁶ Towards the end of the presidential campaign, voters realized that it was nearly impossible to identify a clear platform from the Green Party. Many began to view the effort as just an outlet for opportunistic individuals. Pachón argues,

“I do not think there’s a party. It is a communion of good things that happened around certain characters, but it is difficult to describe that group as a united party. We cannot describe any common agenda, not even Mockus could translate the excitement of the people into a serious party. There were a lot of virtuous people around him, and lots of people with excellent experience, Peñalosa being one of them, Farjado being another, but Mockus does not show any administrative experience.”⁵⁷

Parties are an essential aspect of the political system in Colombia. Mockus’ lofty individualism made him ill fit to organize and lead a party. Without strong party backing, Mockus could not win the election.

Break with Politics as Usual

Mockus is perhaps best known for his break with politics as usual. As mayor his unconventional policies, battle against entrenched corruption, resistance against party reliance, and disregard for

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ Darío Restrepo.

⁵⁴ Mónica Pachón.

⁵⁵ Juan Camilo Chávez.

⁵⁶ Darío Restrepo.

⁵⁷ Mónica Pachón.

convention defined him. During his presidential campaign, he continued breaking norms of political behavior.

Mockus and his team of strategists employed campaign tactics that were unheard of previously in Colombian campaigns. To win the high office, they relied heavily on the Internet and capturing the attention of young people. Strategist Chávez recalls,

“We started with flyers, and then realized the Internet was the way to promote his successes and spread the word... It wasn’t even always our own initiative. People all over the world were asking us, ‘what can we do so that Antanas will win?’ They sent videos around and talked to Colombian communities everywhere. The campaign was completely dependent on the voter participation, especially young people. We utilized Facebook, Twitter, and Youtube. We invited people to change the way politicians get elected in Colombia, and people began to send, send, send.”⁵⁸

Mockus quickly became the most searched for candidate on Google and other search engines.⁵⁹ Because of the campaign’s utilization of the Internet, many once uninterested young people in Colombia began to pay attention. According to the Dialogue’s Michael Shifter, “Mockus’s message and style certainly had an appeal with previously apathetic youth. He deserves enormous credit for arousing considerable interest in a different kind of politics.”⁶⁰ Youth participation and the utilization of the Internet created a hugely successful campaign for Mockus.

The campaign’s focus was on interactive as opposed to static media. Social networks were of crucial importance. Mockus boasted nearly twice the number of fans on Facebook than any other candidate, with 817,682 “likes” to Juan Manuel Santos’s 472,996.⁶¹

“The success of social networks even surprised us. The New York Times, CNN, all sorts of international news organizations came to investigate because people were saying that Mockus was the most important politician online. In our largest predictions, we never anticipated how successful these networks would be. It wasn’t all our doing. We just tried to capitalize on what people, mostly young people, were already doing on their own.”⁶²

The campaign also employed the use of “flashmobs” to garner interest:

“They started off organically, completely organized by the people themselves. People would collect in a designated spot, take off their jackets to reveal Mockus T-shirts, and sit cross-legged on the ground in complete silence for three minutes. Then everyone raised his or her hands, still in silence. People around began to chant ‘Mockus! Mockus! Mockus!’ It was very exciting and had an incredible impact. Then we caught on, and began to organize flashmobs ourselves. It was a moment in which everyone could feel part of a movement, part of the ‘green wave’.”⁶³

The campaign built off the buzz around Mockus to create a sense of community.

The 2010 presidential election brought about the most intense civic participation in Colombia’s history. The feeling of working towards a common goal, and supporting an authentic rebel candidate fostered an infectious excitement. “The biggest success of our campaign was making people feel like they were part of a unique, important movement...Mockus was the politician that every campaign manager wanted to direct, because it was such an exciting challenge.”⁶⁴ By breaking with campaigning as usual and utilizing new tactics, the Mockus campaign was extremely effective at reaching a relatively limited demographic.

“Mockus certainly surpassed any other candidate in Colombian politics in the use of

⁵⁸ Juan Camilo Chávez.

⁵⁹ J.C. Martínez Duarte and J.G. Ortiz Abella, *Mockus: ¿Una Nueva Colombia?* (Bogotá: La Oveja Negra, 2010), 123.

⁶⁰ Michael Shifter.

⁶¹ J.C. Martínez Duarte and J.G. Ortiz Abella, *Mockus: ¿Una Nueva Colombia?* 123.

⁶² Juan Camilo Chávez.

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ Juan Camilo Chávez.

Facebook, which helped boost his candidacy, especially among the young living in major cities. Such social media are likely to continue to be important in Colombian, and Latin American, elections. Of course, as the final results showed, such techniques can be helpful, but are not enough to insure victory, as Mockus discovered.”⁶⁵

Although the Mockus campaign was surrounded by an excited fervor and mobilized many previously dispassionate youth, it still failed to win Mockus the presidency for several reasons.

The largest issue was that Mockus’s support was overwhelming limited to young people in urban areas. Only approximately 30% of Colombia’s population is connected to the Internet.⁶⁶ With such a heavy reliance on the Internet and urban gatherings, many voters saw Antanas Mockus as a youthful fad, someone who was not prepared to take on the important office of the executive.

“A large majority of the campaign was run by people under 30. It was very well organized internally. If you went to a rally, you would see the vast majority were young people... Sometimes this worked against Antanas. Adults would say that he was a fad. They weren’t connected to the social networks. They didn’t think he was serious.”⁶⁷

Mockus also continued to break the norms of political campaigning by refusing to send out transportation to take supporters to the polls, because he thought it was buying votes. In Colombia, however, it is a commonplace campaign tactic among all parties. This failure to reach out to voters and enable them to get to the polls cost Mockus thousands of votes. What had won the Mockus campaign so much Internet traffic, international press, and excitement among youth voters, ultimately cost Mockus a majority of votes among serious, older, and rural voters.

The Betrayal of Distinctive Characteristics and the Loss of the Election

Antanas Mockus broke the mold in many ways. He was honest at a point when corruption had become the norm, he blended the two normally separate worlds of academics and politics, and he invigorated traditional campaigning by reaching out to voters via interactive social media. All these rebellions excited young voters and created an audible buzz around Antanas Mockus. However, voters also saw him as a loose cannon, lofty intellectual, and a product of youth excitement.

VI. CONCLUSION: THE FUTURE OF THE GREEN PARTY

After the June 2010 election, many questions remain. Is the Green Party a united coalition or a collection of opportunistic individuals? Was their relative success due to the charisma of Antanas Mockus or did the party itself pick up and capitalize on new issues important to the Colombian people? And finally, what is the future of the Green Party?

Some argue that the reason Mockus and the Green party saw success in the election cycle of 2010 is because it is a unified coalition of important players who all believe in good governance and anti-corruption. According to Michael Shifter, “the Green Party is surely a collective effort, which explains why it got some traction this past electoral cycle. Mockus won the primary election, but the other former mayors, his colleagues, were also crucial to the Green Party’s rise and will be vital if it to play an effective role in the country’s current political context.”⁶⁸ Ricardo Plata believed that the Green Party label was not easy to give Mockus’s coalition, but that it was indeed a coalition: “It’s hard to label these guys. They are not stereotypical in their points of views.”⁶⁹ If the Green Party is a unified coalition, it is bound to play an important role in future elections.

However, others believe that opportunistic individuals united under the banner of the Green Party without necessarily believing in a common message. Professor Mónica Pachón is even wary of the Green Party name, regarding “this idea of the ‘Green’ Party. They are not environmental or ecological. They just needed a party, and they made

⁶⁵ Michael Shifter.

⁶⁶ TNS survey on Digital Life, October 2010.

⁶⁷ Juan Camilo Chávez.

⁶⁸ Michael Shifter.

⁶⁹ Ricardo Plata.

it a business transaction. It was completely opportunistic.”⁷⁰ She disagrees that campaign members Peñalosa and Fajardo, who believe “politics is politics” and are “realistas”, have much in common with the ideological Mockus. She claims both, “made a successful campaign of giving people what they want, and they wanted independent politics.”⁷¹ Put even more bluntly, Pachón believes, “they are not a party. They are followers. They don’t share ideology.”⁷² If the Green Party is in fact politicians in the right place at the right time, it will face an uphill battle maintaining popularity as the country’s agenda changes.

Many are conflicted as to whether the root of the phenomenon was in the Green Party or solely in Mockus himself. Plata summarizes the two sides. On the one hand, “people inside and outside of Colombia wanted to ride the ‘green wave’ and that could not have happened without the legacy of Mockus.”⁷³ However, in many ways the Green Party also succeeded at capitalizing on the evolving politics and sentiments of the Colombian people, “Mockus does have the support of many people, but the green wave is really the transfer into the spotlight of the discontent of the growing middle class that corruption shouldn’t be tolerated and that education is the way to succeed in life... The Green Party could have existed without Mockus. Maybe it came up faster because of him. Something like it existed in Fajardo. But it would have happened.”⁷⁴ If the Green Party was a force that grew out of popular sentiment, it is likely to continue to play a definitive role in Colombia politics.

Moving forward, the Green Party’s performance in the 2010 presidential election by no means assured them future success, and they must take several pragmatic steps to remain relevant to Colombian voters. Shifter concludes, “it will take a lot more Mockus, however appealing he might be, to fundamentally change the political culture in Colombia, not to mention Latin America. His impact beyond Colombia has been minimal and in Colombia it will depend on whether he is able to

sustain the momentum he helped build and keep pressing the crucial themes of anti-corruption and good governance.”⁷⁵ The Green Party will have to organize better and think more strategically to ensure its survival. For starters, they will have to concentrate on building representation in the Congress, so that if they do elect one of their own to the presidency, he or she would actually be able to pursue and accomplish Green Party initiatives. Pachón concedes, “for Mockus, this is it, but with the right focus and work, the Green Party can become a decisive political force.”⁷⁶ The future success of the Green Party will depend on whether they can begin to behave like a political party.

The Green Party was too ahead of its time to be elected, but it burst onto the national stage and captured the voters’ attention. Beyond the draw of mere personality politics, the Green Party’s success was rooted in its ability to perceive new trends and developments in Colombia. First, the Green Party understood the growing importance of the Internet and social networks in Colombia. Its campaign allowed voters to feel they were a part of a revolutionary movement, thereby generating considerable excitement. Second, the Party grew out of Colombia’s recent political stability. Ten years ago the country was on the brink of state failure, but today Colombia is thriving. The Green Party capitalized on this increasing sense of stability to present fresh, different ideas. It allowed voters to picture a government that could make incredible changes under a stable Colombia.

However, only about a third of Colombians have access to Internet and the country is not yet totally stable. Therefore, Colombia did not leap into the unknown and elect Antanas Mockus. Despite the dramatic ups and downs of the lead-up to the election, Colombia ultimately elected the candidate with whom it felt more comfortable. Juan Manuel Santos not only has the political chops and adroitness to be president, but he also represented the safe choice. Colombians knew that Santos would be relatively predictable and not try and turn their country into a social experiment. He would behave responsibly in the international arena, while making strides toward Colombia’s goals. Most of all, Santos would abide by conventions and respect

⁷⁰ Mónica Pachón.

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² Ibid.

⁷³ Ricardo Plata.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ Michael Shifter.

⁷⁶ Ricardo Plata.

the game of politics, because he ultimately represents politics as usual.

The Green Party will be only marginally successful in the future, because it is too disorganized, its members are too different, and its focus is too much on the future and not enough on the present. However, the Green Party succeeded in identifying and profiting from powerful new trends in Colombia that are not going away. No candidate in the next election cycle will be able to win without capitalizing on Colombia's growing number of Internet users or the feeling of excitement derived from recent stabilization. Antanas Mockus and the Green Party may have lost the race, but they succeeded in changing the dialogue in Colombian politics and ushering in a vision of the country's future.

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About the Contributors

Anna Thiergartner is a senior at the George Washington University where she majors in International Affairs with concentrations in Conflict and Security and the Middle East, as well as a second major in History. During her time as an undergraduate, she obtained limited professional proficiency in Arabic and studied abroad in Amman, Jordan. She hopes to pursue a graduate degree in History and a career in diplomacy.



Omar Quinonez was born in 1988 in El Paso Texas. He lived in Juarez Mexico until he was 15 years old before moving to Denver, Colorado in 2004. He is currently a senior at UC Denver majoring in History, Philosophy, and Political Science. His interests include: international political economy, U.S. foreign policy, economic development, 19th and 20th century history, and the works of philosophers such as G.W.F. Hegel, Karl Marx, Martin Heidegger, Jean-Paul Sartre, and Slavoj Zizek.



Andrea Delmar Sentías is receiving her Bachelors in International Relations from Syracuse University in the summer of 2011. Academic concentrations include Latin America and the global political economy. She became interested in International Relations and Latin American politics due to her Mexican heritage. Andrea feels passionately about indigenous and human rights because she believes all individuals are entitled to opportunities and a safe political environment. Andrea plans to pursue a career in the human rights field, involving nongovernment organizations and international law.



Elise Boruvka graduated from Indiana University with an honors degree in International Studies, concentrating on international communication and Spanish-speaking countries. During her undergraduate studies, she completed a language and culture immersion program in Spain and earned a certificate in the Liberal Arts and Management Program at IU.



Cory Siskind graduated Magna Cum Laude in February, 2011 from Tufts University with a major in International Relations and a minor in Latin American Studies. Cory also attended the University of Buenos Aires in Argentina, where she conducted research in collaboration with the University. She was a Tisch School of Active Citizenship Summer Scholar and, as an Undergraduate Research Fund Grant Recipient, Cory traveled to Bogotá, Colombia to complete research for her Latin American Studies capstone project. Cory now works for the Inter-American Dialogue in Washington DC.

